

THE

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ART. I.—GOETHE.\*

A DISSERTATION BY DOCTOR RAUCH.

Wer das Dichten will verstehen  
Muss ins Land der Dichtung gehn.  
Wer den Dichter will verstehen  
Muss in Dichter's Lande gehn.

The time when Goethe appeared among us, was barren and uninteresting. The Muses seemed to have retired from our globe and to have given up our race to its dry notions of utility and the pursuit of it in life and science. The Parnassus of Germany especially had been converted into a large farm, the temple of Apollo into a barn, and Pegasus had become a strong, stout working horse. A tedious and lifeless spirit pervaded all sciences, and there

\* The substance of this elaborate Dissertation on the Life and Character of the great German Poet, was originally delivered by Doctor Rauch as a Lecture before the Goethean Literary Society of "Marshall College," on the 28th of August, 1839. At the solicitation of many persons who heard it, the Discourse was subsequently revised, in part rewritten, and very much enlarged, with the view to publication in the form of a pamphlet or small volume. For what reasons the work never made its appearance we are not informed. The manuscript remained in the hands of Dr. Traill Green of Easton, Pa., a brother-in-law of the Author, to whose kind consideration the Editors are now indebted for the privilege of giving this beautiful and philosophical literary production a place in the *Mercersburg Review*.

We publish it as it came from the pen of Doctor Rauch, without any additions or omissions, or any modifications of language, such only excepted as the idioms of the English language require.—Edu.

was no sign of a higher and nobler life any where visible. But Goethe was not sent alone into this world ; he was accompanied by a number of kindred geniuses. In *the arts* we see at his side a Thorwaldsen, Rauch, Mozart, Weber, Beethoven, Zelter, Meyer, West ; in *poetry*, Klopstock, Lessing, Wieland, Herder, Schiller, Jean Paul, Byron, Moore, Burns and Manzoni ; in *philosophy*, Kant, Jacobi, Fichte, Schelling and Hegel ; in *history*, John von Müller ; in *theology*, Schleiermacher and Daub ; and who could enumerate all the great names, from which philosophy and all the other sciences received a new impulse ! Thus when Goethe was given to us for a while, the world of spirit poured out its cornucopia upon Germany, and with a magic wand suddenly opened the fountains of Beauty, Truth and Nobleness. As when a plentiful and mild shower has followed a long drought, nature assumes at once a vigorous covering of verdure, so the world of mind budded and shot forth its twigs and flowers in every direction, to witness and enjoy the presence of him, whose name will stand worthily only by the side of Shakspeare, Homer, Dante and Calderon.

In attempting to give some idea of a man, who was the centre and organ of so rich an age, I feel like the capitalist, who, in possession of great wealth, is at a loss how to employ it to the best advantage. For manifold are the aspects, under which Goethe might be viewed, and though great under any, there are no doubt some which will exhibit him more fully than others. I might follow him from his early youth and show the struggle he had to endure, not only in calling forth a new life, but in removing an inveterate and false one ; not only in recalling the Muses and in creating an entirely fresh world of beauty, but also in forming the taste of the public for it. I might show how he rose from an insignificant station in life to the highest except one, that of a Sovereign, and how by a conscious and clear activity, by a well formed plan, by a resolute and firm character, and by an admirable adaptation of the best means to the wisest and always well known

ends and intentions, he gradually gained such authority and reputation, that Princes, Kings and Emperors paid him homage; that his words and opinions became laws in the literary world; that as a light-house to the mariner, he became the guiding star of his contemporaries in every science; that every letter he wrote was considered public property and preserved as such; and that his power continued not only undiminished, but increasing to the end of his days.

Interesting and instructive as it might be to unfold so rich a life, I must at present endeavor to resist inclination and confine myself to a consideration of what Goethe was as a Poet and as a moral man, without asking how and by what process he arrived at such unprecedented greatness. But to understand him as a Poet, it will be indispensable to know his views on Poetry. It would indeed be impossible to judge correctly of Goethe, of his conscientious activity, of his devotedness to his art, if we should not know what it was to him. A man whose life was in every respect the product of his own will, who took nothing, nature had given him, without impressing the stamp of his own genius upon it, must no doubt have known what the final end of his labor and activity, the highest object of all his affections and the soul of his life, was. Yet only the like can understand the like, and without spirit on our part we will not be able to appreciate his spirit; without poetry in ourselves we will not be able to discern poetry in him. Plato, shortly before his death, in a vision saw himself converted into a white swan, flying from branch to branch of a tree, whose top pierced the clouds of heaven. Many were in pursuit of him, but none were able to overtake him. While in the swan and the tree the idea of immortality presents itself, we cannot but perceive in his pursuers those who tried but were unable to understand his works. Thus Goethe's works will always attract many and no doubt equal their desires, yet only those will discover all they contain who are willing to bestow deep study and labor upon them. Nothing can, however, facilitate

this worthy task more than the knowledge of the leading idea which the great Poet desired to carry out in all his works. Let this *idea* engage us for a few moments.

Poetry, or Art in general, is frequently considered merely as an imitation of nature, and its great end and object to attain to the highest resemblance. The grapes of Zeuxis, picked at by pigeons; the horse of Appelles neighed at by horses; the curtain that deceived even the Painter; and the painted insects that invited the attacks of the monkey, will always be spoken of as the highest attainments of imitative art. But while we must admire the skill and success of such faithful imitations, we must admit that if art were nothing more than an imitation of nature and history, Goethe's life would have been ill-spent; for if any thing be superfluous, the trifling repetition of a mere natural object would be so. The flower which I have in my garden, blooms and exhales fragrance, but its representation has no internal organism, no life, no vigor; it can only give the external form, the appearance of life, but not life itself; it may attract the birds and excite their appetite, but can not satisfy it. Thus art, instead of leading us into the sphere of Truth, would lead us into that of deception. No doubt it is for this reason, that the Mohammedans do not allow works of art in their temples; for they say, the artist can not give life to his representations, and on the day of judgment they will rise up against him and demand a soul of him, while he will be unable to comply with this just request. If it be said, that it is the skillful success in effecting a striking resemblance, which is the object of our pleasure and admiration rather than the resemblance itself, we will have to grant more nobleness to the *mechanical* than to the fine arts, since the former are no less skillful, and at the same time more useful, than the latter. Nor could the continued exercise of so useful a skill entertain us for a long time. But as the ventriloquist soon ceases to amuse, so we would quickly grow weary of this mere mock-

ery of art. What is it that interests us in the plaintive notes of the nightingale that, sitting in a shady grove, fills the valley with its melancholy, pure, full and swelling sounds? Is it not the idea, entertained by the Greeks, that the little songster breathes forth its soul in grief, that it is capable of feeling sorrow like ourselves and of giving vent to it in music. It is this that causes our delight in listening to the nightingale, while the most skillful imitation would fail to interest us. We like to have nature raised to us and imitate man, but do not desire on our part to condescend and mock nature. If mere skill in imitation be all that interests us in art, it matters little on what that skill is exercised, whether on a straw or a lily, whether on a reptile or an eagle, whether on the beautiful or the disgusting.\*

While Goethe protests against such views, he acknowledges, nevertheless, that Poetry can not do without nature; that the poetical ought neither to be unnatural and artificial, nor exactly as it is found in nature. So he says of his *Wahlderwandschaften*: "There is nothing in them which I did not experience and yet there is nothing as I experienced it." Again of "*Dichtung und Wahrheit*" or his Biography: "Every real truth becomes poetical only by its symbolical tendency, by ascending with its contents into higher regions. Not the mere occurrence, but its significance entitles a fact to admission into Poetry." By the word *fiction* or *Dichtung* is therefore not meant that some parts of Goethe's Autobiography were untrue; *all* had really occurred, yet only such facts were selected from the rich experience of the Poet as had peculiar significance; again the Poet would say by that term that he had given more than life gave him, for he knew how to make visible the whole depth of truth, which often lies concealed beneath the surface of ordinary occurrences; and finally he would say that the *life of a Poet is the Poetry of life!* "The Poet must go farther than the Historian," Goethe says in another place, "and if pos-

\* Hegel's *Aesthetik*, Vol. I, Introduction.

sible he must give something better."† Once he was asked whether a certain beautiful landscape of Reubens was not taken from nature, and he replied: "By no means, for such a picture has never been seen in nature, this we owe to the poetical genius of Reubens." So he said of Claude Lorrain's pictures: "They are full of truth, but not a trace of common reality is in them. Lorrain knew the world and used it as means to express the world of his beautiful soul." Again he said: "There are certain master pieces in great number, in which Greek artists not only equalled nature, but surpassed it. The English, the best horsemen in the world, must now admit the heads of two horses carved in old times, to be so perfect in their form that there are no races on earth to equal them. These heads are of the best Greek time, and if such works surprise us, we must not suppose that those artists had a more perfect nature to copy, but that they viewed nature with the greatness of their minds."

Ridiculous as it is to say in good earnest that Music, the great works of Haydn, Mozart, Haendel, Beethooven

† "Manzoni wants nothing," Goethe once said, "except to know how good a Poet he is and what rights he has as such. He has much respect for history and for this reason loves to add to his works some explanations, by which he shows how faithfully he has followed the facts of history. Now his facts may be historical, but his characters are not, as little as my *Thoas* and *Iphigenia*. No Poet has ever known the historical characters which he represents, and if he had known them, he would not have been able to use them as they were. The Poet must know what effects they will produce and form his characters accordingly. The characters of Sophocles bear all of them something of the high soul of the great poet; so the characters of Shakspere of his." Eckerman I, 326. A poetical character is not less true on this account, for it is what it *ought to be*; as the great soul of the poet conceives it in all its perfections, so he gives it again, while characters in life are rendered imperfect by desires and passions, by external and internal impediments. As the truth of moral Philosophy, that of its laws and duties is greater and more to be valued than the truth, that certain actions have occurred, which are at variance with these laws,—so is the *truly* poetical character worth more than the historical, since it represents the *ideal* of true character by far better than the latter. It is in this sense, that we must take the words of the celebrated and learned Solger in his *Aesthetik*: "Where Portrait-Painting commences all *true art* ceases." More mechanical execution and skill are all that is requisite for the Portrait Painter.

are imitations of the music of nature, which, if there be any, has neither *harmony* nor *melody*, or that the Cathedral of Strassburg or the temples of the Greeks are mere copies of caves and grottoes,—the idea has nevertheless been spread to a considerable extent, and Goethe's views will no doubt meet with opposition among many. For while there those who, like Sancho Pansa, praise him who invented sleep, there are others who attribute more wisdom to animals than to man and send the lords of creation to school to the fish, to learn to swim, to the beaver to learn architecture, to the bird to learn music. Others finally admit Truth to be no where, except in a dry and uninteresting reality. With them the mere existence of a thing is its truth, and its usefulness its value. Real truth, however, exists only in the sphere of mind, and genuine reality is not the external existence of an object but the general nature, realizing itself in it, the fact that it, as an individual, belongs to a species which will continue to live as long as the world stands, while the individuals in which the species lives, will one after another disappear. But the species and kind, the general law and nature, of a thing become known only to the mind of man, while nature, which produces it, is unconscious of it. Hence it is correct to say, that *real truth* exists only in the sphere of mind. A falsehood no doubt has reality, but certainly not truth. Claude Lorrain, one of the greatest Painters, agreed with Goethe, for he called the general nature or idea of a picture its truth, and whenever he parted with one of his works, fully executed, he would draw a sketch of its general idea in a book, called by him "*Liber veritatis*."

Without criticising any other view concerning the nature and object of art, I will endeavor to give that of Goethe, which ever since Schiller first pronounced it, has been the prevailing one throughout Germany. I shall base my representation of this view on the following words of our Poet:

"The Poet," he says, "seizes the individual and represents by it the General."

We might for a moment be induced to believe, that "the

General" here was merely "*the Common*;" that consequently, on the one hand, it meant the *external resemblance* of things, or, on the other, that which in history, characters and occurrences will regularly repeat itself under similar circumstances. Such a view might appear to be strengthened by an appeal to Zeuxis, who, according to Cicero, demanded the five most beautiful ladies of his time, in order to form a statue of Helena for the city of Crotona. But Cicero was neither great as a Poet nor as a Philosopher, and his authority in such things, it would betray ignorance to rely on. While we admit the fact, we must draw a different inference from it, for such an external composition of parts would never produce a beautiful whole. The artist, in making this demand, no doubt bore an image of beauty in his mind, which he nowhere found fully realized, or else he would never have discovered the defects of each of these ladies, but have been satisfied with the most beautiful among them. So our artists of the present day study anatomy, not to gain their ideas of beauty from it, but to learn the proportions of the human frame.

As it is a favorite idea with many that artists collect the most beautiful parts of different beings of the same class and unite them in one, it may be well to illustrate this subject somewhat more fully. No one will indeed hesitate to admit a great difference between the jumping and shouting of the savage, and the dance, regulated by time and measure. With the savage jumping is nothing else than the wild, external expression of a deep, internal emotion, and the stronger the latter the more irregular and ungraceful the former will be. Now I ask, whether it would be possible to create the graceful, the constantly changing and still regularly returning well proportioned motions of the dance of civilized nations by selecting the choicest jumps of the savage? There is something else required besides the internal emotion and its external muscular expression, and that is the *free conception* of beauty in motion and the power to call it into life. This conception may be called forth by the sight of the leaping of the savage, but is not derived from it.

No one could produce a bell with a full and sonorous sound by patching pieces of different bells together ; nor could the Poet, if this notion were true, be said any longer to possess a *creative* imagination, but merely the art of *making* skillful combinations ; poetical inspiration would be less valuable, than mathematical calculation and design.

“ *The General*,” which Goethe meant, is

First, in the sphere of nature *the type, the image, the power*, which produces every where the individual beings. Ever since the system of involution has been discarded by Physiologists, it has been admitted on all sides, that in the seed of every plant a power is contained, which will, all conditions being favorable, not only germinate, but *form* such parts as are demanded by the image slumbering in this power, invisibly, yet with the full energy necessary to realize itself. The nature of this power is *generality*, for it preserves the genus and species in every individual so much, that the influence of no elements can make it pass over from one kind into another. This generality we have called for our purpose the image or type, which is to be represented by the individual. When we examine, for instance, the egg of a bird, we can not discover the formation of any part ; neither the beak, nor the head, nor the body and its plumage, nor the eye is yet visible. Yet the power is there, to form all these parts according to the image, that lives and works in it. This power, as it is general and productive according to a certain law, so it is likewise infinite, for it is it that makes the acorn, which decays before me and disappears in the ground, reappear high on the top of the tree. According to this explanation of the term, “ *General*,” Beauty, in the view of Goethe, is the union of the general and individual, of the Infinite and Finite, of the *Ideal* (in the true sense of the word) and *Actual*.” The *Individual*, the *Finite*, the *Actual* may be seen with the eye or heard with the ear ; the *General*, the *Infinite*, the *Ideal* is only accessible to *thought* ; where both are so united, that the one seems fully to represent the other, that no reflexion, no deliberation is required to perceive the *Infinite* in the *Finite*, that consequently *Thought*

and *Perception* coalesce in us as they are united in an object, we have the Feeling of Beauty. What is it, that we call *beautiful* in nature? Certainly not any thing material or physical; not any quality of matter; not the merely agreeable, or that which affects our senses conformably to their nature. The Beautiful in nature is no doubt the *Individual* which presents most perfectly its species or type.

It is true, we speak of beautiful sounds and colors, but then we mean their purity and clearness,\* which please us. We speak also of beautiful landscapes in which the most varied scenery with villages, rivulets, roads and luxuriant vegetation form one picture, but here it is the *union* of the manifold, that interests us. So when we speak of a beautiful mild moonlight, of the loveliness of rest and silence reigning throughout nature, of the murmuring of a brook as it passes over its pebbly bed, of a soft, uniform green spread over the fields, it is the disposition, into which we are transferred by them, that makes us call them *beautiful*. Hence Poets use these external objects frequently, to make their feelings known by them and to excite the same emotions in others. On the other hand many objects, beautiful in themselves, are considered ugly by us, because we never have examined them, or because we fear them and for this reason feel an aversion to them. Nothing can appear beautiful to us that excites in us either aversion to or desire for it, for as soon as we consider it in the form of means, it ceases to be what it must be in the sphere of beauty, its own end. In many cases this aversion might be overcome and the experience of Leibnitz be repeated, who, after examining an insect much hated by him, laid it down full of admiration. In other cases the want of liveliness and activity, the unwieldiness of form, its distance from what we consider the standard of beauty, the imperfect penetration of form and mass, may cause us to feel always disgusted with many creatures; whilst the Poet's eye will nevertheless frequently discover beauty, where ours can see none !

\* Hegel's Aesthetik. Introduction.

But the sphere of Beauty extends farther than that of nature. Some indeed have confined it to the sense of sight, yet while I admit that other senses have nothing to do with it, the ear undoubtedly has, since music, the Creation of Haydn, for instance, the Messiah of Haendel, and the Don Juan of Mozart, contain beauty no less than the Cathedral at Strassburg or the temple of Apollo. Really true Beauty exists only in the region of mind; if nature has many and various lovely sounds, man alone has melody and harmony; if nature has many scattered leaves of the original beauty, man possesses the whole, full and proud flower. As the eye of a beautiful lady, from which spirit and mind flash forth, cannot be equalled by any eye of nature, not even by that of the Gazelle; as the eye of the bird that spies the bursting bud, is not only more artificial, but also more beautiful than it;—so is the beauty of mind superior to that of nature. We will, therefore, in a few words have to consider, what Goethe's term, "*the General*" means.

Secondly, in *the sphere of mind*. Here it signifies the *Conception*, the *thought*, the *idea*; not arbitrary thoughts and ideas indeed, but such as will be produced by all men, who think according to the laws of reason. Every thought is infinite, its representation finite. Whether I say now, that the Poet represents the Infinite by the Finite, or that he exhibits Truth in a sensual form, it is the same. This it will be easy to illustrate. When, for instance, the artist by the power of his imagination produces the thought of an eternal, ever blooming youth and lays it in an image, which is susceptible of representing it, we shall, when his skillful chisel has rendered it visible, see before us the statue of Apollo. Here we perceive the strength of mature years wedded to the softest forms of the most beautiful spring of youth. Great and strong, these forms are fit to execute noble purposes. The bloom of health spread over the whole form and strength, is ready to break forth, like the day whose full morning glow gilds the mountain tops. Or, when the artist conceives the idea of swiftness and unites it in himself with an image, the statue of Juno will

start forth from his hands, light and easy, scarcely touching the soil, on which she treads. Her swiftness is like the thought of a man, that having travelled much, says: "Here I have been and Thera." Or, when an artist conceives the thought, beautiful in itself, that all beauty flows forth from the Lord and leads back to Him, and when he unites it with an image, we will, if externalized, see a winged angel whose form is the effluence of harmony and whose face, full of peace and happiness, rests in the light of the Lord.

If the question be asked: What need is there of art and Poetry? I would answer, that the human mind cannot rest, until it has produced in the highest possible perfection, what its ideas sketch forth, but cannot discover in reality. The genius of the artist sees the imperfect beauties of nature and conceiving at their call the true ideal of Beauty, he becomes inspired, his whole mind is absorbed by them, and his raised imagination penetrates his whole system so entirely, that, be it by the finger, as with the Painter, or by the hand, as with the Sculptor, or by the lips and language, as with the Poet, it becomes the organ of his inspiration; and like Phidias, who kneeled before his own Jupiter, the statue of wisdom, might and mildness, he considers his productions the effects of higher powers. So it is with the beauty of mind; here also no *action*, no *character*, no *situation* is perfectly beautiful, but defective in some respect or other. An *action* may be said to be beautiful, when it represents the complete union of an individual will with a general law, and when this union proceeds freely and wholly from will. But in every real action of man the struggle of individual wishes and desires with the general duty, is more or less perceptible; nor do actions proceed wholly from within, but are much determined by external circumstances. Again a *character* is beautiful, when an individual will is so wedded to a general moral principle that all its actions proceed from this harmony and union. But even the best man is dependent in some degree on external circumstances; his activity is frequently

no less exacted of him than it flows forth spontaneously from him ; laws, institutions, wants, desires influence him ; no one can therefore claim all he does as his own, or as having been designed by him. Hence the beauty of the most heroic and independent character will remain imperfect. And so it is finally with every *historical* truth. However pure the truth may be which rests in the bosom of its agents, however full and developed, hundreds of accidental circumstances will attach themselves to its execution, and instead of being clearly and transparently exhibited, it is only darkened and obscured by them. The artist or Poet conceives the true idea of genuine actions, characters and situations, and representing them, he gives us something far better and more true, than life affords. If these remarks need further proof, I would add to the declaration of Goethe, those of two of the greatest Italian Painters, Guido and Raphael, both of whom agreed that they could not find the elements for the beauties of their archangels in all created nature. Raphael distinctly says: "As I cannot find the beauty I seek for any where, I am in the habit of using an *idea* of beauty, for which I am indebted to my imagination." Something similar Mozart also stated in a letter to a friend.

The office of the Poet is therefore a high and noble one. He exhibits to us the Invisible in a visible form ; the Infinite in the Finite ; the Ideal in the Actual ; the General in the Individual. He frees the Essential from its many accidental parts ; he makes sensible objects the receptacles of his lofty conceptions. Above the confusion of life, his pure and noble soul perceives every where the magic rod, with which to dispel the enchantments and solve the enigmas of life. For in his bosom the flower of wisdom springs, and like a bird that nestles on the mountain tops and lives on buds and fruits, he plucks the finest and most beautiful of all and presents it to the world, without expecting or receiving any reward.

Ich singe wie der Vogel singt,  
Der in den Zweigen wohnt,  
Das Lied, das aus der Kehle dringt  
Ist Lohn, der reichlich lohnet.

Like a higher being, he becomes the organ by which whatever darkly moves our hearts is made manifest to all; for he feels clearly and distinctly whatever agitates or quiets the human breast. He opens the secret sources of all that is noble and good and true and beautiful; he awakens in us a susceptibility for all this and nourishes and strengthens it. He purifies our views and desires by making us acquainted with the highest and best of all. The true Poet is the friend of God and of men. When Psyche, the youngest of three sisters, had been persuaded by the other two who lived to the world and themselves, to forsake her intercourse with the gods, and follow them,—she became sad and mourned, for having once lost the high privilege she was unable to recover it by her own power. Then Pan, the god of song and melody, approached to console her, and persuade her to deny herself and thus regain the favor of the gods. She followed the advice, and her intimacy with Olympus, the seat both of gods and Poets, was restored. From that time Poets were considered Teachers and Prophets among the nations, for they praised the good and censured the evil; they encouraged to noble deeds and deterred from the ignoble.

Thus we have gained the proper rank for the true and real artist. His aim is as noble as that of Science, but the means employed are different. Science exhibits all individual cases under general rules, and to understand them demands much thinking and a disciplined mind. Art represents the general in the individual, and every one will consciously or unconsciously be charmed by it. Science may try to expound logically the general nature of love; the artist shows its power at once by placing the youthful Eros upon the Lion's back, guiding him with a silken cord. Moral Philosophy will tell us what man *ought* to be, Poetry holds up to us truly finished moral characters, and thus incites and encourages us to attempt the introducing of Moral Philosophy into our lives.

I felt myself constrained to trespass on the patience of my readers in developing the nature of art, for two reasons.

First, because many entertain views on this noble subject derogatory to true artists. They of course would not be able to appreciate Goethe's conscientious labors. To invite them to lay aside for awhile their views and enter those of Goethe, was my first desire. But in the second place, I should not like to appear to be reviewing the life of one who sung only to the idle and lived merely for the entertainment of others. I will not deny that there are Poets whose only aim it is to pass away time; there are bunglers in every science and there will be Munchhausens in every department of fine arts. But where this is the aim of Poetry, poetical inspiration can certainly not rise very high, and in proportion as this is low the products of such men will be unpoetical, and instead of ranging with Poets they ought to be ranked with jugglers, jesters and the like.

I shall now pass over to the qualifications of Goethe as a Poet.

In his earliest youth already his great talent was strongly indicated, and one of his principal characteristics was the plastic, practical and productive tendency of his mind. What is said of Ovid: *Quidquid volebat scribere, versus erat*, may be said with still more truth of Goethe; for every abstract idea had to receive form and shape. Whatever he studied was to be fashioned anew by his genius, or to be arranged better and exhibited more clearly. When as a boy he studied Mathematics, he was constantly engaged with the pencil in his hands. Every book he read, became for him only material, which if it interested him was to be transformed, and a new, a more beautiful form was always the result. Want of proportion and harmony, disorder and confusion he could not endure, and when he could not improve or mend such a sight he would silently turn away from it. He was passionately fond of painting and though his talent for it seems not to have risen above mediocrity, the productive and plastic tendency of his mind would impel him to draw upon paper whatever interested him in nature. This inclination to beautiful forms was so great in him and so irresistible, that a few moments before his death he not only saw most beautiful apparitions,

but when his voice failed, he drew figures in the air as he was wont in days of health, and his importunate desire to communicate continued until his hand sank powerless upon his limbs.\*

His knowledge of characters, of passions, inclinations, of man in general may be said to have been intuitive. "If I hear a man speak a quarter of an hour," he once said, "I will make him speak two hours, without mistaking his true character." Whilst his works teem with the most sound experience and observation, he nevertheless asserts, that if he had not carried the world in himself by "*anticipation*," he should have been blind with seeing eyes and all his observations would have been a fruitless effort.

Waer' nicht das Auge sonnenhaft  
Wie koennten wir das Licht erblicken?  
Was' nicht in uns des Gottes eig'ne Kraft,  
Wie koennt uns Gdettlichen entzuecken?

At another time he said: "Had I waited with my representations of the world, until I should have known it, I would have lost every desire to represent it. This desire was really lost, when I learned that the world was as I had represented it." These confessions are remarkable and strongly show the error of those, who, because they justly attack ready made and innate ideas, believe in no power that may, when elicited by external objects, produce them, and consequently make all our knowledge dependent on external experience. The region of hope, of love, of hatred, of

\* It certainly is remarkable, that Goethe's great genius discovered its proper sphere so early. We are accustomed to see musical talent exhibit itself soon; Mozart, for instance, when six years old, discovered the *exact* difference between two violins which he heard in succession, the one a day after the other. So he composed beautiful pieces, while yet a child. But the Musician bears his whole art in his bosom; the world can give him nothing; he demands no nourishment from without. In the infancy of Linneus, a flower placed in his hands would quiet him more readily than any other toy. Pascal's talent for Mathematics was indicated in his earliest youth. With Goethe, all the occurrences of his life and all his studies were changed into poems when he was a boy. Correggio, on the other hand, perceived his great genius and its corresponding objective sphere only, when once he had lost himself in admiring a picture of Raphael. His words are well known: *Anch' io sono pittore!*

despair is born in and with us; and so all the forms of passion. The Poet has them by intuition, because he needs only to look into his own nature, to perceive that of others. But the knowledge of courts, parliaments, history, is not innate, and in order not to violate such truths the Poet needs tradition and experience. So, for instance, in Faust, the Poet could easily represent from his own feelings wearisomeness in Faust, the emotions of love in Gretchen by mere intuition, but to say:

*Wie traurig steigt die unvollkommen Scheibe  
des späten Monds mit feuchter Gluth heran,*  
he must have observed nature." "The Poet," Goethe once said, "needs not much experience to delineate characters, he possesses the knowledge of human nature as a talent. I wrote my Goetz von Berlichingen while yet young, and ten years after I was astonished at the truth of my representation. I had never experienced any thing of the kind and had consequently the knowledge of those situations and characters by anticipation." So when in Italy, Goethe was surprised to hear that a number of scenes had really occurred in the Netherlands, as he describes them in his Egmont, yet they were all of them, as he asserts, the products of his imagination. Characters and situations are based on something rational, which will necessarily exhibit itself in the same manner at all times and in all climates. After such statements, Goethe no doubt has a right to say, "that a great and elevated nature must distinguish the Poet. Whatever the world adds by experience, must remain subordinate to his poetical genius and must only excite or induce his genius to speak and to reign. This nature of the Poet must ennoble reality and elevate us. The Poet that speaks *exactly* as the world speaks (i. e. merely imitates) is no Poet; he must give much reality, but it must be raised and supported by his noble nature." It is indeed the prerogative of the Poet, that while listening with delight to the language of nature, he perceives with delicacy and depth its signification, and giving in a

sensible form what he thus perceives, he becomes its interpreter.

Two qualities, however, distinguish Goethe from all other modern Poets. He is the most *objective* and the most *universal* writer.

Like Homer, Goethe enters wholly his characters and their situations and in delineating them forgets himself, his views and feelings entirely, and depicts only those of his heroes. He summons their images before us not as the products of his imagination, but by inducing our own mind to produce and form them and to see them by its own activity. Every where he discovers at once the point, the centre of interest, from which all the parts shoot forth like organs, filled with the life and interest of the whole. Hence it is, that we scarcely commence a work of his, when this general interest seizes us and carries us from page to page. And while we read, we forget Goethe so entirely that we imagine we see all the occurrences and characters and situations in reality before us. There is nothing, that bears the stamp of the subjective opinion of a single individual, but the Poet has merged his interests in those of his heroes and his views in theirs. Hence it is too that his language, though it flows always smoothly and evenly, nevertheless accommodates itself to the expression of every feeling, and that while it is always clear, easy and calm, while it expresses the most common and the highest occurrences in the same successful measure, while it connects all parts so with each other, that they truly seem to proceed the one from the other and all from one common idea,—it nevertheless assumes the specific hue of every situation, character and feeling. "I went to work like the Painter," Goethe says, " who in representing certain objects avoids certain colors and has certain others to prevail. When painting, for instance, a morning scene, he will put much blue upon his picture, but little yellow. When he paints an evening scene, he will put much yellow upon it and omit blue almost entirely. In a similar manner I proceeded with my different works and hence their different characters." Compared with Schil-

ler or Byron, Goethe has in this respect the decided advantage. In Byron, for instance, we perceive every where his discontent, his reflexions, his views and dissatisfaction with the world, in Goethe no where. He forgets himself entirely in his objects and most faithfully and visibly produces and depicts persons, landscapes, social circles, connexions, intricate embarrassments, passions and all kinds of feelings. To effect this objectiveness in his writings, Goethe took great pains. He observed closely and studied most faithfully the nature of every thing coming before him and with a determination to lay aside all prejudices and preconceived opinions. He frequently would concentrate all his energy upon a single object, whether pleasing to him or not. Every person with whom he had intercourse, he considered as an independent being, whom he had to explore, with whose peculiarities he had to make himself acquainted.

*Ihr sucht die Menschen zu benennen  
Und glaubt am Namen sie zu kennen,  
Wer lieber sieht, gestalt sich frei,  
Es ist was Anonymes dabey.*

It was for this reason, that he not only cultivated the acquaintance of such as harmonized with him, but considering that every person had a right to differ from him, he did not shun intercourse with those opposed to his views. Such intercourse put him constantly on his guard, made him observe others closely and awakened his own slumbering talents in every direction. Thus it became easy for him to do justice to the most opposite characters. His journal in Italy gives witness of this. At that time sentimental journals had been the fashion of the day ever since Sterne. Every traveller compared things and customs of foreign countries with those of his own and judged favorably or unfavorably, as they agreed or disagreed with those cherished by him. The reader had to view foreign countries through the medium of the traveller's prejudices. Goethe with his clear and observing eye, investigated soil, rivers and their streams, atmosphere and climate, wind and weather, cities and their origin, and successive formations, countries and their surfaces, and then inquired how

all these influences were active in producing certain manners, customs, institutions, governments, trade, style of architecture, of art and literature, manner of living, of dividing the time of the day, etc. He endeavored, as far as possible, to trace the original descent of the inhabitants of the different Italian States; and believing that generally they would settle where climate and soil were best suited to their desires and peculiar constitution, he included this consideration in forming a judgment of their customs and manners.

Goethe was however objective in another sense of the word. Whatever moved and stirred darkly in his bosom, he would indicate by an object well calculated to represent it. He knew nature and all its effects upon man, and he made it symbolical or used it to express his feelings. As whatever affects our senses must, by their connexion with all the nerves of our organism, also affect the whole inner man and thus produce a particular state of mind, which will in nearly all men be the same;—it is natural that Poets at all times should have sought to represent dark and unintelligible, but powerful feelings, by such external objects as will call forth similar emotions in all who are affected by them. The silence of the atmosphere, a clear sky, the mild light of the moon, the roaring of an oak-wood, the rustling of leaves, the soft breezes passing through tender branches, the sight of a valley through which a rivulet meanders, the darkness and silence of night, produce nearly the same effects upon every one. Goethe knew well how to fill this objective world around him with his own noble spirit and how to give expression to his thoughts and feelings by these objects. Of this character are many of his smaller poems. So his *Wanderer's Nachtlied*:

Ueber allen gipfeln

Ist Ruh'

In allen Wipfeln

Spuerest du

Kaum einen Hauch;

Die Vögelein schweigen im Walde  
 Warte nur, balde  
 Ruhest Du auch.

So also his *Fischerlied* :

Das Wasser rauscht, Das Wasser schwoll.

The water is that element which is but loosely held together ; one drop follows the other. Not like the atmosphere, which holding itself together and forming an elastic fluid, can it produce clear sounds, but only indistinct murmurings or roarings. The feeling we have when sitting by the side of a clear stream, is precisely similar to the nature of water. We lose ourselves in the never ceasing flow and are ready to plunge in and be dissolved in it. So the songs of Mignon, who, a mystery to herself and to all around her, bursts forth into song for a moment and is again silent. Her glowing heart consumed itself in longing for the sun of her native land, from which a cruel hand had torn her in infancy and thrust her into a cold world; her grief and longing are excited by the dim remembrance of the myrtle and orange groves, of the statues and marble halls of Italian palaces and her songs are like the dying tones of a harp. Who does not know the beautiful poem :

Kennst Du das Land ?

Or,

So last mich scheinen, bis ich werde.

Such Poetry is like music ; we hear and we love it ; we are charmed by it ; it makes us feel now cheerful, now sad ; it excites deep emotions in us and yet does not say what they are ; it contains more than it expresses ; it reminds us of something better and nobler, but we cannot give it a name.

Yet while this kind of objectiveness characterizes many of Goethe's minor Poems, his larger works are like temples of crystal, clear and transparent, so that nothing, no thought and no feeling of the Poet, is left unexpressed. This is the truly objective character of our Poet, that what he felt he had full power to express ; that he chose such

words and language, as will render it impossible for any particle of his ideas to escape—that his expressions and his representations would be fully adequate to his feelings and ideas. He retained nothing in his bosom that he did not communicate, but all his communications bore the full impress of his soul.

The other of the two qualities, distinguishing Goethe favorably from other modern Poets, is his *Universality*. This indeed would be with every one else a very ambiguous attribute. Voltaire too was universal, but only according to the subjects, which he treated. He had for himself his settled and fixed views, which he applied to any object coming before him. It is not the nature of a thing we see in reading Voltaire's works, but his views and opinions on it. Like a cork swimming on the surface of the water, he no where makes a deep impression. His subjective manner of thinking is the general form which he impressed on every thing, whether it was gold or silver or copper. He no where exhibits true and real beauty as resting in the general nature of his object, but he seems to bestow some beauty upon it gratuitously from his *own* mind as a kind of ornament. Goethe is universal in a different sense. Not the number of his subjects, not their variety or universality made him universal; he knew how to confine himself, and the greatest art in his view was that of limiting oneself and exhausting all contained within certain limits. That which rendered Goethe universal was the *flexibility* of his mind. There are some fine talents that within their proper sphere will be quite respectable; but no sooner do they exceed it than they appear inferior. Roos, for instance, was very happy in painting granivorous animals, especially sheep; their nature and manner of living was transparent to him; he knew it by "anticipation;" but whenever he undertook to paint other animals, he failed.\* Only such objects in general will be transparent to the artist as are analogous to his talent, and the extent

\* This is contrary to the opinion of Cicero, who seems to think that he who can paint one quadruped, may paint all!

of the latter will be the limit of the former. Goethe's genius on the other hand was universal. The world lay open before him and he could see into the most secret motions of its life. With the greatest ease he could enter by his feelings and thoughts the nature of any object, whether animate or inanimate, whether near to men or distant, whether foreign or at home. I cannot deny myself the pleasure of giving at least one striking instance of the great flexibility of his genius. When once he looked for a long time upon a picture of Roos, representing sheep in their different positions and situations, with all the simplicity of their physiognomies, their curly hair, and so on, he said: "I feel always uneasy, when I view these animals. The *limited, dull, dreaming* and yearning nature of their situation draws me into a sympathy with them; one fears to become an animal and almost might believe the artist was one himself. At all events it remains highly astonishing how the artist could transfer himself with his thoughts and feelings into the souls of these animals, in order to make their characters appear with so much truth in their external forms." His eye discovered quickly the poetical nature of every object and, honoring their peculiarities, he would be new and vigorous as his themes. Thus he was enabled to breathe new life into old chronicles; to revive national songs and bring them near to our times; to make an obscure fact the basis of a beautiful poem; to bring light where darkness and oblivion had reigned; and to give form to the colossal and rude productions of an early imagination.\* He was universal, for he belonged to no country and to no age. He lived in the sphere of truth and of beauty. Whatever was noble and great in past times or whatever agitated the present, all centered in him, and his breast was great enough to receive, to understand and reproduce it anew. "Like the eagle that, soaring high in the atmosphere above villages and towns and countries, looks down to watch his prey, without ever asking whether he finds it

\* Goethe's works vol. 50. p. 95.

in Saxony or in Prussia," so Goethe rose beyond the prejudices of times and nations, and wherever he discovered beauty and truth, he gave it a place in his heart and delighted to communicate it in song. The old classical spirit of Greece lives in Iphigenia; in his Goetz von Berlichingen the air of the middle ages breathes around us, but of the middle ages in decay; as they are giving way to a higher order and when the hero dying exclaims: "Heavenly air, Liberty, Liberty!" a new spirit seems to dawn upon us. In his Faust, this tragedy of the world, the heart of man with all its low and high desires, with all its weakness and strength, with its never dying thirst for the Infinite, with all its faults and noble traits is strikingly exhibited. He desires every thing and cannot find satisfaction in any thing. Scene changes after scene, desire after desire, and there is nothing permanent but the dissatisfaction of Faust. In Torquato Tasso the passionateness and fire of the South gains expression. In his Westöstlichem Divan the Poet, advanced in age, yet possessing the fire of youth, transfers the Orient to the West. And what interest is there capable of touching any one's heart, what suffering, what joy, that did not find a sympathizing cord in Goethe's breast? Like the aeolian harp, that sounds softly or strongly as it is touched, Goethe's genius would seize and give form to every material offered, take marble here and brass there and erect a permanent monument.

Goethe's universality rested on two things. On *Love* and on the *Flexibility* of his genius. Without the former the latter would have been impossible. We can learn only from him and understand him whom we love. Love alone is communicative, and love alone is willing to receive and to favor. "Talent is not enough for a Poet," Goethe said once, "he must have Love."

Our Poet was much opposed to all pretended originality. "What is it, that man may call original in himself?" he once asked and answered: "*Ignorance and Stupidity!*"

Ein Quidam sagt "Ich bin von keiner Schule  
Kein Meister lebt, mit dem ich buhle  
Auch bin ich weit davon entfernt  
Dass ich von Todten was gelernt."  
Das ist, wenn ich ihn recht verstand  
"Ich bin ein Narr auf eigene Hand."

When we consider, that once every one thirsted for originality and exhibited it by arbitrary, singular and strange and striking notions, by placing himself above the rules of education and science, by a desire that all his ideas should flow forth without study and labor, like water from a fountain,—we cannot wonder at Goethe's dislike of all originality. "We speak constantly of originality, but what is meant by it? As soon as we are born, the world commences to operate upon us and thus we assimilate what is offered from without. What would I be, if this kind of assimilation were inimical to genius? I have collected and applied in different ways all I have seen, heard and observed; I have claimed both the works of nature and of man. Every one of my writings was caused by thousands of persons. The Learned and the Ignorant, Infancy and high Age, the Fool and the Wise have assisted me; mostly without being aware of it, they have brought me the gifts of their experience, talents and thoughts; sometimes they have sown what I have reaped. My work is the union of beings which were taken from the whole universe, and the name of this work, that is, of my life and poetry, which form one whole, is *Goethe*." How much and how widely do these noble confessions of the greatest and most original thinker of our age differ from the petty pretensions of those that sneer at the efforts of their ancestors in literature and, like the man who throws away the most costly pearls merely because he has inherited them and he desires to fish up one himself, or who refuses to use the fruit of an orchard because he did not plant it, or like him that would raise flowers independently of trunk and branches, expose both their ignorance and vanity by neglecting the historical development in science and art. No one, generally speaking, is so great, that he will not find one greater than himself, that either has preceded him or lives with him. Sciences and arts too

have their infancy, their youth and manhood, and as every individual must experience in himself the spirit, prevailing in different ages of the world, so the truly learned man must be familiarly acquainted with his science on its different stages. Only then he may be able to lead it farther, otherwise he will have to discover, that what he with much labor and self-satisfaction produced and considered new and original, had been expressed long before him better, clearer and more systematically. Continuing where our forefathers left off, we may advance towards the end and consummation of literature; but if every one that is anxious to call a few thoughts his own, fears to contaminate their originality by reading the works of others, we will not get farther. The "origines" of all things do not lie in man, but rest and proceed from God as the eternal Truth. There is nothing in ourselves that we have a right to call original.

Vom Vater hab' ich die Statut  
 Des Lebens ernstes Fuehren  
 Von Mutterchen die Frohnatur  
 Und Lust zu fabuliren;  
 Urahnheerr war der Schoensten held  
 Urahnfrau liebte Glanz und Gold.  
 Sind nun die Elemente nicht  
 Von dem Complex zu trennen  
 Was bleibt denn an dem armen Wicht,  
 Original zu zennen!—

Yet much as he spake against such a pretended originality, he was highly original himself; not by the novelty of his thoughts or by the strange, unexpected and irregular manner in which he treated his subjects, but by wedding in love his great genius to the *rational* nature of his themes. Originality consists in an independent reproduction of what historically is given us. Such originality presupposes two things. It demands, on the one hand, a faithful study of the true nature of the subject, close and accurate observation, a familiar acquaintance with all its qualities and their connexion among each other; and on the other, it demands *genius*, greatness of mind, which is able to form these materials, as their nature and the plastic power demands, to represent externally the image or idea, which genius con-

ceives internally. Observation is the mother, genius the father and their joint product is *originality*, or original views, knowledge and works. Genius without genuine observation is fanciful; observation without mind, without the source of all union and connexion, produces contradictions and a rude mass of undigested knowledge. Observation must give the materials and basis, genius or mind the principle of knowledge and its union. Now when true genius, by faithful observation, wholly enters the nature of a theme, uniting itself with it fully and from love to it, then we get what we call an original production. For a production is original when all its parts proceed from one *common idea*, when this idea, as the centre of the whole, lives in every twig and branch and leaf, so that nothing is there, taken from other combinations and merely joined to it for the sake of *ornament*. In such a production all the parts cohere by necessity;—not arbitrarily, irregularly patched together, they are like members of the same life. The one supports the other, not like a prop, placed externally below, but like organs growing forth from each other, and all of them starting from the nature of the subject, as viewed by a great genius. Each part has an end and peculiar distinction in itself, but at the same time its significance and its existence depend entirely on the whole. As the leaf that is vigorous and green resists every storm, while an integral part of the plant becomes game for the winds and withers and decays, when torn off from its branch, so every part of an original work has its beauty only in its connexion with all the rest. Zelter's compositions to Goethe's poems are both *new*, and *original*. But he studied them over and over until he knew them by heart, he tried to discover their true nature, all the situations and feelings contained in them and to appropriate them entirely; then he sought for their true and proper expression in music, and without labor and great endeavor the melody would easily and at once flow forth from the union of his genius with the nature of his subject. These melodies, Goethe says himself, have something indestructible, un-

changeable; they are so grown together with the forms which they accompany, that it would seem impossible to make by music a more correct impression of the feelings of the Poet when he wrote those lyric songs. When, on the other hand, Albrecht Duerer in his Arabesks paints garlands of flowers, from the cups of which the smiling faces of angels peep forth, or when he paints plants that, instead of flowers, bear beautifully colored birds, we may admire the *ingenuity* of the artist, while we hesitate to speak of great originality. But when an Italian Count, at great expense, unites parts of different creatures into one; when he, for instance, places the face of a woman upon the neck of a goose, or the neck of a goose and the head of an eagle upon the trunk of a lion; or when a poor sculptor selects the different parts of an intended statue from different quarters and dovetails them into each other, we cannot take the least interest in their works.

Goethe was truly original in the sense of the word just exhibited. His pieces do not contain a scene, not a line, not a word, that is not pertinent; every syllable seems to be so demanded by his subject, that it would seem impossible to substitute or add another, or take away any. Form and contents so grow together under his hands, that every attempt to unite them more closely would be in vain. His Iphigenia is not based on a new theme, but on one already made use of by Euripides. Iphigenia is a truly Greek Lady and the character of the whole piece is antique; yet there is a wide difference between the Iphigenia of Goethe and that of Euripides. As of the three Tragedies, under the title of Philaktet, the latest, that of Sophocles, is the most original, so Goethe's Iphigenia is more original than that of Euripedes. I will prove this by one or two remarks. Orestes, driven by the furies from place to place, without rest or peace, is promised relief by Apollo, if he bring home his sister from Tauris, where she is unwillingly detained in the hands of the Barbarians. This is the plot of the dramas, both of Euripides and Goethe. The former understands the god to demand his own sister, Diana; the latter, more humane,

Iphigenia, the sister of Orestes; the former accomplishes the will of the god by making Orestes and Iphigenia commit theft, and by calling in the aid of Athene, when discovered by Thoas, who has to submit to the goddess' command as to an irresistible power. The latter conquers the reluctance of Thoas to allow the departure of Iphigenia, by the power of truth. Goethe applies, therefore, to no external aid, to no power, to no violence, but the *truth* uttered by the lips of a beautiful lady, sinks into the bosom of the rude Scythian and renders him mild and yielding. For

Die Stimme der Wahrheit und der Menschlichkeit hoert Jeder  
Geboren unter jedem Himmel, dem  
Des Lebens Quelle durch den Busen rein  
Und ungehindert fliest.

Considering that the aim of the whole Drama is to show, how by the power of *love* and *truth* a savage nation becomes civilized, Goethe's Iphigenia is certainly more original than that of Euripides.

To produce new thoughts, is a difficult thing in a time which has been preceded by so many and great thinkers. Energy of will, vigor of thought, cultivation of both, deep study and a character that knows what it aims at and perseveres in realizing its aim, give at present the best originality. This was the case with Goethe in a high degree. He never commenced writing any part unless he had studied the whole thoroughly and clearly. As Mozart says of himself, that his pieces, however many the parts they might consist of, and however long they might be, would be so complete a whole and union in his mind that he could contemplate them as he would a picture, not part by part, but all at once; so Goethe bore the ideas of his works with him, till they were so completely adjusted that it was a matter of indifference which part he wrote first. He wrote, for instance, the second part of his Faust at once on letter paper and not a single erasure was perceptible in the whole manuscript. This manner of study and meditation gave him an unchangeable attachment to the subjects he once

had chosen. They all corresponded to his great soul or proceeded from it, and though he should lay them aside for years, he would certainly return to them with his old love. Faust and Wilhelm Meister accompanied him from his earliest youth to his last hour. The second part of the former he finished on the evening before his last birth day, after having cherished it in his bosom for fifty years. Thus many of his productions unite the vivid imagination, with which his youth had conceived them, and the mature judgement and cultivation of age. The Trilogy of Paris, a lyric poem of extreme beauty, haunted his mind for forty years, before it ripened. It is neat and close, like a Damascene blade, welded of steel wires. But during forty years it had time enough, to free itself from every thing superfluous. "The child and the lion, a novel full of peace, love and piety grew and ripened in him for thirty years. He had sketched the whole thirty years before he executed it. When about to write it out he sought for the old skeleton, but could not find it. Afterwards the old plan is again obtained and it agreed entirely with the new. The Poet no doubt during thirty years had changed very much, but the objective character of the piece remained the same.

Goethe was a Poet in the ancient sense of the word. He considered art a profession that demanded much study and cultivation, and especially greatness of soul.\* "The mere

\* It is truly astonishing to hear many speak of the ease, with which they conceive their works and write them; with some nothing seems to be required but to lie down under a shady tree, to look through the foliage into the blue sky and to try remember the fullness and riches of thought that in such a position come over them. Leibnitz on the other hand, a genius of the first magnitude not only in philosophy, but also in philology, history, mathematics etc., studied so constantly, that sometimes for whole weeks he did not rise from his chair. Paganini, whose musical talents are unequalled in many respects, practices the gamut during the whole day, when he expects to give a concert in the evening. Goethe studied with remarkable perseverance, and thus not only cultivated his innate genius, gave it a moral tendency, but he secured nourishment for it and necessary materials. For whatever he studied, became finally a means for his poetical productions. His endeavors in Meteorology, Optics, Botany, Zoology are all of them beautifully reflected in his poems.

technical art of versification, wit, spirit, deep feeling is not enough to secure the favor of a public for any poet. Greatness of character must shine forth from his writings, significance, dignity, a certain seriousness and greatness of disposition. One must be something, in order to produce something." Yet even this is not enough, the Poet must cultivate, what nature has given him. "If any one will learn to sing, all the sounds that lie in his throat, are easy and natural to him; but others, that are not in his throat, are at first difficult. But to be a singer, he must conquer these difficulties; for all sounds must be at his command. So it is with a Poet. As long as he pronounces his few subjective sensations he does not deserve the name of a Poet; but when he knows how to appropriate the world to himself and to pronounce it, he is a true Poet. And then he will be inexhaustible and ever new, while a subjective nature will soon empty its few contents and finally ruin itself by Mannerism." The theme of the Poet is the world; he must know it, in order to represent it; he must be acquainted with nature and history and science. This principle Goethe acted out in his long life so earnestly that he not only spent more than half a million on his education, but accumulated astonishing treasures of knowledge. So regular was he in his studies, that no occurrences of the day were suffered to interfere with his once established order. The information of the battle near Jena reached him, when he was about finishing the last part of his work on colors. The same doctrine he studied, while engaged as a soldier in the campaign. When the Grand Duke died, he went into the country to study nature. When his only son was torn away from him, he again sought consolation in his favorite study. Thus he reigned with a firm and inflexible will over the circumstances of the day and did not suffer himself to be affected, nor his course of study to be interrupted by any thing. Among all his studies, however, he loved that of nature next to Poetry; for "the smallest production of nature has the circle of its perfection within itself, and I need only eyes to see; and I must

discover that within a small circle a whole and true existence is inclosed." His study of nature nevertheless aided his poetical labors considerably. He knew nature in all its details by heart from the stone up to the animal, so that when he needed a comparison, it would offer itself easily and always be full of truth.

Goethe was finally a truly German Poet. It may seem strange, that he who advocated a *literature of the world*\* and whose works have really become the world's property should be bound down to a single nation. Our Poet would feel himself insulted by such an attempt. What I mean here is that we perceive in him all the peculiarities of German character, its faults and its beauties. The honesty and simplicity of the German; the enthusiasm and love of deep reflection; the impartiality in judging of other nations and in appropriating all that is noble and good in them; the desire to penetrate and fathom every depth; the inclination to that which is mysterious, full of presentiment and redundant in meaning; we may easily discover in his different works.† "A work that leaves nothing for the reader to think out, is not a product of art." So in *Wilhelm Meister* "the seemingly insignificant points always to something

\* Goethe once said to Eckermann: "I see constantly more clearly, that poetry is a good, common to all the human race, and that it everywhere and at all times appears in hundreds and hundreds of men. Some one of them may make it a little better and swim a little longer than others, that is all. Mr. Von Matthison must therefore not think, that he is the one, nor must I think, that I am the one, but each must admit, that poetry is not so rare a gift as to justify a high degree of self-esteem, if one can make a poem. But if we Germans do not extend our view beyond the little circle of what surrounds us, we may easily indulge this pedantic pride. *I love therefore to study foreign nations and advise every one to do the same.* National literature means nothing, the epoch of the literature of the world is at hand and every one must co-operate to advance this epoch."

† He was fond of enigmas, of significance and of mysteries even in common life. Being truly convinced that great undertakings could only be executed by union of effort he liked symbols as external signs of an internal agreement "for every undertaking," he used to say, "needs forms and rules and mysteries, to secure noble efforts from profanation and raise the power of will."

higher, and it depends only on a sufficient knowledge of the world and circumspection, to see the greatest in the smallest." His works demand study ; they are not written for the idle, or for him who desires mere entertainment.

Dann bei den alten lieben Todten  
Braucht man Erklärung, braucht man Noten,  
Die Neuen glaubt man blank zu verstehen;  
Doch ohne Dolmetsch wird's auch nicht gehn.

Each of Goethe's works embodies some great idea ; to perceive it, study is required ; and while many may read without perceiving it and still be entertained, it is this idea that is the soul and life of the work. So we see in Werther's sorrows on the one hand the prose of the world, its stiff laws and regulations, its selfish calculations and lifeless formalities, its external and artificial customs on the observance of which the reputation of a man depends on the other hand we perceive a sentimental and poetical youth, whose mind is full of ideal notions, who considering the law of his heart alone entitled to regard, places it in opposition to that of the world. In this opposition he stands alone; however noble his views, however tender his feelings may be, he cannot find a heart that will wholly sympathize with him. His existence has no soil to strike its roots in ; he feels solitary while he is surrounded by an active and always busy crowd ; his bosom is an abyss into which every thing sinks, to excite, to rage, to disturb, while nothing returns from it to the light; for it does not produce any thing or leave a single trace of its energy on the realities of this world. The reed holds itself up in all storms by its little roots, but Werther had no hold on the laws and institutions of the world, none upon himself, none upon God; and while his heart continued to glow, he died by his own destructive power, like a burning coal that is separated from all combustible material. Thus every individual opposition to the general laws of the whole must be destructive to man.

The relations of life, its prosaical laws and institutions,

are the pillars of individual existence; we must not oppose, but revere them; we must learn to unite the Prose of life and the Poetry of the heart, the Beautiful and the Useful, the wishes and desires of our bosom and the commandments of the law, whose origin is divine and whose power is irresistible. To unfold such a life, Goethe wrote *Wilhelm Meister's Lehrjahre*, the *Wahlverwandtschaften* and the *Wanderjahre*. In his *Lehrjahren* he represents the world, as he with his great soul had seen it.

Nichts verändert und nichts verwirkt,  
Nichts verzerrt und nichts verkrümmt;  
Sondern die Welt soll vor dir stehen,  
Wie—Wolfgang Goethe\*—sie hat gesehen.

As travellers, while they remain on the same stream, pass through the most varied scenes, for the shores are constantly changing, now presenting cities with their busy activity and then villages with their rural silence, now mountains from whose tops the past looks down in its decaying castles, and then fertile and inviting plains that give witness of the labor and ingenuity of man; so all the employments of life, all its deep and agitating interests, all the spheres of religious, moral, political, economical, scientific and mechanical activity pass before us. Characters, devoted to one or the other sphere of life, and filled with its spirit, represent in their persons, discuss, defend, and explain, partly by design, partly by accident, every occupation. *Wilhelm Meister* who, in search of general cultivation without a certain plan, forms a connection with all these different characters, leaves each enriched with the spirit of his occupation and with an insight into its true nature. Constantly rising from the less to the more perfect, from the lower to the higher, he shakes off one error and prejudice after the other and becomes himself more wise; for he learns to love and esteem every calling in life, and closes his apprenticeship by passing over from manly endeavor to activity, a perfect reconciliation with the world, and to that permanent union, which is the general end of every apprenticeship, marriage.

\* The original has : Wie Albrecht Dürer sie hat gesehen.

This marriage-life is the theme of the *Wahlverwandtschaften*. Marriage is the basis of all moral and civil virtues. It rests on Love and Faithfulness; its object is to preserve that love which silently but irresistibly attracts two persons and makes them one. Where this love is wanting, the law of marriage and that of the heart will be at war with each other. The law of love is a strong and a sacred power; it demands its rights; and, like a dark fatality, forces us to acknowledge its claims even against our will. But the law of marriage is more mighty, yet no less sacred. Both laws are harmoniously united, when the hearts of married persons are one in love; when on the other hand feelings and views, desires and cultivation are of an opposite character, these laws will be in conflict. If either one of an externally united couple should from an affinity of nature and of soul, be attracted to another person, it would be not only natural but delightful; but then being thus attracted they will either pine away and consume themselves by a vain and ever unsatisfied longing, or if not strong enough to resist and exercise self-denial, they will fall a victim to the power of the marriage law. Matth. 5: 28, and John 8, 7.

Drum prüfe, wer sich ewig bindet  
Ob sich das Herz zum Herzen findet;  
Der Wahn ist kurz, die Reu' ist lang.—Schiller.

In the above Romances the education of the individual is accomplished and the care for personal welfare is relieved. Hence the *Wanderjahre* present to us the generality that prevails and which every individual must serve. Purposes, designs, great aims, and the objective world we must learn to honor and to revere. Moral powers must reign with a merciless rigidity; man must submit; and if he becomes guilty of a mistake, for

Es irrt der Mensch so lang er lebt;

he must atone for it by resignation and self-denial, or heal the wound by devoting himself more earnestly to the interests of society in general. What subjectively rests in man, is here objectively realized in the world. Every one has to examine himself and discover his talents, and then

seek the proper sphere for their exercise, confine himself to it, but within this sphere he must exert himself without intermission. Two great doctrines we are here taught: "If you find your sphere of labor, revere its laws! if not: Deny yourself and continue your search." The basis of such a life is education, as resting on well-digested principles, which must be pervaded by religion and morality. Among all the occupations and interests of our race education is the most important.\*

I presume that I might sooner succeed in giving you an idea of a new and beautiful plant by merely exhibiting the outlines of its flower, without mentioning its splendid colors and agreeable fragrance, or the rich stock with its many leafy branches, than try to give any adequate notion of the beauty, richness, depth and fullness of Goethe's works by such indications. Life, in all its ramifications, with all its deep interests, through which the golden thread of love is woven in every direction, is laid open before us; the most opposite characters, from the most volatile to the purest, most pious and devoted, appear and disappear, and all receive in the most poetical manner their appropriate reward and position. And how could I, without giving a specimen, convey any idea of that language which with incredible flexibility and richness varies, with the nature of the object, its ever new beauties and rhythmical periods, its charming figures, its blooming fullness, its striking accuracy and its power to express and exhaust every feeling and every thought. For this is to be noticed repeatedly, that with Goethe, form and expression are not external, but seem to grow forth from their contents; that his poetry is not merely beautiful in contents, but equally so in form, to which from his earliest youth he paid the greatest attention.

It remains yet for me to speak a few words of the *moral* and *religious* character of our Poet, for he himself consid-

\* Höthe's review of Goethe's works, Vol. XXI. XXII. XXIII. Berliner Jahrbücher. December, 1829.

ered this of the highest importance. "If a Poet is morally free, we will feel it in reading him. Whatever he does or has done, will by his power transfer us into the same disposition in which he was when he did it. A free and cheerful disposition of the artist will make us free and cheerful; a discontented one will likewise communicate discontent to us. A great nature will elevate the reader!"—To know something at least of his moral life will be found indispensable to the student of his works. For his life as well as his poetry was the work of his strong will. They do, therefore, not only mutually explain each other, but they form one *whole*. His poetry is a continued confession of all he experienced in his life, and his life, the result of a will that reigned over every desire and passion, is Poetry itself. He felt nobly, he thought nobly, he expressed himself nobly, and he lived nobly.

Zierlich Denken und suess Erinnern  
Ist das Leben im tiefsten Innern.

His great object and aim was to get a clear consciousness of all his faculties and powers, to improve and cultivate them and to make his own by *will*, what was his by nature. Thus he gave them a moral tendency and his *natural inclination* to the Beautiful became *moral love*. He did not suffer himself to regulate and limit his studies by his inclinations, but conquering all prejudices and reluctance in himself, he directed his attention to every object containing truth, which he loved on its own account and not because it was useful, which he loved to communicate in the form of beauty because he considered it intrinsically desirable. This was in general his moral relation to *art* and *science*. All his activity had reference to the human race and proceeded from love of the good, the true and the beautiful. Not like celebrated performers on an instrument, who select their pieces more for the purpose of showing off their skill than of benefitting their hearers, did Goethe ever desire to display his talents or show his superiority, but love of his fellow-men and love of truth alone could induce him to undertake serious works.

Edel sey der Mensch  
Huetfreich und gut!  
Denn das allein  
Unterscheidet ihn  
Von allen Wesen,  
Die wir kennen!

He ennobled himself constantly, but only as a part of a noble whole. "Only all men together constitute the human race; hence let every one endeavor to get an idea of this great and beautiful whole and, acknowledging his own limits, let him do with modesty in his place what he is able to effect for the well being of the whole. This whole, as it consists of the human race, living in all regions, existing in all centuries, contains in itself every power from the lowest animal tendency to the highest energy of mind, and if the various talents distributed among all are properly developed, they will form one whole. Every talent is important; each has the energy required to unfold itself; and if the one improves the useful, the other the beautiful, and the third the true and noble in life, they will all only when existing together form a whole." These noble views of Goethe on our race as a whole, base themselves on his Metamorphosis of plants. Every plant is a whole consisting of parts. It commences its growth in a globular and fluid point which is scarcely perceptible in the flower of the mother plant. In it no different parts yet exist; nevertheless all of them proceed from it. The first formation, arising from this point, is that of the pericarp and kernel. When the seed is fully ripe and cast off from the mother plant, it will, when sown, produce formation after formation, yet so that every successive formation repeats the preceding one, only in a more rapid manner. The germ at first is split into roots and leaves and while the former seek the dark abode of nutritious juices, the latter rise towards the sphere of light, clothing themselves with a lovely green. Every bud repeats this process of the seed, by bursting the outside and sending forth a leaf, more delicate, however, and more perfect, more highly colored, until a number of leaves clustering around one point, form a new

and large bud, which incloses the mystery of the bloom, and, bursting, unfolds its full beauty. So all proceeds from one point. The leaves of the stem become leaves of the bud; these become leaves of the flower, and these again become filaments. It is the same in the animal world. The caterpillar proceeds from joint to joint and finally forms a head. And what thus takes place in individuals, occurs also in the mass. The bees, a series of individuals that attach themselves to each other, produce as a whole something which forms the conclusion, and which may be considered the head of the whole, the Queen. Nor is it far otherwise with our race. Isolated, man is powerless; an integral part of the great family, he will be important, whatever his station may be. Only let him follow Goethe's advice,

Im Ganzen, Guten Wahren  
Resolut zu leben!—

Poets are nothing else than the flower of the whole nation, the joint product of the mass, the organ which reveals the soul and life existing in every single branch and leaf of the whole stock. It is scarcely credible that the man who considered his existence, his genius and energy, so interwoven with that of the rest of his race, should have been charged with a want of patriotism. True, he was opposed to revolutions, he desired merely an improvement of that which was good in old institutions; for seeing the evil consequences of arbitrary innovations with his clear eye, he could not be drawn into a momentary enthusiasm, that would rather tear down than build up, rather destroy than correct. "If our race were perfect, we would have perfect governments!" was his motto! Let every one be faithful in his sphere and he will soon gather around him a small number of such as will aid and assist him. We are free, not because we acknowledge nothing above us, but because we have something to revere. Revering it, we raise ourselves to it and prove that the better and higher has a hold upon us. Laws and institutions are therefore necessary, and the acknowledgment of something sacred is

indispensable to true Liberty. Every one is free, who is humble and knows how to control himself. Once he said to Eckermann: "You see how spacious my residence is, and yet during the last six months two rooms have been sufficient for me!"—Such views of course would not appear patriotic to those that desired to rule rather than to be ruled. Envy and jealousy too had their part in producing this malicious charge; but since Heine has publicly confessed that he aspersed the lofty character of Goethe from envy, Boerne, Menzel and consorts have lost their favor with the public and can no longer sully the bright fame of the favorite of the German nation.\*

Another principle, which he acted out in his life, was that of justice. "Let us be just towards others, for we

\* How well Goethe knew his opponents, will appear from the following remark:

"The number of my opponents," he once said, "is Legion; and yet it is not impossible to classify them. *First*, I have opponents from stupidity. These are such as never understood me and found fault with me without knowing me. This large class has wearied me very much; yet I forgive them, for they knew not what they did. A *second* large class consists of those that envy me. They cannot look with favor upon the fortune and position which I have gained by my talents. They endeavor to tarnish my honor and would like to destroy me. If I were miserable and unfortunate they would cease. A great many oppose me because they do not succeed themselves. Among them there are men of talents, but they cannot forgive me for eclipsing them. *Fourthly*, I have opponents that have good reasons. For since I am a man, and as such have human faults and frailties, my writings cannot be free from them. But as I place much value upon my cultivation and have necessarily labored to enable myself, I have been constantly progressing, and it has often happened that they have censured a mistake which I had long before corrected. These good men have offended me least; they shot at me when I was miles in advance of them. In general a finished work becomes indifferent to me; I never took it up again, but always commenced something new. Another large class of my opponents has arisen from different modes of thinking. It is said of the leaves of a tree, that not two of them are wholly like each other, and so among a thousand persons there are not two who will wholly harmonize in disposition and manner of thinking. Supposing this to be a fact, I must feel astonished less that the number of my opponents is so great, than that I have so many friends and adherents. My whole age dissented from me, for it was wholly *subjective*, while I was entirely *objective*, and thus stood alone and had the disadvantage."—Eckermann's conversations with Goethe.

deserve esteem only when we know how to esteem ! When we accustom ourselves to reflect with pleasure on the high virtues of others, we shall give a proper place to our own virtues and thus gain ourselves ! " How much Goethe lived and acted in accordance with these views, might be made to appear from a collection of his noble, benevolent and highly modest judgments on Shakespeare, Byron, Calderon, Schiller, Herder and Wieland ; from the frequent comparisons he instituted between himself and Shakspeare in favor of the latter ; from the value he placed on every calling and talent and product that was deserving in any degree of attention. It was easy for him to resign his own views for those of others, if he found them superior, or to enter the manner of thinking and reasoning of those who differed widely from him. He rejoiced in meeting with any new theory, though it should affect his own unfavorably, and frequently he would feel himself induced to commence a study anew which he had been in the habit of considering as finished in its results for himself.

*Stets geforscht, und stets gegründet  
Nie geschlossen, oft geruendet !*

It was this disposition which rendered Goethe great, both in character and in literature. He was great indeed by his natural talents, but as every thing human is limited, so his genius had its limits. But being willing to acknowledge these limits, he was enabled to raise himself above them by study, diligence and perseverance. Hence it was, that by the time critics discovered an error or a weakness in his works, he had already corrected and conquered it and was engaged in something far superior. Not the limits of our talents make us appear insignificant and little, but the desire to deny or conceal them ; not talents in themselves make us great, but a will that is determined to cultivate and enoble them by moral principles. The latter was the case with Goethe, and hence it was, that in others he loved nothing more than a strong and decided and correct will. Any one who possessed energy and firmness of moral power might be certain of his favor, though

he should not be gifted with any particular talent. Every business in the world is carried on by moral laws; all depends on our moral personality, on *love* and a firm *will*. Hence it was, that Goethe never attempted to *determine* the will of any person, but only sought to inspire every one around him, even his servants, with *resoluteness* and the love of *good principles*. This silent power gave him an unparalleled influence over all connected with him, and secured him their love, their gratitude and everlasting friendship.

Tokens of kindness, received from friends or strangers, he would always acknowledge gratefully and in the most appropriate and delicate way. When the citizens of Weimar once celebrated his birth-day by illuminating the street in which he lived, he sent his two little grandsons the next day from house to house to express his thanks. His friendship was pure, firm and lasting. His intimacy with Schiller is sufficiently exhibited by the six volumes of letters exchanged between them. Whatever presented itself to the mind of the one, was communicated to the other, so that the one frequently gave the thoughts which the other formed into verse. With Zelter, one of the first musical composers of our day, he kept up for more than forty years, a most interesting correspondence, which has lately been published. With Lavater, likewise, he continued an uninterrupted intercourse by mail for ten years, which has become highly interesting to his admirers since its publication. His attachment to the Grand Duke was so great that Wieland once said: "If I ever should get displeased with Goethe and remember how much he has done for the Grand Duke, I would thank Master Goethe more for it than even for his literary productions." One example of his friendship for this noble sovereign is so beautiful that I cannot pass it by entirely, though time will allow me only a partial communication of it. This great man during the time when the French reigned in Germany, had aided many sufferers and was suspected by the French of an unfriendly or hostile disposition. When Goethe was informed of this and of the dangers arising from it, he ex-

claimed with deep emotion : "What is it that these Frenchmen demand ? Since when is it a crime to aid one's friends and old companions in arms, when they are in distress? . . I tell you, the Grand Duke ought to act as he does. He must act so ! He would do wrong, if he should act otherwise! Nay, if he had to lose his country and people, crown and sceptre, he must nevertheless not violate his noble disposition nor neglect what the duty of a sovereign in such cases demands of him. And if the worst should come, as was the case with his predecessor John; if both his downfall and his misfortune were certain, I shall not feel feel distressed, but with staff in hand I will accompany our sovereign in misfortune, and faithfully remain by his side. Children and women, when they shall meet us in villages, will raise their weeping eyes and say to each other: this is old Goethe and the former Grand Duke of Weimar, whom the Emperor of France has dethroned because he was faithful to his friends in misfortune." Here the tears rolled profusely down the cheeks of Goethe and after some time he continued to say : "I will become a ballad singer; I will go into all the schools and villages, where the name of Goethe is known; I will sing of Germany, and make the children learn my songs by heart that when they become men they may dethrone the French and reinstate my sovereign !" The Grand Duke knew well what a precious jewel in his crown this great poet was. When once many distinguished strangers were at the court of Weimar, the Grand Duke and Goethe happened to be in different rooms. By and by all the strangers collected in the room of the latter and only two being left with the sovereign, he rose with the words: "Let us go likewise to pay our tribute of respect to Goethe."

His powers of conversation were very great. "When Goethe," some one says, "indulges the cheerfulness of his nature, it is as if the sun were rising. All limits vanish away before his mind and the whole universe seems to lie in his eyes, in his forehead, and in the features of his face." Yet he would always observe a proper measure; and when others forgot themselves, he would grow serious.

His influence with the Grand Duke was unlimited ; he used it, however, only for the promotion of talent, merit and honesty. His rich experience had to serve the same end ; and therefore he gathered young men around him to aid them in their studies and give them his valuable advice. " We old men had to perform the task of committing errors ; but of what use would all our seeking and our endeavors be, if young men should run over the same road again ? Thus we would not get any farther ! "

He entertained very rigid views of domestic life. Reinhard, the celebrated pulpit orator, frequently expressed his astonishment at the moral correctness and simplicity of his style of living. All kinds of comforts and luxuries were against his nature. He had no sofa in his study, but only an old wooden arm chair, even when he was 82 years of age. He was frugal ; rarely ate in the evening, and never, as a servant of his for twenty years voluntarily testified, did he indulge wine too freely, or even make use of it often.

His activity was astonishing. It spread over all the branches of practical political economy. He had new turnpikes built ; mining was improved ; and meadows gained by erecting dams and distributing the waters of the Ilm ; he devoted himself to the University of Jena and raised its reputation and character by carefully filling its chairs with able men. He established Institutions of all kinds, superintended libraries, museums, collections of minerals, coins, etc. ; he had the city of Weimar and its environs made more beautiful by art ; its old gates were removed, ditches filled, an observatory established, and wherever his acute and observing eye noticed any defects, he felt himself impelled by his nature to assist in removing them. If we consider that besides these many near and distant circles of activity, his time was employed in scientific investigations in Meteorology, Mineralogy, Morphology, Optics, in writing fifty-five volumes of the most noble Poems, Dramas, Romances, Histories, Biographies, Criticisms, and in keeping up a correspondence with the most distinguished

ed persons of his time, which alone would fill a great number of volumes,—we cannot help asking: How was all this possible? By two things. First, by the clearness and order, which, as they reigned in his breast so they ruled also over all his business. Whatever he did, was done in its season, and at once neatly and well. Every visiting card, every little Poem was dated, that in re-reading these pieces, he might be able to remember the disposition in which he was when he wrote them and thus obtain a complete view of his life, which lay clear and open and transparent before him, every one of whose moments and pulsations was determined by his will. He effected so much, in the second place, by making the best use of his time. He looked upon it as his greatest inheritance:

Mein Erbtheil, wie herrlich, weit und breit  
Die Zeit ist mein Besitz, mein Acker ist die Zeit.

He rose, to the end of life, every morning at five o'clock; and continued to labor till evening. His life was but a succession of labors. "Labor was his employment, change of labor his recreation." And as he commenced early in the morning and rested only late in the evening, so he began early in the morning of his youth and rested only when he died. His mind did not grow old, but remained young and vigorous; and as the setting sun frequently before disappearing shows himself once more in all his glory, so Goethe was great even in his decline. He was only reminded of his age by seeing so many of his early companions dropping away from his side. "When I look back upon my earlier and middle life and consider in my advanced age, how few are left of those that were young with me, I cannot help thinking of a visit to a watering place. When one arrives one makes the acquaintance of those that have been already some time there and will shortly leave. This loss is painful. Now one becomes attached to the second generation, with which one lives for a time and becomes intimately connected. But these also depart soon and leave us alone with the third class, that arrives shortly before our departure and with which one has no desire to form intimacies!"

As I approach the close of these loosely connected characteristics, I hear many a one silently ask the question: "Did he, who drank so fully of every created beauty and sung of every noble deed and lived in the regions of truth, ever mention Him with a word, who is the Fountain of all beauty, the Source of all goodness and the Author of all truth? Did he seek for *Truth* and *Beauty* every where, but in the Lord of creation find none?" These questions might be framed into one: "Was Goethe a Christian?" Upon this answer the final judgment on his character must depend, for only that is good and praiseworthy in man which proceeds from the Spirit of Christ; only that is permanent and ever valuable, which gives witness of our love to the Lord. The more the answer must affect the character of this great man in our judgment, the more will charity and meekness suggest caution. And above all ought we to be willing to lay aside our prejudices in favor of certain forms in which we are accustomed to see the spirit of the Christian Religion utter itself. The Lord is also there, where His name is less frequently mentioned, and His Spirit may live and act where we do not see the accustomed forms. Nor is it always an infallible sign of genuine piety to hear a man constantly speaking of sacred things. In this respect we must be willing to be guided by the confession which our Poet once made in a letter to Lavater: "My Beloved Friend! You speak to me as to an unbeliever who desires to comprehend and have Truth demonstrated, because he has experienced nothing in his own heart. And yet the very opposite of all this is in my heart. I only feel and express myself differently from others." So he wrote to Pfenninger: "Perhaps I am foolish not to express myself as you do. I have experienced what you have experienced, and only express myself in different words."\* Did he not sing early in his youth:

\* In the *Encyclopedie Americana* we have read in the article on Goethe the following words: "He was also led by the reading of several religious works to construct for himself a strange theological system, of which New Platonism was the ground-work." This system he formed early in his youth (1769)

Der Du von dem Himmel bist  
 Aller Leid und Schmerzen stilltest  
 Den, der doppelt elend ist,  
 Doppelt mit Erquickung fuelltest.  
 Ach ! ich hin des Treibens muede,  
 Was soll all' der Schmerz und Lust?  
 Süsser Friede  
 Komm', ach Komm' in meine Brust.

In his letter\* to the new Pastor in N. N., he says: "I love Jesus Christ and believe in Him. There was a time when I was Saul, now I thank God that I am Paul." "I thank God for nothing more than the certainty of my faith. For upon this I die, that I have no happiness and no salvation to hope for save that which the eternal love of God grants me." "I consider faith in the divine love which in Christ dwelt on earth, as the only ground of my salvation." And how, without having experienced it, could he have described so faithfully the operations of faith upon the heart of a lady? Having considered herself for a long time safe, she is aroused from this slumber and asks: What is faith? "To believe the narration of an occurrence to be true, what can that avail? I must be able to appropriate its effects and its consequences. This appropriating faith must find a condition of mind, which is un-

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and it was as transitory as the disposition in which he wrote his *Werther*. The fourth volume of Goethe's *Autobiography* appeared only after his death; this treats likewise of his early life and nevertheless exhibits already an entire change in his religious views. The remarks above are based on it and on the whole poetry of Goethe.

\* This letter Goethe had intended to publish again in his collected works, but he did not do so. The greater part of it may be found in Goeschel's *Schillerungen Goethescher Dicht- und Denkweise* I, 206. It was this letter that first attracted Lavater's attention to Goethe, and was the commencement of a long and happy friendship. He wrote at the same time several other treatises in the same style, as for instance, two biblical treatises on the ten commandments; one on the speaking with tongues on Pentecost. These Essays he published at his own expense and distributed them gratuitously. "Here and there a review made favorable or unfavorable mention of them, but soon they were forgotten. My father preserved them carefully in his Archives, else I should not possess a single copy of them. I intend adding them, and some few other things of the kind, unprinted as yet, to the new edition of my works." *Goethe's Werke*, XXVI, 106.

known to the natural man. Almighty God! grant me faith. I once wrestled and prayed in the greatest distress of my heart. I leaned myself on a little table at which I sat, and covered my face with my hands and wept. Now I was in the state of mind in which one must be if God shall regard our prayer. My soul felt itself attracted to the Cross on which Christ grew pale. My soul approached Him who became man and died for us, and from that moment I knew what faith was." And he who wrote these beautiful words, wrestled himself; he studied the Bible from his earliest youth and was anxious at one time to connect himself with the Moravian Church. The mere difference of opinion on the doctrine of depravity,—for "no doctrine," he says, "can purify us, except one that will first humble our pride"—which he explained somewhat differently from the Moravians, prevented his joining them. He became alarmed, when they told him that he was on the scale of Pelagius, and under the most serious impressions he studied the Bible again; and, as nothing could, to use his own words, separate him from the love of Christ, he formed a system of his own. He continued from that time to take the deepest interest in Missions and expressed publicly his gratitude to the venerable Dr. Knapp for keeping him acquainted with the progress of the missionary cause. He acknowledges too in his Biography that Daub, by his "*Studien und Kritiken*," revived his interest in religion. His intercourse with Lavater, with Haman, with the celebrated princess Gallizin of Russia, so well known, for her piety, and who esteemed him highly, with Stilling and other pious men, bears favorable testimony to his interest in religious matters. Young Stilling used to say, that the world knew only the inferior qualities of Goethe, *his heart was known to him alone*. And well might Stilling say so, for in many a time of need he received unexpected and most generous aid from this, his noble friend."\*

\* Of the many interesting anecdotes concerning the intercourse of Schilling with Goethe, I will only copy two from Goeschel's *Schilderungen Goethe'scher Dicht- und Denkweise*, Part II, p. 8.

Of the Christian religion, it may easily be presumed, he spoke with the highest reverence. "It is a power, by which suffering and fallen humanity from time to time raises itself and which is beyond all philosophy and needs not its aid." He disliked all criticism in religion. "They attack the books of Moses; if the destructive criticism is any where injurious, it is so in religion, for here all rests

In Strasburg we find twenty young gentlemen, most of them students, at the dining-table. Pleasure and mischief are not wanting: wit, animated and animating, flows in rich veins through the cheerful circle. Now some, with whom others were soon associated, tried to tease Stilling who had lately arrived, on account of his old-fashioned dress and his biblical faith. Stilling in mild words turns aside the coarse and rude wit.

But even the best and most cheerful humour may degenerate into inhumanity and cruelty, when it hits and wounds the weak side of man always on the same place and thus violates in the individual the dignity of man in general. And here it hit the most true and tender part of the human heart, the eternal in the breast of the mortal. The old coat was but a sign of the poverty of the youth and of his riches: and his faith in the word of God was old indeed, because its contents are eternal; but even therefore it was eternally young.

Stilling however directs their attention only to the spiritless and lifeless nature of a wit, long ago used up by the French; but it avails nothing: his contradiction makes evil worse. Then a youth hastily rises, until then the most mischievous cheerful of all and steps forth and raises with power his youthful, heroic voice, to vituperate such "Satanic sarcasm"—as he called it—and to suppress it. This was—Goethe. From that time a tie of friendship and brotherhood was drawn around the two young men. "Pity" Stilling says, "that so few only know the heart of this noble man."

Who does not know, how miserably poor Stilling lived during the early part of his life. Care for support rested hard on him. Once he had to pay \$70 for a year's rent, and he had not a cent. Then the waves passed over his soul. Often he ran into his bed chamber, fell upon his face, wept and prayed for help to God. And when business called him away, Christian (his wife) took his place: she wept aloud and prayed with a zeal that might have moved in stone; yet no hope to get so much money was to be seen. At length Friday came, when the payment was to be made: it was the last term. The two married people prayed and labored the whole morning; the piercing anxiety of the heart sent forth continually deep sighs. At ten o'clock the letter carrier comes with a heavy letter. Stilling takes it; it was Goethe's handwriting. On it stood the words: "With \$115 in gold." The poor man is astonished at receiving so much money. He opens the letter, reads and finds that friend Goethe took and without his knowledge published the MS. of "Stilling's Youth," and that now he sends him the fee for it from Weimar, his new residence.

on faith, which one cannot regain, after it is once lost."\* "It is best, without criticism and doubt, to appropriate the religious and moral doctrines of the Bible." This principle he leads out in his Prometheus, in his Faust, for there he teaches the doctrine, that *Humility* becomes man. His faith in the immortality of the soul was firm and unshaken. "No right minded man will suffer himself to be stripped of his belief in a future existence." Once, when taking a ride he seemed to be lost in meditation, watching the setting sun. "Even while setting it is the same sun! When one is 75 years of age, one cannot help thinking sometimes of death. The thought of it does not disquiet me, for I am firmly convinced, that our spirits are indestructible. They must live from eternity to eternity. They are like the sun, that only to our earthly eyes seems to set, while in reality it never sets, but continues to shine constantly."

If any one is willing to accede to the request of Goethe, as expressed in his letter to Lavater, and to seek for the spirit independently of forms, he may find in all his works a great deal of Christian truth. For he sings of the vanity of all things; and again he sings of something that is permanent in all changes;—he rejoices in the pleasures of life and again he knows that there is rest only in the grave. The spirit is to reign over the body and we must learn to resign the world. The law is a holy power and all desires must be silent before it. Sin is the ruin of man, for

Die Sunde weh dem Menschen that!—

Whoever violates the divine law, poisons the root of his happiness. He frequently, it is true, describes sin in attractive colors, but only to raise virtue the higher. If he had painted sin so ugly, that none would have been willing to own it or recognize his own in it, he would have effected nothing. But by making his readers first feel

\* "In Poetry" he added, "this destructive criticism is not so injurious. Wolf has destroyed Homer, but the poem itself he could not injure; for this Poem has the miraculous power of the heroes of Wallalla, who in the morning cut each other to pieces, but at noon sit at the table with entire limbs."

that the sin described resembles their own, he could exhibit the glory and dignity of virtue and its permanency, on the one hand, and the ruin of sin, on the other, with more effect. So in his *Faust*, sin is represented in an agreeable dress, but Gretchen repents, suffers and submits willingly to a higher judgment. *Faust* himself, in the second part, is handed over into the hands of angels, that by the infinite power of mercy he may be saved. "There are strange critics," Goethe once said. "They find fault with *Wilhelm Meister*, because he is too much in bad society. But by making bad society the vessel in which I could deposit what I had to say of good society, I gained a poetical basis and a variegated one too. Had I painted good society by good society, no one would have been willing to read the book."\*

I cannot close these remarks without mentioning a Poem full of love, of piety and peace, written by our Poet when he himself was near the peace of the grave. It bears the title: "The Child and the Lion." Its object is to show how a child by gentleness and love, by piety, that expresses itself in hymns and sweet melodies, conquers the wild tyrant of the forest and makes him mild and obedient. The lion is not destroyed, but tamed. It is not the physical power of a giant but the gentleness of a child that leads him about. By love lions shall become lambs; the leopard shall lie down with the kid and a little child shall lead them. The form of this poem is beautiful beyond conception. It commences in clear and transparent prose in the narrative style. The prose becomes more poetical with every page, till finally it passes over into a lyric song. As a luxuriant plant sends forth one full and vigorous leaf after another, but all only for the purpose of supporting

\* We must consider in addition, that a Poet confesses openly all his thoughts and feelings, as they at the time move his heart; and as every man has to regret many of his actions, so the Poet may look with displeasure upon many of his poems. Goethe at least had lost in his higher age all relation to and interest in some of his productions; like the sting of a serpent they were left by the road side; while others remained a living part of him even in old age.

the flower that is to come; so in this poem, all parts are there only on account of the flower, which is the idea that *piety* alone can conquer the savage disposition of man. And who would not admire the bloom of this Novel, when at once it bursts upon us:

Engel schweben auf und nieder,  
Uns in Toenen zu erlaben,  
Welch ein himmlischer Gesang!  
In den Gruben, in dem Graben  
Waere da dem Guten bang?  
Diese sanften frommen Lieder  
Lassen Unglück nicht heran:  
Engel schweben hin und wieder,  
Und so ist es schon geßtan.

Und so geht mit guten Kindern,  
Seliger Engel gern zu Rath  
Boeses Wollen zu verhindern,  
Zu befoerdern schoene That.  
So beschwoeren, fest zu bannen  
Lieben Sohn an's zarte Käle  
Ihn des Waldes Hochtyraanen  
*Frommer Sinn und Melodie.*

Denn der Ew'ge herrscht auf Erden,  
Über Meere herrscht sein Blick:  
Loewen sollen Lämmmer werden  
Und die Welle schwankt zurueck.  
Blanko Schwerdt erstarrt im Hiebe  
*Glaub' und Hoffnung* sind erfüllt;  
Wunderthaetig ist die Liebe,  
Die sich im *Gebet* entheult.\*

Let us yet cast a glance at the last days of this great and noble man. His latter years were much cheered by his relation to all the distinguished artists and literary men not only of Germany, but of all Europe. Lord Byron had long before dedicated some of his works to him and looked up to him with much reverence. On the 28th of August, 1831, he received a splendid present from fifteen friends in England, among whom the names of Walter Scott, Lockhart, Thomas Carlyle, Fraser, Lord Gower, Churchill,

\* These verses have been thus arranged by Goeschel in his *Schilderungen Goethe'scher Dichtweise*.

Southey, Wordsworth and Procter were found.\* He had the pleasure of seeing his Faust translated into English—of which afterwards, in one year, no less than seven or eight different translations appeared in that tongue—into French, into the Swedish and other languages. His Iphigenia was rendered accessible to the Greeks by a translation. Werther's sorrows inspired a Chinese artist to represent them in a series of pictures. Russia followed with a benevolent eye his rise and progress. Artists honoured him in a public manner. *David of Paris*, travelled at

\* I copy the letter, accompanying this beautiful present.

To the Poet Goethe on the 28th August, 1831 :

"Sir : Among the Friends, whom this interesting Anniversary calls around you, may we "English Friends" in thought and symbolically, since personally it is impossible, present ourselves to offer you our affectionate congratulations. We hope you will do us the honor to accept this little Birth-day gift, which as a true testimony of our feelings may not be without value."

"We said to ourselves: As it is always the highest duty and pleasure to show reverence to whom reverence is due, and our chief, perhaps our only benefactor is he who, by act and word instructs us in wisdom; so we feeling towards the poet Goethe as the spiritually taught towards their spiritual Teacher, are desirous to express that sentiment openly and in common. For which end we have determined to solicit his acceptance of a small English gift, proceeding from us equally, on his approaching birth-day, that so while the venerable man still dwells among us, some memorial of the gratitude we owe him, and think the whole world owes him, may not be wanting. And thus our little tribute, perhaps among the purest, that man could offer to man, now stands in sensible shape, and begs to be received. May it be welcome and speak permanently of the most close relation, the wide seas flow between the parties."

"We pray that many years may be added to a life so glorious; that all happiness may be yours and strength given to complete your high task, even as it has hitherto proceeded, like a star 'without haste, yet without rest;'. The words, "without haste, yet without rest," were the motto given to the Present from Fifteen Friends, and with reference to them Goethe replied :

Worte, die der Dichter spricht,  
Treu in heimischen Bezirken,  
Wirken gleich, doch weiss er nicht,  
Ob sie in die Ferne wirken.

Britten! habt sie aufgefass't  
"Thaet' ger Sinn, das Thun genuegt;,  
Thaetig Streben ohne Hast,"  
Und so wollt ihr's denn besiegelt.

his own expense, not invited by a Prince, but impelled by his own admiration, from France to Weimar to mould Goethe; and in the year 1831 a splendid marble bust with a noble letter from the hand of this celebrated artist arrived in Goethe's house.\* In the same year a medallion was struck in Italy bearing the likeness of Goethe on the one side and on the other the inscription: "The 28th of August, 1831." A beautiful house brought to light among the ruins of Pompeii was named in honor of him: "Casa di Goethe." Walter Scott visited it and expressed his determination not to return to England before having seen the German Poet. Thorwaldsen erected, at his own expense, a monument to the young Goethe, who died while journeying in Italy. Italy's greatest Poet, Manzoni, knew of no greater pleasure than to hear that Goethe was satisfied with his works.† Madame de Staél, the Prince of Ligne, Benjamin Constant belong to his earliest admirers in France. Delavigne, Victor Hugo, Cuvier, Geoffrey de St. Hilaire paid him on every occasion their tribute of respect, and frequently appealed to his authority in Science

\* This bust was accompanied by the following letter:

"Monsieur !

Aussitôt que mes jeunes pensées ont pu se fixer vers la contemplation des sublimes ouvrages de la nature, mon admiration a été pour les grands hommes, qui sont sa plus belle création. J'ai étudié la sculpture, comme un moyen plus durable de consacrer leurs traits; je leur ai voué ma vie, toutes les sensations de mon âme. Il m'était réservé, comme un indig-  
ne bonheur, de reproduire les traits du plus grand, du plus sublime. Je vous offre cette faible représentation de vos traits, non comme un ouvrage digne de vous, mais j'ai osé en faire un fragment; un génie plus digne de vous la terminera.

Veuillez, Monsieur, recevoir favorablement l'assurance du profond respect de votre très-humble serviteur,

DAVID.

† It would be impossible to enumerate here all the translations that were made of Goethe's works in different languages. His *Herrmann* and *Dorothea* was translated into the ancient Greek; other poems were translated into the Latin. A great number of commentaries have since appeared, and among them there are no less than seventeen on *Faust*, independently of the many *outlines and pictures* to it. On Goethe himself there have been written no less than sixty to seventy different, larger or smaller volumes.

as decisive. Of his Metamorphosis of Plants Geoffrey de St. Hilaire said in the Academy of Paris : "When Goethe first appeared with his theory in the year 1790, little notice was taken of it and some considered the whole a mistake. And there was a mistake at the bottom of it, but one that can only be committed by a genius. Goethe was wrong in publishing it half a century too soon, before there were botanists able to understand it."

Thus honored at home and abroad, successful in all his undertakings, affluent in his circumstances and cheerful by nature, one would think him to have been the man whom Solon would not have hesitated to call happy. And yet he uttered these memorable words of himself: "They have called me a particular favorite of fortune ; nor have I any intention to complain or find fault with the course of my life. Yet on the whole it has been nothing but labor and sorrow, and I may truly say, that during 83 years I have not had *four weeks* of true *happiness*. It was the constant rolling of a stone, that always was to be lifted anew. I would not desire to live my life over again ; as little as the fully developed plant could wish to return to its narrow and contracted state of buds and seed."

His day was closing. Having finished a number of works before his eighty-third birth-day he hastened once more to Ilmenau, the place of his early endeavors and joyful hours. The deep silence of the woods, the fresh breezes of the mountains, inspired him with new life, and strengthened, he returned and felt himself impelled to resume new meditations on nature. The doctrine of colors was reviewed, corrected and corroborated ; the nature of the rainbow was investigated anew ; the spiral tendency of all the formations of plants more accurately ascertained. He once more felt youthful :

Von allen Geistern, die ich je angesogen,  
Fuehl ich mich rings umlagert und umringt.\*

\* Who is not reminded by these lines of the words which Goethe wrote early in his youth in imitation of Ossian : " Warum weekst du mich Fruehlingsluft ? Du buhlst und sprichst : "Ich bethaue mit Tropfen des Himmels!"

Geoffrey St. Hilaire's and Cuvier's discussions attracted his attention; he read and reviewed them. On the same day he wrote a great number of letters. On the 17th of March, five days before his death, he recommended warmly and affectionately his favorite Institutions and the persons engaged in them, to his influential friend and physician, Dr. Vogel. On the 20th he signed an order to assist a person in distress. This order, written by his own trembling hand, is now preserved in the library of the Grand Duke at Weimar. On the 22nd the silent messenger gently approached him and called him to his eternal home. Pressing himself gracefully into one corner of his chair and exclaiming "*more light!*" he departed this life.

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Of his external form I may be permitted to say yet a word. Poets are generally sickly, "for the extraordinary task which these men have to perform demands a fine organization, that they may be susceptible of delicate impressions and hear the voice of nature. Such an organization is in conflict with the world and its elements and may easily be hurt." Goethe had a healthy and strong constitution. He gave his physician little to do and the celebrated Hufland, who attended him for ten years, speaks much of the vigor diffused equally through his body and soul, and of the harmony in which both his physical and psychical functions coöperated. Productiveness, the character of his mind, was also that of his body. A rich nutrition, quick and full sanguification and reproduction, critical self-restoring and fullness of blood characterized his constitution. His body was large, strong and of regular form. Erect and straight, he had his hands generally folded on his back. His breast was broad and highly arched; his limbs full and softly muscular; his feet neat and of the

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Aber die Zeit meines Welkens ist nahe, nahe der Sturm, der meine Blätter herabstoert! Morgen wird der Wanderer kommen, kommen der mich wäh in meiner Schönheit, ringum wird sein Auge im Felde mich suchen, und wird mich nicht finden."

purest form ; his head covered with a silky, thickly grown white hair ; his neck torous ; the whole body covered equally with a rich flesh, except the head. His breath was easy, but intermingled with sighs ; he spoke slowly, but with the dignity of a monarch.

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#### ART. II.—INFANT SALVATION.

INFANT SALVATION IN ITS RELATION TO INFANT DEPRAVITY, INFANT REGENERATION, AND INFANT BAPTISM. By J. H. A. Bomberger, D. D., Pastor of the Race Street Evangelical Reformed church, Philadelphia. Lindsay & Bla-kiston. 1859. 12mo. pp. 192.

This little volume treats successively of Infant Depravity, Infant Regeneration, Infant Salvation, and Infant Baptism. It contains many things which are good, beautifully and forcibly expressed and well worthy of being seriously laid to heart by parents : but it also takes a few positions, which I consider erroneous and untenable. In the third section, which is by far the largest, the esteemed author endeavors to prove, that *all little children dying in infancy are saved, whether baptized or not.* I propose to examine his arguments and show that they do not establish the doctrine. This will lead me to notice not the excellencies, but rather the defects of the book.

*“In all God’s covenant transactions with men, CHILDREN are included in the covenant with their parents.”* p. 58. This is the first argument. The examples of Adam in Paradise, of Noah after the deluge, of Abraham, and of the New and Better Covenant, to which the author refers, are beautiful and forcible illustrations of the fact that children are always included in the covenant with their parents. This I presume all will admit. Provision is indeed made in this way

for their salvation, but it does by no means follow, that all will therefore be saved. The fact that they are included does not make their salvation certain. For adults too are included in the covenant, and yet this is no proof that they will all be saved. Nothing can be said of certain conditions,—faith and repentance—in regard to these: because the argument is the fact that they “are included in the covenant,” and since this can be affirmed alike of the adult and children, they are therefore equally entitled to its advantages. In my opinion this argument by itself does not prove the salvation of any one, whether parent or child, much less of all children.

The Heidelberg Catechism, Question 74, tells us, that infants “as well as the adult are included in the covenant and church of God.” What is the inference? That they are therefore saved? No. For instead of inferring the salvation of any or all from their inclusion in the covenant, it says they shall therefore be *baptized*, and “admitted into the Christian Church and be distinguished from the children of infidels as was done in the old covenant or testament by circumcision.” All the children of the Jews and Gentiles are included in that New and Better Covenant; they have therefore equally a right to be baptized and thus “be brought into actual participation in the redemption of Jesus Christ.” p. 16: and yet according to the Catechism the baptized shall “be distinguished from the children of infidels,” although the latter are in like manner included in the covenant. The argument of the Heidelberg Catechism and that of our author, are the same: and yet their inferences are not alike. The former infers the right to be baptized, but the latter infers their salvation even without baptism.

The inclusion of the children of the Jews in the Abrahamic covenant, guaranteed to them the right to be circumcised—not the certainty of salvation: and if circumcised, they were entitled to all the temporal and spiritual blessings of Judaism. So the inclusion of all children in that New and Better Covenant, secures for them the right to be

baptized: and if baptized they have the promise of salvation through Jesus Christ. Were not the male-children of the Jews to "be cut off" from the people, in case they were not circumcised, notwithstanding their inclusion in the Abrahamic covenant? Gen. xvii. 14. But more of this hereafter. It does therefore not follow from the fact that they are included in the covenant, that all little children are saved, whether baptized or not.

"*Suffer little children, and forbid them not to come unto me: for of such is the kingdom of heaven,*" Mat. 19:14. p. 75. After giving an explanation at length of these words, the author says: "The conclusion, therefore, to which a candid consideration of this incident, and the various phrases, which occur in the Gospel report of it, lead us, is undoubtedly this: that our Lord teaches the salvation of all little children." p. 109. From this conclusion I respectfully dissent. Let it be distinctly noticed, I deny not that all little children may be saved,—they may or they may not—Scripture being silent, this question is undecided; but I deny that *this passage of Scripture* proves that all are saved. Let us examine it, and also our author's remarks.

He tells us our Lord "does not say; 'Suffer *these* children to come unto Me; but in the most general terms which language affords: Suffer children.'" This statement I regard as unfair. It is true our Lord does not say: "Suffer *these* children;" and it is also equally true He does not say: "Suffer children;" but He says: "Suffer *the* little children." It is known, our English translation of this passage of Scripture, is defective in the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke. By referring to the original we find that Christ said *τα παῖδεα*, and these words are used alike in Matthew, Mark, and Luke. Luther in his German translation rendered them correctly, *die Kindlein*, alike in the three Gospels. In our English version of St. Mark x. 14. they are rendered: "Suffer *the* little children." This agrees with the original Greek, as well as with the German translation. The definite article "*the*" is omitted in our English translation of this passage, in the Gospels of St. Matthew and St. Luke. It is therefore not correct to say that our Lord

used "the most general terms which language affords." Now it seems to me not to be fair, that the author should lay so much stress upon this imperfect translation, and use it, if not as an argument, at least in preparing the way for the introduction of his view on Infant Salvation. He cannot defend himself by saying, that he quoted the received translation. This is true: but did he not also quote the received translation of the passage: "Go ye therefore and teach all nations;" Matt. xxviii. 19. p. 170. Yet he corrects this, why not also the other? Any one in reading his remarks under consideration, can easily see that its correction would have required him to modify his language considerably. What precedes as well as what follows, shows that he desired to point out the universality of "the law of the kingdom, in regard to children." But this he could have done equally well by allowing our Lord to say: "Suffer the little children to come unto Me,"—the little children as contradistinguished from the adult, who have been coming unto Me from the beginning.

"*Of such is the kingdom of heaven.*" Our author tells us: "Strange explanations of these apparently plain and simple words may often be met with—explanations which lose sight altogether of the true and avowed purpose of our Lord in uttering them." p. 95, 96. Having stated and refuted some of them, he says: "We must therefore, adopt another sense of these words as the only correct one. And that sense is the one most obviously lying in the declaration as it stands, without amplification or paraphrase, of such (little children) is the kingdom of heaven." He has scarcely told us that the correct sense lies so obviously in the declaration as it stands, that it needs no amplification or paraphrase, till he amplifies or paraphrases it himself by inserting "little children" in the words of Christ.

What is the sense of the words: "Of such is the kingdom of heaven!" Our author answers: "The kingdom of heaven consists mainly and emphatically of little children. All who have died in infancy, a countless host, 'early lost to be early saved,' all these are safely housed

in that kingdom above." "The kingdom of heaven consists of so large a proportion of *children* saved by the blood of the Lamb, that it may be said with truth, of such emphatically is the kingdom of heaven." p. 102, 103. This I presume, our author will admit is a fair and full statement of his view, which he regards as the only correct one. If I understand him correctly, (and I trust I may not misrepresent him) he supposes there are so many children in heaven, that it can be said, of such is heaven, or of such does heaven consist. He accordingly understands the words as referring to "a great multitude, which no "man can number," and then concludes, that our Lord teaches the salvation of all little children." Is he however not begging the question? For in trying to prove that all children are saved, he says, "of such is the kingdom of heaven;" and now in explaining these words of Christ he tells us, "heaven consists *mainly* and *emphatically* of little children. *All* who have died in infancy, a countless host, *all these are* safely housed in that kingdom above." But this is the point in question. If indeed "*all who have died in infancy are in heaven,*" the question is decided. Does he not thus assume as a truth that all children are in heaven, and then use it to explain his argument: and after his argument is thus explained, he comes back again and gravely tells us, all children are saved. To say the least, I regard his view as also a "strange explanation of these apparently plain and simple words—an explanation which in like manner loses sight altogether of the true and avowed purpose of our Lord in uttering them." They can be misinterpreted and misused not only in the way he tells us others have viewed and used them, but also by viewing and using them to prove the doctrine of general Infant Salvation. There is indeed in heaven, "a great multitude which no man can number, of all nations, and kindreds, and people, and tongues;" but whether this great multitude consists mainly and emphatically of little children, is a question which he has failed to answer satisfactorily.

He tells us: "Because *they are little children*, are they of

the kingdom of heaven." p. 103. Did he not prove successfully in the first section of his treatise, that they are by nature depraved,—conceived in sin and born in iniquity? In discussing their sinfulness, he allowed neither age nor size to annul it. Now however he tells us they are of the kingdom of heaven, because they are little. What becomes of his doctrine of Infant Depravity? Perhaps however, he will answer, not exactly *because they are little children*, (though he says so in his book), but because they are little children regenerated,—"joined to Christ in regeneration." True, he endeavors in the second section of his treatise to show the necessity of Infant Regeneration. It does, however, by no means follow, that all *are* regenerated. The adult too "must be born again;" and yet this is no proof that they *are* born again. You cannot infer the actuality of a thing from its necessity. All men need bread, and yet not all have it; for some starve. If I mistake not, he has advanced no argument to prove this point: for all his arguments are simply in favor of its necessity. Their regeneration ought certainly to be established, before it can be used as an argument to prove their salvation. If they "have been joined to Christ in regeneration," they will of course be saved, and the question is decided. But where is the proof, I ask respectfully, that all *are* regenerated?

Christ says "*of such*." Let us examine these words. Such signifies: "*of that kind*," "*of the like kind*." Webster. It never means all, or its equivalent, "*a countless host*." It is an adjective and therefore limits or defines. Let me illustrate. If I point to several two story brick houses, and say "*of such*," do I mean all houses? You would not understand me so. For some are built of stone, others of logs, and others of marble: some have only one story, others three, four or more stories. I do therefore not mean all houses; but only those of this kind, in regard to size, material, appearance &c. If you see little, sick, dying children lying upon a bed and say "*of such*," do you mean all children, including the healthy and the strong? Do you not simply mean those of this class?

I need not multiply examples: every one knows what these words generally signify. The houses and the children to which I have referred, are indeed different among themselves, and on this account the illustrations might seem to be inapplicable. But our author by allowing "that some special efficacy was connected with the imposition of the Redeemer's hands upon those infants," has made a difference equally broad and marked between those who received and those who did not receive His benediction. In his beautiful and graphic description of the significance of the Saviour's treatment of those little children, he has pointed out very plainly whom our Lord meant by saying "of such."

Let us however also see what our author means by saying "such." On page 64 he tells us: "Such, we say, are the expectations" &c. "and such are the convictions" &c. Does he mean *all* expectations and *all* convictions? If I were to interpret his language in that way, he would have reason to complain of a gross misrepresentation, and would gently remind me that he did not mean all, but only that kind of expectations and convictions which he had described, and that every careful reader would understand him so.

Now what does Christ mean by the word *τοιούτων*, "of such?" I will venture to say, he means exactly what we mean by saying of such, viz: "of that kind," "of the like kind." We generally have no difficulty in understanding each other, when we use these words, why shall we have more difficulty in understanding them when our Lord uses them? Did He attach unusual and mysterious meaning to these apparently plain and simple words? Perhaps however, you are impatiently asking what kind? I reply that kind that "come" unto him. I will therefore, also amplify the words of Christ and say: Suffer the little children to come unto me, and forbid them not: for of such (as come unto Me) is the kingdom of heaven.

This explanation I think, will be confirmed by reference to the incident to which they belong. Read it care-

fully as it is recorded of St. Matth. xix. 13-15, or in the parallel passages of St. Mark x. 13-16, and St. Luke xviii. 15-17. Here are persons (probably parents) bringing little children to Christ: the disciples however rebuke them. There is now a dispute between the parents on the one hand, and the disciples on the other. The question is simply this: shall little children be brought unto Christ, or shall they not? The parents say, Yes: the disciples, No. Who shall decide this important and interesting question satisfactorily for all time to come? Behold, Christ is present, and both parties are willing to submit to His decision. He decides it in the affirmative by saying: "Suffer the little children to come unto me and forbid them not: for of such is the kingdom of heaven." The great question is decided. Little children may come to Christ, and if they do come, they are saved. Are not all little children thus virtually divided into two great classes, (just like the adult are and for the same reason) those on the one hand that come, and those on the other that do not come unto Him? To understand these words, it seems to me, we need only read the incident carefully, remember under what circumstances they were spoken, and mark the point at issue. Christ did not evade the question, which was thus put to Him by the parents and his disciples for decision, by giving them a dubious reply: neither did He tell both parties, that it is immaterial whether little children are brought unto Me, or not, for they are saved at any rate. No. He rather insisted upon them coming unto Him, was much displeased with His disciples for interfering, and encouraged the parents to bring them. Upon what principle or according to what rule can the words "of such" be interpreted so as to mean all or "a countless host"? The meaning of the words, as well as the tenor of the whole incident, is against such an interpretation. The terms are so "explicit" that I can scarcely see how they can be used as an argument to prove the doctrine of general Infant Salvation.

How are little children saved? This is an important

question and well worthy our attention. Some people have an idea, they are saved simply because they are so little and helpless. No idea, however, can well be more unscriptural than that; for it militates against the doctrine of human depravity, the necessity of the atonement and a living union with Christ. Our author plants himself upon far higher ground than that, by insisting upon Infant Depravity and a connexion with Christ through regeneration. Little children are therefore saved, not because they are little and helpless: for though young and small, they are conceived and born in sin and subject to pain, disease and death. But they are saved because they are brought unto Christ, and thus united to Him in a true and living way and made actual participants in his redemption. For out of Him, there is no salvation for any one, no matter how young or old he may be. He tells us solemnly: "No man —or more correctly, not any one,—cometh unto the Father but by me." John xiv. 6. He thus assures us in the most explicit terms, that none, whether adult or child, can be saved without Him. Hence we may understand why He insisted so earnestly upon the little children coming unto Him, and why He was much displeased when His disciples attempted to prevent them from receiving the benediction from His hands.

If we ask what object the parents had in view in bringing their little children to Christ, we are told "that He should put His hands on them, and pray." They were thus brought by the parents and invited by Christ to come, not because they were already pure and holy and heirs of heaven, but that He might make them good and acknowledge them as His children by redemption. Our Lord appeared in the world and solemnly invited young and old, children and adult, to come unto Him, because all were sinners and therefore needed Him as a Saviour. He accordingly says: "I came not to *call* the righteous but sinners to repentance." Luke v. 32. This view I think is confirmed by several passages in the little volume I am reviewing. "Rightly apprehended, then, the invitation of

our Lord, calling the infants to Him, involved a true spiritual approach to Him in his mediatorial character." p. 85. "His words of invitation reveal Him as standing with open heart, ready to receive them into His inmost and saving love." p. 86. Very true. But now it seems to me, the admission of such an approach and reception is fatal to the doctrine of general Infant Salvation. Or are also those children saved, who do not approach Him in His mediatorial character, and who are not received into His inmost and saving love?

The necessity of coming to Christ, even in the case of little children, is still further confirmed by the following beautiful remarks. "The law He here lays down must be allowed to operate as freely as the invitation: 'Come unto me, all ye that labor and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest.' And the phrase. 'Come unto me,' employed in both cases, means substantially the same thing." p. 80. I am aware he makes this statement to show that the invitation given to children, is as general as that extended to the adult. But now I also argue from it the necessity of its acceptance. If the invitation is alike, the duty enjoined is also alike. Christ invites the adult to come unto Him, because they are sinners, and only by accepting the invitation can they hope to be saved. If now the invitation: "Come unto me," means substantially the same thing in its relation to the adult and children, then the duty of acceptance which it imposes is also substantially the same in its relation to both classes of persons. I need not prove at length the ability of little children to come to Christ. Our author admits this in language sufficiently plain and strong. He says: "Infants though they be, requiring parental arms to bear them, they can as effectually and savingly come to Christ as adults, and by an easier approach." p. 86, 87. Of course they cannot come in the same way, that the adult come. For the latter shall come personally in the way of faith, repentance and prayer: deny themselves, believe in Christ and thus receive Him in the fulness of His mediatorial character as their Prophet, Priest

and King. The former, however, cannot come exactly in this way: for they have no sense of sin, no knowledge of guilt, and they cannot repent. Yet they too shall come to be "apprehended" by the grace of God in Christ Jesus. Believing parents shall therefore bring them to the minister of Christ, and ask him to "put his hands on them and pray;" and he shall receive and bless them in the name of Christ, and they have the assurance: "of such is the kingdom of heaven." Baptism I conceive to be the divinely appointed means of bringing them to Him; and of such *baptized* children, it may be said, in our author's language which he uses with reference to the children in the incident before us, "what was visible and corporeal, was but the symbol and pledge of deeper and invisible spiritual operations," p. 81; that Baptism involves for them "a true spiritual approach to Him in His mediatorial character," p. 85; that they are "received" into His inmost and saving love, p. 86; "that some special efficacy was connected with the act," p. 89; and that grace "streamed from the Divine hands of Jesus into the souls of these little children, as really as the life of the vine transfuses itself through the smallest and tenderest shoots," p. 90. His remarks on the reception of these children, and the significance of the imposition of the Saviour's hands are so good, that I can scarcely resist the temptation to transcribe them.

We are told Langé proposes that the words "of such," be rendered: "because *for* such is the kingdom of heaven." This proposition would be also as favorable, if not more favorable, than the common version to my interpretation of these words of Christ. If you ask *for* whom is the kingdom of heaven prepared, the reply must be, for those who are saved through Christ.

To confirm the view he takes of this passage of Scripture, our author quotes the additional remark of St. Mark and St. Luke: "Verily, I say unto you, whosoever shall not receive the kingdom of God as a little child, shall in no wise enter therein." After explaining how a little child receives the kingdom of God, he says: "It is thus, and

thus most prominently, that Jesus holds up these, and through them as types, all infants, as model members of His spiritual kingdom." p. 108. What infants are thus held up by the Lord himself as model members of His spiritual kingdom? Surely not "*all infants*." This is again begging the question; and it also destroys the point of comparison. But those infants, that were thus brought unto Him, and had made a "true spiritual approach to Him in His mediatorial character," are the model members of His spiritual kingdom. By admitting that "*all infants*," even those who never come to Christ, are model members, is virtually representing Him as teaching that the adult can be saved without accepting His invitation: "Come unto me." It is therefore not correct to say, that "they—that is these words—seem plainly to teach that every little child receives the kingdom of heaven." p. 108. Neither can his amplification be admitted: "Whosoever does not receive the kingdom of heaven *as (every) little child receives it*, shall in no wise enter therein." Christ says simply *re-pete*.

I presume there is scarcely another passage of Scripture which is more frequently misinterpreted and misapplied than this: "Suffer the little children to come unto me," &c., and I make this remark at the risk of being charged with a similar offence. To say nothing of "pious and devout commentators," there are also many other persons ever ready to claim the promise without complying with the condition. If a child die, it is often very consolingly said, "of such is the kingdom of heaven," without asking whether it was brought unto Christ or not. The eyes are thus joyfully fixed upon the words which contain the promise, whilst those are quietly passed by upon which that promise is based.

Our author also quotes the following words of Christ as being in favor of his position: "Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones: for I say unto you that in heaven their angels do always behold the face of my Father which is in heaven." "Even so it is not the will of

your heavenly Father that one of these little ones should perish." Matth. xvii: 10-14. It will be observed that our Lord does now in this passage say, not "little ones," but "*these* little ones," which evidently implies that they were before Him and that He also very likely pointed to them. If this was the case, they too had been brought unto Him, and I can also appeal to these words in favor of my interpretation.

"*For the promise is unto you, and your children, and to all that are afar off, even as many as the Lord our God shall call.*" Acts 11: 39. p. 118. This is the next passage of Scripture quoted in favor of the author's doctrine. I cheerfully admit that it asserts in plain terms that the promise is unto the Jews and their children, and also unto the Gentiles and their children—that all are included in that New and Better Covenant and therefore invited without distinction to come to Christ. "Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ, for the remission of sins, and ye shall receive the gift of the Holy Ghost." It will be observed that it says not whether some or all the children will be saved: it simply affirms a "promise," which shows that provision is made for their redemption and that now the means shall be used to secure it. This is the same argument of inclusion in the Covenant which we have already had under consideration: we need therefore not repeat our remarks.

"*Therefore, as by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation: even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners; so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous.*" Rom. 5: 18, 19. p. 128. This we are told is "another special Scripture proof of this cheering doctrine." Being a "special" proof, it claims our earnest attention. The conclusion of this argument is as follows: "As many as were made sinners without their moral assent, 'by one man's disobedience,' and who die before they reach the age in which men become personally responsible," so many, *at least*, shall

"by the obedience of one be made righteous." The whole human race was originally treasured up potentially in Adam, as its first representative, and when he sinned, his sons and daughters sinned in him. Christ the second representative of the human race, made an atonement, which is fully commensurate with the sin entailed by Adam on his posterity and also fully sufficient for all the actual sins of men. Their inclusion in Adam is the ground of their sinfulness by nature, and also constitutes their right to inherit that fatal legacy which he bequeathed to them. But something more than that inclusion is required: for unless a child is born naturally, it never comes into actual possession of original sin. "By the offence of one, judgment came upon all men unto condemnation" as they were included potentially in their federal head: but that judgment comes upon them individually in the form of an actual punishment only by their natural birth. For as long as a child is not "born of the flesh," it is subject to no pain, no sorrow and no death. Their natural birth is therefore necessary not only to become actual members of the human race, but also to inherit original sin. So on the other hand, Christ by virtue of his incarnation took up humanity as a whole, and thus he was prepared to make an atonement "for the sins of the whole world." 1 John 2: 2. This is the ground of salvation and constitutes the right to receive it. But something more again than this is required: for unless a child is now born spiritually it can never come into actual possession of the righteousness of Christ. "By the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life," as they were again included in Christ their second federal Head: but this free gift comes upon them individually in the form of an actual salvation only by their spiritual birth. This is therefore necessary to secure an "actual participation in the redemption of Jesus Christ." In proof of this I can appeal to the second section of our author's treatise, in which he affirms and vindicates the necessity of Infant Regeneration. The fallacy of his argument before us, consists therefore in

tacitly assuming that all little children "have been joined to Christ in regeneration." He admits the necessity; but fails to furnish us with the proof that *all are* regenerated. "As by the offence of one, judgment came upon all men to condemnation: even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." You cannot infer, however, that all little children are "born of the Spirit," because they are "born of the flesh." Many shall be made righteous in Christ by His obedience, just as many were made sinners in Adam by his disobedience: but now as the natural birth is necessary in the case of the latter to inherit original sin, so the spiritual birth is necessary in the case of the former to inherit that righteousness which has been procured for them. As pertinent as our author's arguments are in proving the necessity of Infant Regeneration, so pertinent are they also in requiring him to prove that all little children are regenerated, before he can affirm their salvation.

"But the promised seed of the woman so far counteracts and remedies this sore evil—(viz: of the fall),—that none perish eternally because of that entailed condemnation. The inherited penalty is annulled." p. 133. What becomes now of the original or inherited sins of the adult? According to this view, they were forgiven and the penalty was annulled, when they were little children. Or was all this taken back again, when they grew up to manhood and did "by their own free, personal act willfully cleave" to their sins? It seems to me if sins are once forgiven, and if a penalty is once annulled, they are gone forever. Or is this sore evil of the fall counteracted and remedied, and is this inherited penalty annulled, only in the case of those who die in infancy? If so, by what authority does he make such a distinction in regard to inherited sin, between those who go down to an early grave, and those who grow up to manhood? Were they not in all respects alike in infancy? Did they not sustain the same relation to Adam, and also precisely the same to Christ? Surely if all little children "are destined by His grace to be received into

His arms as soon as they are born," their advantages must be alike. How can our author, therefore, according to this view, successfully maintain the doctrine of original sin in regard to the adult? That the Heidelberg Catechism calls for their "original as well as actual sins," will appear when we come to notice his last argument. The adulterer, the murderer and the pirate were once little children, and had they died in their infancy, I presume some would have been sure of their salvation. In speaking of Judas Iscariot, Christ tells us: it had been good for that man, not if he had died in infancy, but if he had not been born. Matth. xxvi. 24.

As already remarked, the conclusion our author draws from this passage of Scripture, is this, as many as were made sinners without their moral assent 'by one man's disobedience,' and die in infancy, "so many at least, shall by the obedience of one be made righteous." To confirm his opinion "that St. Paul really meant to affirm this very doctrine," he quotes the following: "For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." 1 Cor. xv. 22. p. 186. This death in Adam the author refers to a bodily death, and being made alive in Christ, he refers to the resurrection from the dead. But resurrection is certainly not righteousness. To "revive the bodies of these little slumberers in their narrow tombs," is not making them "righteous." To establish his view of the previous passage, he ought to have planted himself upon univeralistical ground, and said, as all were made sinners in Adam, so shall all be made righteous in Christ. But from such an interpretation he shrunk, when he came to explain these words. The two passages are not exactly alike, and hence cannot be used in this way. For the former refers to sin in Adam and righteousness in Christ: but the latter refers to temporal death in Adam, and the resurrection in Christ from the dead.

He uses also the passage of Scripture before us as an argument, if not directly at least indirectly, to prove his doctrine. Every one, I suppose will admit, that all, the

adult and children, became mortal in Adam, and that all will be raised up from their graves by Christ. But now although He will raise up all little children from their narrow tombs, it does by no means follow, that all will therefore be saved. He will also raise up all the adult from their graves, and yet this is no proof of their salvation. If this passage teaches universal infant salvation, it also teaches universal adult salvation. For St. Paul does not distinguish in this case between infants and the adult: he includes both in the word "all" in each proposition. I am pleased to find that our author by his own interpretation, has not only destroyed his argument, but also escaped the charge of teaching Universalism. For he has limited this being "made alive" to the resurrection, and resurrection is not salvation. Christ tells us there is a "resurrection of life," and also a "resurrection of damnation." John v. 29.

His remarks in regard to the good even infants may accomplish, their birth day, their sickness, their death, and their graves, are beautiful, and well calculated to touch the hearts of parents. Some scenes are thus vividly brought before their minds, through which they have passed, and in which they have been deeply interested.

Finally he says: "The last Scripture proof of the doctrine of general Infant Salvation which I shall adduce, is furnished by the *revealed object of the final judgment.*" p. 144. The only ground of everlasting condemnation in the judgment day, he tells us, will be personal sins freely committed by the sentenced transgressor. I cannot expose and refute the error of this argument better than by quoting the language of the Heidelberg Catechism. The tenth Question asks: "Will God suffer such disobedience and rebellion to go unpunished? Answer. By no means, but is terribly displeased with our original as well as actual sins: and will punish them in his judgment temporally and eternally." Actual sins and personal sins, I presume are synonymous terms. It will be observed that according to the Catechism, God is terribly displeased with our *original* as well as actual or personal sins, and will *punish*

them, (the original as well as the actual or personal sins) temporally and *eternally*. Is it then correct to say : "the only ground of everlasting condemnation in the judgment day, will be *personal sins* freely committed by the sentenced transgressor" ? There is evidently a discrepancy between this statement and the doctrine of the Heidelberg Catechism in regard to the object of the final judgment. If the doctrine of general Infant Salvation requires such a view of the judgment, it is *prima facie* evidence of its erroneousness.

He says : " Read the Saviour's description of the character of those who shall then go away into everlasting punishment, and tell me, can departed infants be included in that class " ? p. 145. I answer by saying: Read the Saviour's description of the character of those who shall then go into everlasting life, and tell me, are departed infants included in that class ? Again he asks: " When did they deny Him before men, that it should be supposed He would deny them before His Father in heaven " ? I reply by asking: When did they confess Him before men, that it should be supposed He would confess them before His Father in heaven ? Equally irrelevant are his remarks in regard to the character of barren fig trees, the unprofitable servant, and the guests that spurned the wedding garment. It is a rule: " From negative premises you can infer nothing."

It seems to me, the esteemed author has omitted a strong, if not one of the strongest arguments in favor of Infant Salvation. It is found in St. Paul's Epistle to the Romans vi: 8-5: " *Know ye not that so many of us as were baptized into Jesus Christ, were baptized into his death ? Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death : that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life. For if we have been planted together in the likeness of his death, we shall be also in the likeness of his resurrection.*" Being thus buried with Christ by baptism into His death, infants participate in the grace of the Gospel, and in this way the benefits of his me-

diatorial work are not only promised to them, but also transferred to them. Being planted together in the likeness of His death, they shall also be planted in the likeness of His resurrection. This argument of course proves the salvation only of the *baptized*, not of the unbaptized. Are not therefore these words of Paul a refutation of the doctrine, that all children are saved, whether baptized or not?

His doctrine of general Infant Salvation, necessarily implies that some will be saved without baptism, (for it is known that many die who have not been baptized) and yet the author wishes to show the importance of Infant Baptism in the fourth section of his treatise. A question, therefore, meets him in the beginning, which he states in the following words: "But why, if children dying in infancy will certainly be saved, whether baptized or not, why have them baptized at all?" p. 153. I have endeavored to give his replies to this question "a candid consideration," but must confess they do not satisfy me: for it seems to me, his arguments and illustrations serve to prove only the *right* of infants to be baptized. That I am not mistaken, is evident from his own concluding remark. For he says: "If, therefore, the considerations just presented satisfy you, as I think they must, that even such children, (viz: those dying in infancy) *are entitled* to the sacrament," &c. p. 162, 163. See also p. 161. That all children have a *right* to be baptized, because they are included in the covenant, and because redemption from sin is promised to them, all will admit who have faith in the doctrine of the Heidelberg Catechism. But this is not answering the question: "Why have them baptized at all, if they will certainly be saved without baptism?" By admitting their certain salvation, it will be no easy matter to prove the necessity, or even the importance of Infant Baptism. And this is one of the most common and plausible objections to it. Just so soon as parents think it unnecessary or even unimportant, they will neglect to have their children baptized. Were I an unbeliever, I would be disposed to say:

He tells me that my unbaptized child will be saved, and that is all I want. I ask not what he says of Infant Depravity, and Infant Regeneration and Infant Baptism : he may adduce never so many passages of Scripture in favor of these doctrines, and be never so logical in stating and explaining, and never so eloquent in defending them; if in the end he only assures me that my child will be saved, I am satisfied. By giving me this assurance, he tells me that his *baptized* child is no better than mine, and mine is no worse than his : that his has gained nothing, and mine lost nothing. *For both are saved.* Why therefore baptize it? Please prove the necessity of Infant Baptism, after admitting the certain salvation of the unbaptized.

In this connexion I most respectfully remind the esteemed author of his own language. In speaking of the neglect of Infant Baptism, he says : "It is because infants are thought to be somehow released from innate sin and sure of salvation, even independently of the Gospel plan of salvation, that it is held to be practically unimportant, or at least unessential, whether they be baptized or not." p. 15. Does he not himself think they are "*somewhat released from innate sin and sure of salvation*," by allowing their salvation without baptism? Does he not also hold it "*to be practically unimportant, or at least unessential, whether they be baptized or not?*" Perhaps, however, he may answer, not "*independently of the Gospel plan of salvation*." But pray what is this Gospel plan of salvation? Undoubtedly the redemption through the Lord Jesus Christ. The atonement, however, by itself as long as it remains without and beyond man, will not save him: it must pass over to him, to deliver him from the law of sin and death, and impart to him a new principle of life and immortality. He admits this in the following words : "We do know, likewise, that in order to be saved by Jesus Christ, they must be found in Christ, be quickened in their souls by Him and have His atonement really applied to them." p. 42. But how "*applied?*" The power of the Holy Ghost is truly necessary: but must not also means

be used, not only in the case of the adult, but even in the case of little children? The redeemed are miracles of grace, saved in a mysterious way, but not without means. Just as Christ used means in performing miracles—clay to open the eyes of the blind, bread and fishes to feed the hungry, and water to make wine,—so he also uses means, even *his own*, in making us participants in the blessings of his atonement. Hence he appointed the Sacraments of Baptism and the Holy Supper, and so solemnly enjoined their use. Are they not means to be used in carrying out that plan?

In all covenants with man something must be done on his part. Thus, for instance, all the members of the human race were included potentially in “the first covenant made with Adam in Paradise.” And yet that inclusion by itself was not sufficient: there was to be obedience or disobedience. Adam disobeyed, and that disobedience of their federal head was the means of bringing death upon the whole race. Rom. 5: 12. So also in the Abrahamic covenant. All the children of the Jews were included in it, and entitled to all the temporal and spiritual blessings of Judaism. And yet they did not receive these blessings, unless they were circumcised. Circumcision was the divinely appointed means of receiving them into the covenant and of preparing them to enjoy its advantages. They had not only a *right* to be circumcised, but the circumcision was the means or the condition upon the fulfillment of which life itself as well as all the blessings of Judaism were suspended. The uncircumcised were excluded from the covenant and disinherited. All male children were accordingly to be circumcised; and in case a child, though included in the covenant and entitled to its blessings, was not circumcised, it was not allowed to inherit the blessings of God’s people. For the Lord told Abraham: “That soul shall be cut off.” In their case the promise did not “hold unconditionally good.” If “denied the sacrament by the negligence or unbelief of parents,” were they not excluded from the covenant, disinherited and put to death? Was

it not "thus in the power of a skeptical father or mother," to prevent them from enjoying life, together with all the advantages of the people of God? Our author tells us: "Indeed if they neglected it they should be condignly punished, (I say they, the negligent parents, not the unoffending children) by being at once deprived of those children, of whom they thus proved themselves so unworthy." p. 166. He thus admits in terms sufficiently plain the necessity of circumcision as a condition of enjoying the privileges of Judaism. Such negligent parents, it is true, were punished by sustaining the loss of their children: but the punishment itself fell most directly and heavily upon the children themselves. For they lost far more than the parents did. Their loss was life itself, together with the enjoyment of the temporal and spiritual blessings of Judaism. Gen. xvii: 14. Were not their exclusion, dispossession and temporal death significant? Did they not point to something similar beyond that which was seen and temporal? Did not the covenant look to a spiritual and eternal inheritance, of which Canaan was but a type? It will be remembered that these uncircumcised children were thus excluded, disinherited and put to death, according to a divine command. Their death was not accidental, nor even the result of some malignant disease, which had baffled the physician's skill, but it was a punishment inflicted by a judicial sentence. If unworthy of a temporal life and a residence in Canaan, why worthy of a spiritual life and a home in heaven? If not fit to be with the Jews in the temple at Jerusalem, why fit to be in the upper Sanctuary? Could it be said of them in that popular, but questionable language, "early lost to be early saved?" If they were "unoffending," the punishment seems to have been unjust. They had no voice in deciding the question of their circumcision, just like the sons and daughters of Adam were not consulted in regard to the propriety of eating the forbidden fruit in the garden, yet that did not screen them from suffering the penalty. The descendants of Adam might just as well be called "unoffending:" and yet of

them it must be said individually, what is said of the uncircumcised male child of the Jews, "he hath broken my covenant."

Now we are told: "Baptism was substituted in the place of circumcision." p. 168. Very true. See also Heidelberg Catechism, Quest. 74. Our author declares, "the fact itself is undeniable. St. Paul affirms it in Colossians 2: 11, 12." What is the inference? If the disobedience of Adam was necessary to bring death upon his descendants, and if circumcision was necessary in the Abrahamic covenant to secure the blessings of Judaism, is not Baptism in like manner necessary to secure the blessings of the New and Better Covenant? If indeed, "This law of the Old dispensation was transferred to the New dispensation," p. 168, are not now the unbaptized like the uncircumcised, also excluded and disinherited? If simply "the outward *form* of the sacrament was changed," it seems to me, that then Baptism is equally necessary in the New dispensation. The attentive reader feels that our author's argument of circumcision proves too much for him. For in speaking of the circumcision of the Gentile proselytes, *adults and children*, he says: "This was made the *invariable condition* of their being admitted to that great typical feast of the Jews, which so *præeminently* foreshadowed the spiritual blessings of the Better Covenant." p. 167. It accordingly establishes not only the "*right*" to be baptized, but also the necessity. And this is more than he wants—more than is consistent with his doctrine of Infant Salvation. If circumcision was "*the invariable condition*," is not Baptism also "*the invariable condition*," because of its substitution? With such examples of the conditions of the covenant before me, and his admission of the necessity of circumcision, I cannot admit the conclusion that all children will certainly be saved, whether baptized or not.

In conclusion, I most respectfully quote the author's statement of the benefits of Infant Baptism as a refutation of his doctrine of general Infant Salvation. Those benefits are as follows, viz.:

1. *In Baptism the child receives, through the promised mercy of God in Jesus Christ, immediate release from the penalty of original sin by a formal covenant transaction.*" p. 177.
2. *The second benefit secured, is the official removal, from the child properly baptized, of the stain or pollution of native depravity.*" p. 177, 178.
3. *The third benefit, is the present renewal of the nature of the child in Christ Jesus by the Holy Ghost.*" p. 179.
4. *The last direct benefit which he specifies, is that God graciously receives such children into special covenant relationship with Himself through Jesus Christ, makes them the objects of His peculiar care, mercifully promises to bestow upon them such spiritual blessings as will promote the growth of grace granted at their baptism.*" p. 180, 181.

It will be seen that he does not hesitate to say in plain terms what he regards as the benefits of Infant Baptism, and I have no disposition to quarrel with him in regard to this point, yea I am rather pleased that he represents Baptism as a means of grace, and therefore rises above many modern authors who look upon it as an empty form. If now, however, in *Baptism the child receives immediate release from the penalty of original sin—if Baptism is the official removal of the stain of native depravity—if it is the present renewal of the nature of the child in Christ Jesus by the Holy Ghost, and if grace was granted to it at its baptism, what becomes now of the unbaptized children?* If these are the benefits of Baptism, then the unbaptized cannot possess them, or are they communicated in some other way? And yet we are assured they are saved. Can they be saved without these benefits—without a release from the penalty of original sin, without the official removal of the stain of native depravity, without the present renewal of their nature in Christ Jesus, and without grace being granted unto them? To allow the certain salvation of the unbaptized is virtually to say that those benefits are after all of little or no account so far as their ultimate happiness is concerned. It is saying to the baptized, You have gained nothing in the end; and to the unbaptized, You have lost nothing. You

are both saved. If, therefore, the above mentioned benefits are really of any account in securing the salvation of the baptized, they are to that extent a refutation of the doctrine of general Infant Salvation.

Taking all these things together,—“keeping in view the Saviour’s treatment of little children, and His declaration concerning them,”—remembering that all covenants have certain conditions, upon the fulfilment of which their blessings are suspended,—adding to these the argument of St. Paul in Romans 6: 3-5, and the above described benefits of Infant Baptism,—let me ask, has the respected author established the doctrine, that all little children dying in infancy will certainly be saved, whether baptized or not?

I have examined this little volume with much interest, and I trust also with profit: but failing to establish this doctrine, it has served only to strengthen the view which I held before. Had the author limited himself to the salvation of baptized children, the most of his arguments would be relevant and forcible, and his book would be calculated to do much good: but by allowing himself to include all children, and thus even the unbaptized, he has involved himself in inconsistency and neutralized some of his forcible statements. I cannot conclude without expressing my regret that I have found it necessary to differ with a beloved brother in the ministry on such an interesting and important subject as Infant Salvation.

N. S. S.

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and I will not offend the Lord with my tongue; for I have not uttered in the assembly of God a word that was not right.

### ART. III.—THE CLOSING CHAPTERS OF THE BOOK OF JOB. THE IDEA OF THE DIVINE SOVEREIGNTY.

The Epic Drama of Job, as we may style it without irreverence, or detracting, in the least, from its claim to the highest inspiration, is divided into three distinct parts, the introductory prose narrative or prologue, the intervening discourses from chapter iii. to chapter xxxviii., and the grand finale. The great thought of the book is suggested in the first, its explanation is given in the third; the middle part, though by far the largest, is incidental and preparatory to this development. If this view be correct, then the key is to be found in the introduction. The wonder is that commentators should have thought of looking anywhere else for it. We should rather say, the key so far as it can be found at all; for it becomes the great question whether this is not the real design of the book, to teach us the incomprehensibility of the divine ways, or the negative, yet by no means barren, fact, that God's dealings with men and earthly things have not always their ultimate reference to men themselves, but are sometimes grounded, or may be grounded, wholly or partially, in reasons belonging to the super-human and super-earthly sphere. We are ever seeking such reason in the human destiny in itself considered, or in something which may be regarded as mere human discipline either in this world, or for the world to come. And this may be true, if by human discipline be meant unquestioning submission to the divine will, whether understood or not, and that on the ground of an a priori conviction that such will must be connected with an infinite knowledge and an infinite goodness. There are reasons, high and holy reasons, but these may altogether transcend the sphere of earth. Man may be their im-

mediate subject, and yet they may have ultimate reference to something altogether aside from human destiny. Thus there is an intimation, and more than an intimation, that even the Church is not for itself alone, or that its mere human salvation, though so important and exclusive an aim for us, is not the highest end as concerns the universe of ascending powers, or the wider kingdom of God—"Which thing the angels desire to stoop down that they may see,—" That now unto Principalities and Powers in the Heavens, there might be made known, through the Church, the *greatly varied* (*πολυποίησος*) or manifold wisdom of God."

Such a thought is impressed upon us in the opening scene of this book. We may call it a mythical accommodation, or a transcending actuality, yet still the great truth remains the same. Not only is the transaction super-earthly but the reasons are super-earthly. Human happiness, human integrity, human discipline are involved in the trial, but it is not ultimately made, nevertheless, for human happiness, or human culture, in any sense that we can see, or for any thing terminating in human destiny in itself considered, or aside from the universal divine government. It is, indeed, "written for our learning," but the lesson we are to learn, and which it may do us good to learn, is, that both our destiny and our discipline are connected with things beyond the human, things we cannot know, and to which, therefore, we must submit without knowledge, unless He who is higher than all chooses to reveal it unto us,—in other words, that the reasons of the divine proceedings in this world must be often incomprehensible, except so far as this very fact of incomprehensibility is taught us for our discipline in faith, and unquestioning assent to the divine righteousness. Paradoxical as it may seem, there may be a revelation of the highest value in the unknown, and of the unknown. Man may be the earthly exponent, and it is much for him to know, it may be salutary for him to know, that he may be the earthly exponent of problems that relate to Principalities, and Powers, and Thrones, and Dominions, good and evil,—that his earthly drama is, in

short, connected with other worlds, widely separate in space and rank from the human sphere. We do indeed revolt at the thought that our sufferings here serve merely as the solution of curious problems for beings of a higher order, or that they constitute merely an *experimentum factum in corpore vili*, according to that philosophy, or that theology, which would ever sacrifice the parts for the wholes, the individuals for the races, the races for that soulless abstraction the "whole of being." This cannot be the true doctrine of the divine sovereignty. We get it not from revelation, we get it not from conscience; it is not human pride but a true faith in God that rebels against it. It comes from the blind study of the physical orders.

'Tis Nature lends this evil dream,  
So careful of the type she seems,  
So careless of the single life.

But we cannot receive it. The individual must have something that is for itself; whatever has been truly informed by the eternal Word must have its *proprium*, however far down it may be in the scale. Even in the lowest forms of life God must have some higher thought than is declared by this all-sacrificing theory. Our heart goes here with one who has been called a sceptical poet,

That not a worm is cloven in vain,  
That not a moth with vain desire  
Is shrivelled in a fruitless fire,  
Or but subserves another's gain.

Even the lower creations "wait with longing for the manifestation of the sons of God," and little as we are in ourselves revelation assures us, as nothing else can assure us, that our Maker does not cast us off. "We must needs die, and we seem like water spilled upon the ground that cannot be gathered up again, yet does God devise means that his remote ones be not wholly expelled from him,"\*—*ne penitus pereat qui abjectus est*. Both Scripture and conscience, or the a priori light of the soul, require of us to hold this firmly, and yet, in perfect consistency with it, it is good

\* 2 Samuel xiv: 14.

for us to think, it may be even elevating for us to think, that the ratio we bear to lower things may be similar to the ratio that is borne to us by powers and worlds above. It is not good for man to fancy himself at the summit, or any where near the summit of created being. He rises when he sees his lowliness, in other words, the hight above him. Faith is the spiritually ennobling power, with whatever physical rank of being it may be connected. The Scripture describes man as a worm, but when he gets a view of his Father God looking down upon him a vertice coeli, then it is that the more humble his place the more sublime his thought, the greater his true moral worth as he rejoices in the ranks of being above and the glory of God as manifested therein, yea the clearer his vision of the divine heavens as he gazes upward from the sight-aiding valley of humiliation.

In this ancient\* book of Job the curtain of the invisible is slightly withdrawn, and we have a glimpse of this idea. The scene opens with the heavenly throne, the Sons of God, the Great Malignant Power. There is a defiant denial of any such thing as true goodness or true faith on the part of a finite being, of any true submission to God on the ground of the unquestioned divine power as ever fulfilling the command of a divine wisdom and a divine goodness. It is assumed that there can be no unselfish submission having as its reason faith in the holy without reference to any present or future life, or to any discipline or destiny, or any conceivable good or happiness, near or remote, that might be regarded as the *motive*, or the selfish moving cause to such submision. "Job does not serve God for nought." And this the Evil One means to affirm of every finite being. No one serves God for nought. He denies that there can be any act that does not proceed from

\* It is well known that the antiquity claimed for this book is denied by some modern criticism. There is not space nor time, in the present article for its proof, and the writer can only say here that a careful study of its internal evidence has fully convinced him that Herder is right in assigning it a date older than any writings of Moses.

a near or a remote, a gross or refined, a carnal or a spiritual selfishness. There can be no pure love of right, no unselfish submission to God because he is God, no rapt adoration of the Holy One on the ground of his holiness unseen in its reasons yet unquestioned as to its essence and idea. Thus it will be seen that a future life for the sufferer cannot furnish the solution of the problem, and is, therefore, not to be looked for as furnishing the express or implied lesson of the book. No doctrine of compensations either in this world or another can satisfy this malignant yet most sublime question. Satan might still reply, and the reply would have received still an addition to its force : "Does Job serve God for nought?"

In the dramatic representation it is God who first makes the challenge. He knew, what Satan could form no conception of, that there might be a finite being,—one very low, it might be, in the physical scale—who could yet partake of the infinite unselfishness. He knew that his almighty power and grace could bring forth and sustain such a being. "Hast thou considered my servant Job, that there is none like him in all the earth, a man whole and straight, (*integer et rectus*) a man fearing God and departing from evil?" It is vehemently denied by the fallen angel, —such a man does not exist, such integrity cannot be found. It is even implied that God himself could not make such an one. All are as evil as himself. All virtue is but a barter, all righteousness but a bargain of some kind. Job's fear of God is not the transeending, holy, self-forgetting reverence—the reality of any such thing is utterly denied—but a crouching service for pay ; his love is, at the highest but a selfish gratitude, a carnal complacency in the blessings so abundantly showered upon him. Change thy dealings with him, and his moral relations, his moral character, are instantly changed. Right, for him, no longer exists when severed from all connection with his happiness, his destiny, as the measuring standard. "Put forth thy hand now." The Hebrew particle here is very expressive. It is a sneering disjunctive implying a strong negation like the Greek *οὐ μην διλλά*—"No, no, just try him

now," or as the Vulgate well renders it, *sed extende paululum manum tuum*, "but put forth thine hand only ever so little," lay but a finger on him, touch any thing that he possesses, and see "if he will not curse\* thee to thy face." A full commission is given to try the experiment, and the evil angel goes out from the presence of the Lord.

Here then is the great design of the book. It is the settlement of the question thus started in the super-human world. The defeat of Satan, the moral power of God triumphant in the fact of such a faith, and such an integrity, even though brought out in this poor inhabitant of the lower sphere,—this is a finale far beyond any conceived of in the Homeric or Miltonic drama. It is for the soul of Job they contend;† this is both the prize and the scene of the conflict. On the one side is the Mightiest of Apostate powers, on the other "Michael the great Prince of his people,"‡ the Good Angel, or the Angel of Good who figures so largely in the eastern traditions, and who is not obscurely alluded to in the intervening chapters of this book. It is the Angel of the Presence, the מלך מלכים, the *Angelus intercedens*, or "One among a thousand"§. It is "the Witness in the Heavens" the "Watcher on high,"|| It is the Goel or next of kin, the Redeemer anciently proclaimed, the אדוננו, the last Adam, or *Survivor Kinsman*,¶ the "Avenger of blood" who was to stand over their dust and redeem his slain brethren from the dominion of Hades. Such is the conflict; but to reveal this is not the end of the poem; at least we are not told so. Such is the discipline, and such the human hope that emerges from it; but again, to reveal this

\* We are satisfied that this old rendering of זכָר gives the true force of this much disputed passage. Still it comes to very much the same thing on the other rendering if we observe carefully the force of the adjuring particles כִּי and שְׁאָל. "And see now whether or no he will bless thee to thy face?"

† Compare the Iliad xxii: 161.

‡ Daniel x: 18-21; xii: 1.

§ Job xxxiii: 28.

|| Job xvi: 19, "Testis meus in coelo, conscius meus in excelso."

¶ Job xix: 25.

is not the end of the drama; at least we are not told so. Neither is it to teach us the fact of another life, or the need of a hope in another life to clear up the problems of this. On the contrary, we are surprised to find how it is kept out of view, or thrown in the back ground when introduced, as it is sometimes, incidentally, and for collateral effect. Here and there are glimpses of such an idea coming in rather as a musing soliloquy or a wondering conception barely presented to the mind, whether as an individual suggestion or as a part of the better thinking of the age, and then dismissed as having little or no connection with the argument or the denouement of the drama. There passes before the soul, occasionally, the transient thought of another state of being, sometimes as the promptings of suffering, or again as the old Arabian idea of some future renovation of man and the earth, but it immediately departs, leaving the darkness dense as ever, the great question still unanswered. The remembrance of the old promise of the Goel or Redeemer gives a momentary strength. In such passages as Job xix: 25, he seems to have for the time a vivid conception that some Great One is contending for him against the malign evil power, but the thought is not pursued. Even after that great expression of trust in the conquering Redeemer which he wished "engraved as a testimony upon the rock forever," how soon do we find him talking again in the same desponding querulous strain: "why do the wicked live, why do they grow old, why do they increase in power and prosperity?"

What some have thought the great question of the drama receives no solution in these intervening discourses. But perhaps it is awaiting the denouement; the previous darkness is all the greater, that the light when it breaks upon us, may be the more brilliant. When the denouement comes however the problem remains still unsolved. Not only is the future life in its connection with the present destiny still kept out, but no allusion is made to any subordinate idea connected with it, as preparatory to such a revelation, or as showing the need of it. In fact, it

stands wholly aside, as furnishing, even if revealed, no adequate solution of the question with which the poem opens as started in the super-earthly scene. The whole of human destiny, regarded by itself, and separate from all things else in the universe, would not be sufficient for such an explanation. It would be only taking us a step beyond the present; it would still be partial and is, therefore, wholly left out in this mysterious close, whose only lesson seems to be that first, and, for man, most necessary, doctrine, that "Gods ways are not as our ways, nor his thoughts as our thoughts,"—that "*he can do all things*," and that we are to believe that all that he doeth is right, good, holy, just, merciful, whether we can see how it is or not. Interesting as is the knowledge of a future life, there is a higher still. Such a submissive unquestioning faith on the part of a finite being is of more value, it is, indeed, a higher spiritual attainment, it brings us nearer to God himself, than any amount of knowledge, ever, as knowledge, unsatisfactory, because, as knowledge, it must be 'not only imperfect but ever infinitely far from the perfect. Without such faith, too, coming first, the knowledge would not be true knowledge; for here, if any where, must that great maxim of Anselm hold true, *Credo ut intelligam*. We must believe that we may understand.

May we not see in this thought something of a reason for that mysterious reserve which, throughout the Old Testament, is maintained in respect to a future life. It was not good for man that he should be first taught this knowledge that he was to live again, and how he was to live again. It might make him presumptuous, speculative, full of the conceit of a curious spiritual science, unless something else were previously taught which might turn such knowledge to good, and make it a means of humility instead of the vain theorising of the reason, or the lawless roving, of the imagination.

There is, indeed in the Old Scriptures the thought of a divinely sustained future life, and yet we may say it is but a thought, a hope, not expressly revealed any where but

some how springing up in the human soul and ripened by the divine Spirit, that there is still for the righteous departed a "living unto God,"\* by reason of which hope He is justly styled the "God of the fathers" the "God of his people," "their dwelling place in all generations"† even the generations that are past regarded as still making a continuous living community with generations on the earth.

It is difficult now to separate this thought of another life for man from the theistic idea. We can hardly conceive of a spiritual religion without it. But it was not so in the early world. Men were devout, godly, deeply religious, in other words, they had a true spiritual faith, they regarded themselves as "living to God," and as living in God, although they had none, or the faintest notion of what would become of them after death. There was really something most sublime in this patriarchial faith,—the soul thus standing on the shore of the unknown, before it the great ocean of being, but no glimpse, and only the dimmest hope, of any isle or continent beyond. It was the wonder of the unsearchable, so different from the worldly indifference which grows out of our petty advance in science. Knowing nothing of nature but its greatness and divinity, with history all a blank, having no guide in any outward experience, with no knowledge of what might befall it here or in any world to come, it still trusted God the one great spiritual source of being,—trusted him for its *all* of life, its whole of destiny.

With all its dimness, too, and outward ignorance, this earliest thought of Deity clothed him with epithets that have never been surpassed in sublimity. No where are there such grand names of God as in the book of Genesis. He is El-Shaddai, El-Olam, El-Elion, All-mighty, Eternal, Most High. Each passes beyond every known boundary of the sense,—stronger than all power, enduring beyond all time, higher than all height. The *conceptual* knowledge

\* See our Saviour's interpretation of the Old Testament, Luke 20: 28.

† Psalm xc: 1.

attending this patriarchal *idea*, how small, it may be thought, when compared with our science! Yet how unphilosophical in us to regard this limitation of sense imagery as at all the measure of its spirituality! "The strength of the hills," the years beyond the flood, the top-most altitude of the visible sky, such were the bounding phenomenal *conceptions* out of which these epithets arose; but the *idea* (to make the necessary distinction which Hamilton and Mansel so strangely overlook) the *idea* itself, with its three vast *infinities*, eternity, all-mightiness, transcending rank of being, this lay in the patriarchal mind as perfectly *thought* as by our proudest modern science with all its accumulated facts of forces, space, and time.

So stood this grand patriarchal theism. God was all in all. The human destiny was lost sight of in the contemplation, or rather was regarded as wrapped up in it. All living was involved in the idea, and if there was a future life, it was a "living unto God." The first form of the doctrine was that of translation. God took away the righteous to be with Him. And so was it told of Enoch when he was no longer found\* on earth. A man so holy, they said, must still be living; somehow and somewhere he still "walked with God." It was a bare thought not yet risen to the rank of a dogma. It was the first faint light dawning upon another existence after the total darkness that followed the primeval sentence of death. A holy life suggests the idea in the minds of men, and all the divine language of the promises, though seeming to carry an earthly aspect, does yet confirm it: "He calls himself their God;" they could not, therefore, be wholly lost, they must, at least, in some sense, "still live unto Him." But of psychological conditions they knew not, they thought not.

\* Heb. xi: 5. The Apostle's language, taken from the Septuagint, is a full but a fair translation of Gen. v: 24—"And he was not." Vulgate, *Non apparuit, he appeared no more, or he disappeared.* The imperfect tense in the Greek would imply the idea of a failure after continuous search. It was a strange disappearance. Men long sought for him afterwards, as they did for the bodies of Moses and Elias, but he could nowhere be found.

They were learning that other first and greater lesson in theology. The spirit world was the second, only to have its true value for souls here trained in absolute, all yielding submission to the higher dogma. Is there not much in modern experience to show the evil of reversing this order of ideas, of coming to regard the human spiritual destiny as the primary thought in religion, and God as something ministerial or mediate to it. We refer not now to the naturalistic form of spiritualism so rife among us, but to much that appears in the better thinking of the religious world. We may yet learn from the Old Testament. We may see a glory in its theism thus standing alone in its sublimity. Boast as we may of our progress in science and theology, unless this order is preserved, our faith, our reverence, our highest thought of God, may fall far below that of the Syrian Pilgrim, or of this ancient son of the East whose sufferings and experience are recorded in the book before us.

Such was the state of the earliest belief in a life to come; but that other awful doctrine these old Scriptures are full of. Here there is no reserve. Every where are we met with the idea of an absolute divine sovereignty as connected with an absolute divine righteousness in which we are to confide whatever may be the human destiny,—to believe in it all the same, and to adore it all the same, whether man is the creature of a day, and created for brief temporary ends, or has an existence immensely prolonged in the flowing aeons, or even absolutely eternal. When this first faith, this unquestioning submission is not first taught, and carefully preserved at whatever cost, this other dogma of a future life, or a spirit-world, not only becomes a speculative conceit liable to be corrupted (as it was among the Greeks and other heathen nations) both by fancy and philosophy, but may actually lead man farther from God by widening the range and so increasing the power of his unhealed selfishness.

Such seems to be the lesson taught in the close of this wonderful poem. Most readers, we think, will admit their

astonishment at two things, so different do we find them from what something in our own thinking, countenanced, apparently, by certain declarations of the book itself, had led us to expect. The first is the passionate outbreak in the third chapter, or the beginning of the strictly dramatic part; the second disappointment is felt when we come to the sublime theophany at the close. We wonder at the absence there of any such explanation of the mystery as we are led to expect, especially if we follow the common interpretation of the plan and design of the book.

In respect to the first, how abrupt the transition! From God's answer to Satan (ch. 2:8) and especially from Job's noble declaration (ch. 1:20) after the loss of his property and children, we expect an attitude altogether different from that presented in the opening of the third chapter. "The Lord hath given, the Lord hath taken, blessed be the name of the Lord :" the triumph over Satan, whether regarded as God's triumph or Job's triumph, would seem complete. There is indeed something in the second infliction that might seem severer than the first. It consisted not only in the sharp bodily pain he was made to endure, and which, to some human temperaments, is so terribly unendurable, but in the nature of the revelation as tending to produce the despairing thought that he was personally cast out, given over by God to the utmost torment of a most malignant adversary. It has some, though a faint resemblance, to that other mysterious cry which so surprises us by its extreme and unexpected agony—"My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me." Still we are not prepared for the abrupt transition here. Even when Satan had put forth his hand and touched his flesh, he still shows this hearty trust, this sublime patriarchal faith: "Shall we receive good at the hands of God and shall we not receive evil." The acknowledgment of the absolute divine sovereignty and the inconceivability of its doing what is unjust, seems complete. "In all this Job sinned not with his lips nor charged God foolishly."

Seven days and nights of silence are passed, and how

changed the scene ! Job opens his mouth and curses his day. Has Satan triumphed, or do we forget that the contest is not between him and his victim, but between Satan and God, or rather the Great Guardian Angel of humanity, the Goel or Redeemer, to whom Job so mysteriously, yet so pathetically, alludes in subsequent passages. This Mighty One is to triumph, but it is to be in his servants weakness. To this final victory the temporary fall was to be subservient. It is not declared that Job was to exhibit no sign of failure. We are not to press the Hebrew word commonly used to denote perfection or integrity to any such extreme. Any other view would make it that false stoicism, so different from the Scriptural resignation to the holy and rational divine will. It would, moreover, leave no room for any dramatic representation; and when we speak thus of the book as a drama, we do not thereby weaken its claim either to inspiration or historical verity. There is to be a real conflict. It is prepared in the super-human sphere, but it is to be fought here on earth, and in the human spirit. The earthly actor fails in the beginning; he would fail utterly were he not sustained throughout and finally made conqueror by the divine interposition. And this victory too ; it is a different one from what many a reader would expect. It is not the victory of insensibility, or of mere endurance ; it is not the victory of a soaring philosophy, or of a hyper-religionism making a merit of its humility. Job is all sincere. There is no show, no cant of any kind, no mere sentiment about him. He struggles, he pleads, he argues to the very verge, and sometimes beyond the verge, of irreverence. How bold, yes we may venture to use the word, how manly is he in his expostulations with his Maker : " Why hidest thou thy face from me, and countest me thine enemy ? How many are my iniquities, O show me my transgression ? Wilt thou show thy power against the leaf that is driven by the wind, wilt thou pursue me as the light stubble ? For thou writest bitter things against me, and makest me inherit the sins of my youth : Thy hands have wrought my form, they

have fashioned me all around, and wilt thou destroy me? Yea, I will say unto God, O condemn me not, but tell me why thou strivest with me: Is it good that thou shouldst oppress? Hast thou eyes of flesh? Seest thou as man seest? or are thy days as man's days, that thou dost seek after my iniquity, and make inquisition for my sin? For what is man that thou shouldst make him of such great account, that thou shouldst so set thy mind upon him? that thou shouldst visit him every morning and be trying him every moment? Have I sinned? What, then, have I done unto thee, O thou watcher of men? Why hast thou set me as a mark, *quare posuisti me contrarium tibi?* Why dost thou not take away my sin, and remove from me mine iniquity? Why contendest thou with me? O remember that my life is wind: therefore I refrain not my mouth, I speak in the anguish of my spirit, I complain in the bitterness of my soul." Only a hyper-piety would find fault with this. The spiritual volcano is laid open, but though it sends up strange and even fearful shapes, it is better thus, than if it were covered over by a religionism, not hypocritical indeed but, false and self-deceiving. Instead of thrusting them down again, as though there were some merit in ignoring ourselves, and refusing to look at the uprisings of our hearts, evil and rebellious though they be, Job lets them all come forth. He does not try to feel virtuous simply by shutting his eyes or inducing an artificial consciousness. Instead of regarding such forced suppression as either deliverance or cure, he lets his doubts, his agonizing scepticism have, for the time being, its full and natural course. He argues with his Maker. It is that sublime style of exhortation which so strikes us, and, sometimes, almost terrifies us in the grand Old Testament men of God.

Job means to be truthful at all events. He will not appear better than he is. He would rather submit unconditionally than for any false reason. He does not see his sin, at least the sin they charge him with, and he will make no falsely humble or hypocritical confessions. He will not

even strive to feel humble, merely for the sake of the humility as some fancied virtue, or in the hope of some fancied reward. God is right he knows, but O how he longs to see it, how earnestly he pleads that his Maker would show him wherefore he so fiercely contends with him, and then, after such a struggle, how sublime the real triumph, when, through the divine interposition itself he is brought to see that he must make this confession whether he knows the reason or not. When at last he humbles himself in the dust, in no artifical humility, but in real self-abasement produced by an immediate sense of the divine presence,—when he cries out, “I know that thou canst do all things,” “I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth thee, wherefore I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes”—this was the victory, this was that “saying of Job respecting God,” or rather, as it should be translated, “that saying of Job to God,” which is pronounced *right*, and which his three friends had not, with all their reasonings, nor even by a sense of the divine presence, been brought to utter. Over them the Evil One still had power. They rested in their traditional lore which they had received “by the hearing of the ear,” their fine-woven arguments respecting the divine equity and providence confined mainly to human destiny, and often seeming to the reader more logically correct, as well as more graphic in their applications to human life, than the passionate ejaculations of the mourner. But they had not been brought to say with Job, “Now mine eye seeth thee,” seeth thee in thy terrific power, thy wondrous sovereignty, thy all silencing Majesty, “therefore we abhor ourselves and repent in dust and ashes.” Here then was the wondrous difference between them and Job, and not in any inferiority of argument they had exhibited. They had gazed upon the divine interposition, they had, doubtless, been impressed with the sublimity of the storm and the awful voice that proceeded out of it; they might have called it adoration, and prided themselves upon the high conception it had produced of God’s physical greatness; but they did not fall on their fa-

cos, they did not say, "we are vile," they did not repent, they did not feel that they and human destiny, and all their arguments respecting human life drawn from itself alone, whether regarded as brief or long, or from the thought of God as subservient to its real or fancied good, were swallowed up, annihilated, as it were, in the inconceivably vaster thought of God's own absolute, eternal, all powerful, all sovereign being. It was in this, and not in their reasonings, that "they did not say unto God the thing that was right," as Job had done; and hence it was that he was accepted, and they were condemned, he was made the holy mediating priest, and they were directed to make their expiation through the sacrifice offered at his hands.

In respect to this second ground of astonishment, much that might be said has been already anticipated. When Deity appears, there is no allusion to the respective arguments. They would appear to be utterly passed by as unworthy the dignity of the scene. God comes not in the whirlwind to decide between the sententiousness of Eliphaz, the treasured lore of Bildad, the high argument of Zophar, the eloquent vindications of Job, and the rhetorical fluency of Elihu. These are all excellent in themselves, a sublime ethics, a noble wisdom, abstractly true, divine, we may truly say, (as coming from fervent men of God moved by the heavenly breath,) yet human in its applications, and, as an argument on the divine ways, presenting after all a human casuistry. Aside from the rich instruction they are all necessary to the plan of the drama, and especially to the closing effect of this inspired poem; yet still may we say reverently, and with all deference for those who have thought otherwise, it is not the design of this closing scene to decide the questions debated or the argumentative merits of the respective speakers. Never was there a sublimer colloquy than that presented in this old Arabian scene, yet God does not break through nature merely to become the umpire in such a contest. This was not the issue presented to Satan in the celestial scene. It was to try the faith and the submission of Job, to show that the evil Ad-

Job's censer was false when he said that even man, low as he might be in the scale of being, could not be brought to submit to God, and "to serve God" from the highest and holiest of motives, or unless he knew that, in some way, such service was connected with his own happiness, or his own fancied good, whether in his earthly or some greater and far more enduring destiny. God pities, indeed, our ignorance, but such a knowledge of the divine ways, if possible for us at all, must be preceded by that very submission which it was the design here to produce. We must first believe that we may understand, and without this, all our reasonings are but a "darkening counsel by words without knowledge."

At all events, whether we are right or not in the interpretation of its meaning, there can be no doubt of the fact of this mysterious omission. Throughout the divine allocution there is no answer to any of the questions which some have supposed it was the design of the book to settle. There is no allusion to any future life as furnishing the key to the mysteries of the present. There is no intimation that it was any purpose of these dramatic scenes to teach any lesson preparatory to such belief, or as leading the mind to feel its necessity either as recompense or explanation. There are, beyond all doubt, allusions in this book to the old Arabian form of belief in a future life as the *ahherat*\* or renovation, but all this is incidental in the

\* It is the Hebrew *nawm*, as it is used in Numb. xxiii: 10. Whosoever examines carefully the frequent use of the word in the Koran, must see that it is not a late dogma brought in by Mohammed, but that he every where refers to it as the doctrine of very early times, which, together with the unity of God, he had come to revive. The wicked are represented scoffing at it as *zatiru 'l-awwalina*, *Fables of the Ancients*, which these earthly men of *nawm* no longer believed. See the Koran *Surat* xxv: 6, and many other places. In its earliest form, it did not correspond exactly either to our idea of the spirit-world, or to the doctrine of the Resurrection. It was the cyclical latter day of the renovation of the heavens and the earth, such as seems to be alluded to in the right interpretation of Ps. cii: 27. It was the *novissimum tempus*, when a new order of things came round and man lived again. Hence Job calls his Goal, or Redeemer, xix: 26, *Alkeron*. He is the *novissimus Aeon*.

argument, and in the closing words of Deity it is not even alluded to. Human destiny, in all its aspects, present or future, is left wholly out of view. There is one all prevalent, all pervading thought, the absolute divine power as proof of the absolute divine sovereignty.† In this there is, of course, a demand of submission on the ground of an absolute wisdom, and an absolute right, but it is implied. The ideas are strictly inseparable in the full thought concerning God, but for the human mind there is an order of reception. The first is to be learned first, acknowledged first,

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the "Last Adam," the Great Saviour, whose triumph on the earth, or o'er the dust, belongs to the *ākārītā* or latter day.

This old doctrine of "the Children of the East" we find, too, in the language of Balaam, Numb. xxiii : "Let my death be like that of the righteous, and let my latter end, *ākārītā*, be like his." The interpretation of the neglegist would confine it to the present life, but what an anticlimax does it make, what a sudden collapse in the associated train of thought! This strange Seer who had come from "beyond" the great "river" of the east, is uttering the language of his mysterious trances. He is looking, or supposes himself looking, far down the stream of time. It is in connection with these visions that he sees the hosts coming "out of Chittim," he sees the "humiliation of the Assyrians," he beholds the "Star rising out of Jacob." The *dunis* or *near world*, *al qāsiyat*, the *rolling* or *hastening world*, as the Arabians called it, (see Koran xvii : 19, lxxvi : 27, and especially lxxv : 20, where it is put in contrast with *ākārītā*) in prophetically passing away. There comes before his mind the *mundus novissimus*, the great day of renovation; and how consistent, as well as sublime, the declaration: "Let my death be that of the righteous; let my *ākārītā*, my lot in the *ākārītā*, or *new world*, be like his." *Moriturst anima mea morte justorum, et flant novissimi sub horum similiis.*

† It might be said that this resembles too much the Mohammedan fatalism. But there may be true aspects even in a false religion. We may, perhaps, learn something from the Koran. Especially is it interesting to us when regarded as preserving some of the earliest Arabian (or common Shemitic) belief,—even such a view of the divine sovereignty as we have found in this earliest Arabian poem, now a part of our own Sacred Writings. It is one of the sublimest features of Mohammed's book, this reflection of the old patriarchal faith. The neglect or omission of other views of the divine attributes may have given this an undue relative prominence, but no one can say that in itself it is overstated. As presented, too, in the common Arabian literature, it often commands our reverence as well as our admiration. We may refer to a remarkable example of it in that work of imagination, the *Thousand and One Nights*. Surrounded as it is there by the fanciful and the absurd, still

and implicitly received as the ground of any true trust in the second and third. When we are assured of the almighty power, then may we joyfully believe that the wisdom cannot fail, the righteousness cannot be inefficient in bringing out all that is wise and right, whether in the sphere of human destiny alone, or in reference to higher spheres or super-human transactions to which the earthly destiny may be wholly or partially subservient.

In presenting this idea it simply remains to give an exegetical interpretation of the passage in which it is principally brought out. There are many things that strongly favor it; there are others that can hardly be reconciled with any other hypothesis.

"And God answered Job out of the *whirlwind*," xxxviii: 1. It is the same Hebrew word we find in Psalm cxlviii: 8 — *Spiritus procellarum faciens verbum ejus*, — "the *storm-wind fulfilling his word*," or rather, in more literal accordance both with the Hebrew and the Latin, that "carries forth or

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we cannot help recognizing it as in fact the very doctrine of this book of Job presented in its most affecting form. The poor weary porter with his heavy load sits himself down to rest by the gate of the rich Sinbad. There comes to him the melodious sound of stringed instruments, he hears the voice of warbling birds, he beholds the pomp of servants, slaves, and pages, he gazes upon the luxuries and flowers of the paradise that surrounds the splendid mansion, these blow upon him the odor of exquisite viands and delicious wine; but instead of repining at the unequal distribution of the divine gifts, or "charging God foolishly," or claiming compensation in another life, he raises his eyes to heaven, and thus pours forth his soliloquizing hymn of prayer.

"O Lord! O Creator! O Provider! O Ruler of all! Thou givest to whom Thou wilt without reckoning! O Allah, I implore Thy forgiveness, I turn to Thee repenting. O Lord! There is no charging Thee with respect to thy power; for Thou art not to be questioned regarding what Thou doest, and Thou canst do whatever Thou wilt. Extolled be thy perfection! Thou exihest whom Thou wilt, and whom Thou wilt Thou impoverishest! Thou magnifiest whom Thou wilt, and whom Thou wilt Thou abasest. Glory to Thee, O Allah! How great thy state, how strong thy power! There is no God but Thee. How high thy dignity! How excellent thy government! Thou hast bestowed thy favors upon the owner of this place; Thou hast given him riches, he is surrounded by affluence, he delights himself in pleasant odors and delicious meats, he enjoys the obedience of many servants. Thou hast Thou appointed unto men what Thou wilt, and what Thou hast pro-

*utters his voice.*" It is the voice itself, the terrific tornado, through which more than through any other phenomena in nature there is manifested, or *speaks* to us, the irresistible power of God. And this is the utterance from the beginning to the end of this inexpressibly sublime theophany. It is power, irresistible power, power "that can do all things." No other divine attribute is presented ; there is hardly an incidental allusion to any thing else. There seems, now and then, an almost concealed reference to some moral or benevolent purpose, as in v. 15, "*From the wicked their light is taken away*," but we see, in the immediate context, that "the wicked," the impious, here, are terms rather used to denote the cruel, the gigantic among men ; so that the idea of power is still the prevailing one. There is here as throughout, the same ever sustained thought: God can overcome all opposition, no strength can stand against him; "the wicked are dragged to light,

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timed for them ; so that, among them, one is weary and another is at ease; one of them is prosperous, and another, like me, bears heavy burdens through a life of abjection and fatigue. I find myself afflicted by trouble beyond measure. Strange is my condition, and heavy is my load, whilst others are free from wretchedness ; they are blessed through life with happiness, and never, for a single day, have borne a load like mine. All men are alike in origin, but how great the difference Thou hast made between them. Yet, in saying this, I utter no charge against Thee, O Allah ! O my Lord ! For Thou art wise, and with wisdom and justice hast Thou judged."

Mohammedan, as it is, there is something here both sublime and pathetic. It is the pure theology of our older Scripture, although most of the phrases in which it is expressed are taken verbally from the Koran. We may say, too, that though surrounded with the grotesque, such a representation of a perfect submission of the soul, such a losing of the individual self in the absolute and sovereign divine existence is in harmony with our own Christian belief. Instead of undervaluing, or giving it a false conception in our minds, we should thank God that such a doctrine of the primitive Shemitism had been, by any means, preserved by other descendants of the Patriarch, though out of the line of the Church.

The idea of compensation in another life belongs to the New Testament, but as a reason (one of the reasons we might say) of the divine proceedings. As a motive of human submission, it would be at war with the very notion of submission ; to regard it as a chief ground of righteous conduct would be, what Satan charges, a serving God for pay. It would make the piety of Lazarus as selfish and as calculating as the worldliness of Dives.

*the high arm is broken.*" So also in v. 41, where benevolence to the dumb animal races might seem to be intimidated, and the language may be used collaterally as having that significance, still, when read by the light of the whole context, it is yet that same unchanging idea,—power, almighty power, extending to the minutest objects, as unwearyed in its universality as in the rarest exhibitions of its omnipotence. The work of creation, the laying of the deep "foundations of the earth," the "shutting up the sea with doors," the mighty forces by which are produced the succession of day and night, the subterranean upheaving powers, the strong "gates of Hades," the rapid energies by which "the light is parted," the "way to its dwelling," or that hidden chamber in nature—still so unknown to our science—whence the light making power penetrates through all other material forces and reaches even to the abode of the spirit,—the "treasures of the snow and hail," the "birth of the dew and the rain" still baffling all research,—the vast celestial influences as represented by the language and conceptions of that day and still unchanged in their essential mystery by any modern knowledge,—the mighty power, be it attraction, or called by any other name, that "holds together the Pleiada," and "draws fast the bands of Orion," and "turneth round the constellations of Mazzaroth each in its season,"—the voice that " calleth for the lightnings," and they come forth and say, "Lo here we are,"—the hand that made the heavenly harmonies,\* rationem coelo-

\* Job xxxviii: 37. Instead of "*the bottles of heaven*," as in our translation, the Vulgate renders *coeli* *concavum coeli*, the "harmony," or "concert of heaven,"—evidently taking the word in the other sense, which it has, of the *nebel*, (a species of cithara) as it is used Isa. v: 12; xiv: 11; Amos v: 23; vi: 5; and other places. Literally rendered according to this view of the word, it would be, "*the harps of the heavens*"—the same word denoting both harp and bottle from some resemblance in shape and hollowness. The common version makes a good and suitable sense, though not so striking as the other. It is strengthened by its association in the first clause. "The bottles of heaven" is an Arabic expression for the clouds. The other rendering suggests the old thought of the "Music of the spheres," as alluded to in Psalm xix: 1-6, and this, the Latin translator evidently had in mind in the expressions *coelorum rationes* and *concavus coeli*.

rum, and the unchanging motions of the celestial orbs,—all are presented as only varying exhibitions of that one great attribute which, for the time, challenges the undivided attention of the soul. The creation, too, of the human spirit, "the putting wisdom in the inward part," are brought under the same category. It is from the same all-quicken-ing force, whether as exhibited in the primal motions of vegetable life, or in the higher energizings of the rational soul. In all there is ever predominant one thought over-shadowing, if not excluding, for the time, every other. It is everywhere power, omnipotent power. The human *conceptions* through which, as finite diagrams, the divine and infinite idea is to be represented, are chosen, locally and ethnologically, for this very purpose. To an eastern imagination this would be especially exhibited in the grander phenomena of the heavens, and in the greater animal crea-tions on the earth; and hence those pictures of Behemoth and Leviathan, the one the "chief of the ways of God" on the land, the other His mightest known work in the waters.

It is a display of power, we might almost say, and we would say it without irreverence, that seems to exult in its arbitrariness, in giving no reason for what it doeth and no account of its ways. "Who hath made a way (a law) for the lightning of the thunder, when He makes it to rain upon the land where no man is, on the waste wilder-ness which no son of Adam inhabiteth?" The ideas of utility, of benevolence, are by no means denied, but every reader must confess that they are wholly, and, it would seem, designedly, left out of the picture.

God is almighty, and, therefore, man must submit to Him, submit to Him unconditionally without asking rea-sons, or seeking reasons for such submission. He is to be-lieve first and then he will understand. The truths of in-finite wisdom and infinite goodness are assumed. They must, if taken along at all, be thus assumed as a priori truths of the soul, for they cannot be proved from nature. The facts on which such an induction must be built are

comparatively so few, the known is such an infinitesimal in respect to the unknown, that the most boasting Baconianism only shows its folly in attempting to reason from them as the *sole* ground of argument for so vast, so universal a conclusion. How can a belief in the infinite be built on finite premises, unless the idea already belongs to the soul. How could we ever trust these partial inductions except as collateral to that a priori thought which is inherent in the very image of God in man, however it may be darkened by his fall ! We carry with us these rays of the eternal light, or we should never find them, we should never even look for them, in nature.

And so, it would seem, it ought to be in respect to the other attribute of power. Why then, it might be asked, this display in its behalf, this mighty array, not of argument, but of impressive and illustrative representation ? Unless the human soul has become wholly demonized, or brutalized, we cannot think of God, if we believe in God at all, as unwise or malignant. But the deepest experience of the fallen humanity, whether it be the uncultivated or the philosophical, shows that there is in us a strange lurking scepticism in respect to the infinity of the power. This may seem a paradox. Some would affirm just the contrary. They would say that we find it easier, in fact, to believe in the resistless power than in the infinite wisdom. The former, it might be maintained, is the attribute that first and most obviously presents itself to our minds. It is so, doubtless, in regard to the first impression, yet sooner than the others is it affected by the associations that connect us with the finities of matter. Like the ideas of Wisdom and Righteousness, this, too, belongs to the image of God in man, but by reason of lying nearer to the plane of the sense it is the first to be weakened by it. An attentive study of ourselves, historically and psychologically, would show that there is no divine attribute we are so drawn to measure by our own standard of finite knowledge, and to limit by our own imperfection, whether of conception or idea. Our own knowledge, we see, ever goes be-

yond our power; we *know* far more than we can *do*; our thought does not take effect in nature, and we do not easily get out of the derived prejudice that there is something in it which yields not to *thought* at all, a stubborn "nature of things" resistless even to the Divine thought and the Divine will.

There is a scepticism here that shows itself, though in a different form, in all human minds. It ever tends to put our idea of God under the control, somehow and somewhere, of something we represent to ourselves under the conception of nature, or "a nature of things," having somehow its necessity in itself, and, in its ongoing, at least, if not in its origin, separate from an ever controlling divine power. In the common mind, invariable sequence, unexplained and unknown scientifically, produces this prejudice ever growing stronger as the world grows older, so that it becomes more and more difficult to think out of it. In the philosophic and scientific it is essentially the same delusion, but taking the more deceptive guise of law ever substituting itself for the law-giver and the law-executive. This is to the more cultivated what fate, or necessity, or nature of things, or any thing else we may choose to call it, is to the vulgar. The one prejudice blinds us through the sense, the other bewilders the scientific reason; but in both there is the like feeling, that God *does* not "do all things," and hence the transition is readily made to the thought, the unowned thought, it may be, that somehow such a mode of acting through an orderly nature is from an inherent necessity actually making finite the attribute of omnipotence though leaving limitless the wisdom and the skill. We tend to the conclusion, though we hardly dare to say it, or even to think it consciously, that it could not be otherwise. Hence that strange repugnance, (ever growing with the age of the world) to believe in the supernatural, or even to admit the possibility of the supernatural, and which more or less affects the scientific mind unless controlled by grace or the teachings of revelation. With all its pride, it is, in this respect, very near akin to

the more vulgar thinking which is described as resting, without reason, in the regularity and unbrokenness of natural sequence.

But why then, it might be asked, is not the appeal here to God's *supernatural* power, some strong examples of which must have come through tradition to Job and his friends? We answer, and reverently we trust, that the same method was not needed then as might be required for an age that had more of the scientific scepticism, or the time hardened, vulgar prejudice. It has been said that these questions in the 38th chapter of Job would seem now altogether beneath the knowledge of this age; our science would answer every one of them. We would not reply to this false boast farther than by observing how it shows the very fact here asserted, or the tendency to extend our really infinitesimal knowledge of physical sequence over all the unknown as well as the nearer ways of the infinite power. It is enough here to say, that though these questions are outwardly clothed in the conceptions of that age, and some of them may be said to have a highly poetical aspect, yet every thinking mind must see that they extend to those remotest *interiora* of causation compared with which our highest modern science has hardly advanced beyond the surface.

If God should speak to our present knowledge, it might, or might not, be in a different voice. But nature then was new; the boundaries between the natural and the supernatural were, in a great degree, unknown. Especially in that wild Idumean life did the outer world put on this form of wonder. The regular sequence had doubtless produced its lulling effect, but in the then state, not of knowledge merely, but of thinking and feeling, the mind could be roused from such a physical stupor by the presentation of the great and remarkable in nature as well as by the traditional supernaturals itself. There are certain reasons why the former might have even a more powerful effect. To the ever musing thought it was only necessary to present some of these greater motions of the physical world in

a new and startling light. Hence the striking imagery of the passage. Hence what even now startles the reader, that peculiar method of so presenting natural phenomena as ever to suggest some still remoter causation, some deep interior lying still beyond, and farther still beyond all induction whether it be of the ancient or the modern science.

Thus to the earliest mind, and especially to the Arabian, the presentation of the most striking natural phenomena might create a stronger conception of the divine, and so make that *conception* best to represent the *idea* of absolute almighty. Especially would that be the case, if (as the book presents it to us, whether dramatically or actually) such presentation is given as proceeding from the very mouth of God himself.

In this appeal to the great natural instead of the supernatural, we think we find an evidence of the remote antiquity of the writing. The historical supernatural in its most striking features, belongs to a later date. The primitive patriarchal mind had not yet so lost its faith and reverence as to stand in much need of it. The divine appearances in Genesis were more like friendly visits than as signs and wonders or miraculous attestations. In those days the vast, the wonderful in nature yet connected itself vividly with God, and was in this respect, almost equivalent to the supernatural. In later years, the debasing effect of the Egyptian naturalism had so sunk the patriarchal mind, that it required the highest exhibitions of the direct supernatural to startle the Israelites into a recognition of the God of their fathers. Hence the dread scenes of Sinai and of the Red Sea. Hence the wonders of the desert, the moving cloud, the pillar of fire, the cleaving of the rock, the passage of the Jordan, the "arm of the Lord" visibly "stretched out" for their deliverance in the wars of Canaan. We cannot resist the conclusion that, if the book of Job had been written centuries after these events, as some maintain, it would have adopted the same mode of appeal so universally and constantly employed by the Jewish prophets; especially since the scene of the poem, as we

have every reason to believe, is in the very neighborhood of some of the most striking of these miracles. In the subsequent Jewish writings, these wonders of the Exodus and the desert are never lost sight of; they are repeated every where; the greater part of the lyrical and prophetic imagery is drawn from them, even where they are not directly alluded to as historical events.

How different is it with this book of Job? There are, indeed allusions to the supernatural; we find it in the closing chapters; it is mingled with the great natural as though from each of them was derived a similar and equal representation of the divine power; but this supernatural, as the most careless reader must perceive, is all of that traditional patriarchal kind that stands separate from the peculiar miracles of the later Jewish history. The creative acts, the old giant wickedness and its dire overthrow, the avenging flood, the impious Babel builders, the destruction of the ancient cities of the plain when "brimstone was scattered upon their habitations,"—allusions to these are found in various places in the book. They are mingled, as we have said, with the more awe producing natural, as though they were all one train of mighty sequences, and nature herself were but the continuation of the same almighty energy that spoke the earth into being and afterwards covered it with the waters of the flood. In these respects the style and thought of the book are wholly patriarchal, varied from Genesis only as affected by the outward in Arabian scenery and the nearer local connection with the earliest Egyptian knowledge. Its supernatural is patriarchal, its natural is patriarchal, and in both we discover a striking difference between it and all subsequent Hebrew writings. In these, "the great works of the Lord sought out by all who take pleasure therein," are neither physical wonders, nor the great supernatural works of creation, but the supernatural national deliverances. These were ever to be. "told to their children, and they were to tell them to their children's children, that they might set their hope in God."

But why this exhibition of pure power whatever form it takes, whether of the natural or the supernatural? Why does the Infinite so overwhelm his finite creature with a display of his own omnipotence? What bearing has it on the great argument of the book? Why is it this attribute, rather than God's goodness and wisdom of which they are to be convinced, and which is to solve the problem, or show it to be insolvable? We think that an answer to these questions will be found by one who examines carefully the course of thought and argument which had been pursued by all the speakers. No one of them had, in terms, denied the Divine omnipotence, and yet, some how, there is, throughout all their reasonings, an implied limitation. They do indeed seem, at times, all of them, to vie with one another in magnifying this attribute of power. "The measure thereof," says one "is broader than the earth and longer than the sea." "Who knoweth not," says Job in scornful reply, "that the hand of the Lord hath made all things?" As an abstract truth, to be received in some form, there is no questioning of it. "He doeth great things" says Eliphaz, "things unsearchable and marvellous without number." Not to be outdone in this, Job follows in a still loftier strain. "He is mighty in strength; He removeth the mountains and they know it not; He shaketh the earth out of her place; He spanned the heavens all alone; He sealeth up the stars; He walketh upon the waves of the sea." And yet the conclusions of all their speeches betray the feeling of an impotence somehow existing in the very "nature of things," and in some way connected with the solution of the puzzling, problem they have rashly undertaken to solve. There is something in Job's condition which makes it impossible it should be otherwise. It must be so, and with this they would seem alternately to rebuke and comfort him. They cannot get out of the thought that all this strange proceeding must have reference alone to the human destiny. It is connected directly with Job's sins, and Job's discipline for his own sake, and should there be made by them a direct reference

to another life, it is still limited by the same conception. There is ever a falling short of that idea which must stand first if recognized at all,—the idea of the absolute divine sovereignty that has its reasons ever, but those reasons transcending, as they often may, the sphere of the human in its widest conceivable extent whether present or future. There is the same impotency of conception in Job. He cannot understand why God thus deals with him, and is sometimes tempted, therefore, to regard his case as hopelessly beyond even the divine strength. It is some relentless nature, or some malignant adversary that is thus persecuting him, and God cannot help him. It is not thus said in so many words, but such is the feeling of the despairing spirit; otherwise we cannot excuse Job from a sin that can only be characterised as the very blasphemy of rebellion. He would seem to regard the prosperity of the wicked, and the misery of the pious, as something which God himself can hardly prevent in certain circumstances. For, if he can, why do the former oftentimes go on in uninterrupted prosperity? Why does “one die in the fullness of his enjoyment being wholly at ease and quiet, *robustus et sanus, dives et felix*,” whilst “another dieth, in the bitterness of his soul and never eateth with pleasure.” Why is this, unless there is some power thwarting that great power which they dare not imagine to be either unwise or unjust,—that good God whom they can easier think of as limited in strength, than as having any bounds to his knowledge or his love? The despondency is unrelieved by any thought of compensation in another life. At least, it does not come in here, where we should so much expect it. The immediate context altogether excludes it; “they lie down alike in the dust, alike do the worms cover them.”

There is indeed a puzzle about it which they cannot understand. If God does not do all this, the physical evil as well as the physical good, then, who or what is this other power? “The earth is given into the hands of the wicked; He covereth the face of the Judges thereof; if not,

then who is it?"\* They are perplexed, they cannot bring themselves to deny directly the divine power and the divine agency, yet still the cloud is upon their souls. They are not brought to that clear recognition of absolute sovereignty which, although it may be said to solve by silencing, is first required to give meaning to any other solution. They do not fully acknowledge that which can alone give value to the wisdom and the grace; for what absolute ground of hope and faith can there be in a knowledge and a goodness, however infinite, that might be baffled by any failure of omnipotence?

We do not say that these views wholly solve the difficulty of the book, but they furnish the best explanation of that unexpected appeal to the pure power and absolute sovereignty of God which marks its striking dramatic close. So Job seems to have felt, and for thus feeling, and thus confessing, he is commended, as "saying to God the thing that is right." He cannot wait for the end of this sublime assertion of omnipotence. Even while the awful voice is proceeding from the storm cloud, there is heard the language of his deep humiliation: "Shall he that contendeth with the Almighty reprove him?" (that is, shall one dare to reprove the Almighty by contending with him :) "Lo I am vile." Rather: "Lo I am *light*," *levis, transiens*, mere nothingness; "what shall I answer thee, I will lay my hand upon my mouth. Once have I spoken, but I will reply no more,—twice—but I will not repeat it."

But it is at the close that he is brought to his fullest confession. There is something very peculiar in the language. It presents that soliloquizing ejaculating style we so often meet with in this book, and which, when understood, furnishes the key to the solution of some of its most difficult passages. "I know that thou canst do all things." He repeats to himself the great truth as though, with all

\* Job ix: 24 "*If not, whom and who is he?*" Our translation is very poor. The Vulgate is better, as well as the Greek—*Quod si non ille est, quis ergo est?* "*If it is not He that doeth it, who, then, is it?*" The Hebrew *an* here is a strong particle of appeal. "*If it is not He, then pray tell us, who it is?*"

his speculative admissions, he had not felt or comprehended it before. It was abstract, far off, dimly seen through finite and inadequate conceptions. Now it is brought nigh. There is something that makes him *feel* it as a truth though transcending all finite modes of representation. "I know that thou canst do all things." Let Hamilton and Mansel say what they will, this language is not an unmeaning sound, a mere empty negation. Here is Scriptural authority, and that grounded on the deepest inward feeling, that a human soul, a finite soul, has something within, some power or faculty that holds as its own, and claims as its own, the cognition of the infinite. Here is Scriptural proof that without such a thought, or until this thought is some way reached, there is no true religious faith, no true "evidence of the things unseen." The expression of the idea in language may have a negative or a positive form, but in itself it is one of the most positive affirmations of the soul, whether we can accompany it with an adequate sense conception or not. I know that Thou art *El Shaddai*, Omne Sufficiens—*Παντοπλω*,—Almighty. "Nothing is beyond thee." If we take the Syriac Sense of "לְךָ" here it might be rendered transitively, "nothing fails Thee or baffles Thee," "there is nothing to which Thou art unequal;" and in this view we have the direct antithesis of El Shaddai in the sense given by the old Greek interpreters, *Ιναντις, αβραπτις, Sufficiens*. "I know that Thou canst do all things;" and then, in his musing awe he repeats to himself that language with which Deity had commenced the startling address. It would seem never to have left his thoughts though followed by so many intervening interrogatories. "Who is this that hideth counsel by words without knowledge?" There is a slight difference in the language, which has perplexed the commentators. In the first passage (xxxviii: 2) or as it is employed by God himself, it is the Hebrew word meaning to *darken*; here it is another verb signifying to *conceal*, to *hide away*. But it is the same thought and the mere verbal difference only exhibits more clearly the simplicity and

naturalness of this soliloquising style. This startling demand of the mysterious voice might have been regarded as a rebuke to the somewhat diffuse eloquence of the last speaker Elihu. "Who is this that hides himself in such a multitude of words? Who is this that is shedding darkness on the high argument he has taken in hand? But Job thinks only of himself; every other speaker is forgotten; he is alone with God. From the beginning, from the moment the awful question broke from the thunder cloud, it has been ringing in his ears. It has brought him to a new way both of thinking and of feeling. He has lost sight of others; he no longer thinks of comparing himself with others, or of asking who has the victory in the argument, who has the better in the accusation or the defence. He thinks of his own rash speeches, his own dark querulousness, and in utter astonishment at his own self-ignorance he says over to himself the words of this astounding interrogatory.

Thus viewed we see the force of the illative particle as it is used, in such a style as this, to connect the silent thought with the abrupt exclamation that follows. In the interpretation of musing or ejaculatory expressions this must often be kept in mind; and when the line of association is thus safely drawn across the intervening chasms these broken musing utterances become thereby the highest style of emotional language. Whilst equal clearness is preserved there is more of *soul* than in the regular discourse, where feeling is often lost in logical coherence, and life is sacrificed to form. It is thus these abrupt particles may be said to contain the *vis vivida* of language. They startle by their suddenness, their seeming unconnectedness, and yet carry with them the most vivid significance in thus pointing, as they do, to the expressive silence. Especially is this the case with the Hebrew words of transition, and nowhere can there be found a better example of it than in the one here used, xlii: 8. "Therefore have I uttered, 'לכָן דָּבָרְתִּי,' what I understood not." The rendering of the particle thus strongly and prominently makes it too formal, too

logical. Every reader feels that there is something wanting as well as something wrong. What inferential or causal connection between the ideas of the two uttered sentences taken merely in their outward consecution? But adopt the interpretation of the musing soliloquising style, in which the broken ejaculatory language is ever springing out of unuttered intervening thoughts, and we have just what we need for the most expressive filling up. The יְהִי shows that the mind of the awed and introspective speaker had been all along upon himself in connection with those first fearful words so vividly remembered. "It was I, *then*,"—as though the reason and application of the language had suddenly burst upon him, like a conclusion flashing out from an inward train of reasoning clear as the light yet too rapid to be expressed,—"it was I, *then* who darkened counsel by words without knowledge,"—"it is I, *then*, who have declared what I knew not, wondrous things far above me that I understood not." All others are forgotten. Their false reasonings, their false accusations provoke him no more. He is drawing nigh to a truth which before had been traditional, speculative, abstract,—of which "he had heard by the hearing of the ear"—but now his soul is becoming absorbed in its infinity. The case is between himself and God, his own infinitesimal littleness and the divine immensity of power and wisdom. He is lost in the contrast. "It is I, *then*," who have spoken thus. I reasoned of God from my dim finite conceptions, from my faint traditional knowledge. Now He comes nigh to me, even as he came in the old theophanies; it is *my* attention he demands, it is *with me* he comes down to reason. It is Job repeating to himself in this same awe-struck style the former words of Deity as though, by such repetition, he would fasten their deep impression upon his soul: "Hear now and I will speak; I will ask of thee and do thou make me to know." They are not strictly Job's words, but God's words that Job is saying over to himself, and wondering at the greatness of their condescension, as though he had said: "It is the Eternal, *then*, who, makes to me this challenge:

I had heard of Thee by the hearing of the ear, I had the knowledge which came from the fathers, I had the lore of our ancient Eastern schools, but now mine eye seeth Thee." The contrast between the eye and the ear is commonly explained as denoting the deeper and more interior thought of God as compared with the more outward conception. This is doubtless a true view; but we cannot help thinking that, whether dramatically or actually, there is a reference, in this *seeing by the eye*, to an actual theophany or praeter-natural appearance of God in nature then exhibited, and to its direct moral effect upon the soul in bringing starting-ly nigh the thought of God and His almighty strength.

Let naturalists or pseudo-spiritualists say what they will of the want of moral power in miracles; still the deepest feeling of the human spirit testifies to the contrary. Want of faith, want of piety, want of reverence, all come from the dullness or obscurity of the Divine idea in our souls, or the putting it far off in our thought. Whatever brings it nigh and compels us to think of it suddenly and *exclusively* must have a mighty moral effect in resuscitating such idea, and giving stronger colors to such conception. The dullest naturalist, at the sight of a real and unquestionable miracle, would cry out as the Gadarenes did of old, "depart from our coast," for we are unholy. It is not so much because it helps the reason, as because it compels us to think of One whom most men do not like to retain in their knowledge. Neither is it because the supernatural offends the reason that some so dislike it, but because it brings God before the soul without the shelter of a speculation or a causality. And so, too, is it with the more striking exhibitions in nature itself. The thunderstorm, the earthquake, in this resemble the supernatural. The suddenness gives us no time for our usual resort to the shelter of law and causal sequence. Such phenomena place God right before us. A sense of utter helplessness favors the conception, and hence it is that most men, if not all men, are religious when the rapid lightning bolts are falling around them, or the earth is rocking beneath their feet. In our books, and

in our laboratories, we know that these events have just such sequences of cause and effect as enter into the slowest movements of the natural world, but here the rapidity startles us. Let the chain, speculatively considered, be ever so long in its links, still the power that seems to go through them in a moment, comes to us with all the religious awe of some near personality. Almighty, irresistible force is the first conception, and then follows immediately the thought of something *separate* from nature, of something unutterably pure and holy.

Whichever mode of interpretation we take here, or whether we regard them as combined, the effect is the same. Job is overwhelmed, driven out of his logical consciousness, if we may use the term; the thought of God stands out before him in its almighty force. He has the idea of the Infinite. A contrasted sense of his own nothingness is forced in upon the soul, and thus viewing it we have the full force of the next illative particle in this passionate language: "I have heard of thee by the hearing of the ear, but now mine eye seeth Thee,—*therefore* I abhor myself and repent in dust and ashes." *Abhor* may not be the best rendering here for the Hebrew, but it evidently requires some superlative term of self-rejection. The verb has no object expressed, and so it may be referred either to himself personally, or to his remembered speeches. In either case it is a total self-renunciation. He rejects himself, his righteousness, his words, his works. The other verb is the one commonly used for repentance; but the context gives it an intensity of meaning that makes us resort to its primary sense. It is the heavy drawing of the breath, a long deep, murmuring sigh. "I bemoan myself," I sigh over myself, my misery, my vileness, "I repent in dust and ashes." We want the Vulgate word here as coming nearer to it than our more abstract or merely intellectual notion of penitence: "*Ago penitentiam in favilla et cinere.*" The latter part of the expression carries the same deep feeling of humiliation: "*In dust and ashes.*" They are the emblems of human frailty and dissolution, the one the matter from which, as

cording to the Scriptural language, man's body was formed, the other the remains to which all organic substances are reduced. The whole language conveys not so much a sense of guilt, though that goes with it, as of utter vanity and nothingness,\* self loathing that such a being should have ever manifested pride, or petulance, or presumed to contend with the Almighty.

The other parties gazed upon the storm-cloud, and heard the awful words with rapt astonishment, it may be, but without humiliation. They may have thought it all intended for Job, and been waiting to see what effect it would have upon him. They might have regarded the manifestation, and its silencing display of power, as all on their side, and as showing the divine condemnation of the sufferer. Job alone falls upon his face, confesses himself vile, proclaims his own nothingness, his entire self-rejection, his recantation of uttered follies, his painful sighing penitence in dust and ashes. In this he was accepted; for this he was approved; for this abasement he was exalted; it was this, and not any superiority in the argument whether special or general, that was "saying unto the Lord the thing that was right."

With this view of the scene so fully warranted by the graphic language, we are prepared to interpret the divine sentence passed upon the dramatic praxis as all brought to its intended issue in this closing confession.

"And it came to pass that after the Lord had spoken

\* So Job says, xxx : 19, "*I am like to dust and ashes.*" The language is patriarchal. "*Repentance in sackcloth*" belongs to the later style, but "*dust and ashes*" is characteristic of the earliest writings. It is a remembrance of the primitive doom, "*dust thou art and unto dust must thou return.*" Hence Abraham thus says of himself, Gen. xviii : 27, "*For me, to speak unto the Lord who am but dust and ashes!*" These three are the only places where both words are thus used. We may say, in general, that this bemoaning of the individual frailty and nothingness is peculiar to the more ancient parts of the Bible. The prophets speak more of the social and political wretchedness. The other style of language we have in the Song of Moses, and in that solemn xoth Psalm which comes the nearest to those primitive times. The fact that this precise expression occurs only in Genesis and Job, gives an argument for the patriarchal character and period of the latter book.

these words to Job, he said to Eliphaz the Temanite: Mine anger burns against thee and against thy two friends because ye have not spoken to me the right as my servant Job has done." In applying, on the other hand, this decision to the whole argument of the poem, there are certainly great, if not insuperable, difficulties standing in striking contrast with the easier interpretation which connects it immediately with the closing words of Job. Why then has the former been so generally preferred? The reason would seem to be the taking of the great body of the book, from chapter iii to chapter xxxvii, as the main or more important part, and the introduction and the close as merely subordinate to the outward management of the drama. These long disputings must be explained on some consistent plan. The mind is intent upon finding out who has the better in the argument. We set out with the notion that they are to reveal, in some way, the great mystery of the human destiny in itself considered, the ground of God's dealings with man in respect to the present or the future life, and all this (we say it with all diffidence in opposition to the opinion of so many, though not all, of the commentators) blinds us to the pivot or grand fact of the poem as it appears in this closing theophany. As a drama, too, (for it is a drama, though not to be judged by any artificial rules) the middle parts must be subservient to the final and not the reverse.

On the other hypothesis the difficulties, we think, have never been solved. The reader is never satisfied, though, perhaps, despairing of finding anything better in that direction. The reasoning of Job's friends, as mere reasoning, their representations of the divine attributes, often seem truer, as well as calmer than those of Job himself. We are indignant at their unjust charges because we have been previously assured that the sufferer is innocent of any such crimes. We sympathise with Job's vehement protests of his integrity, and yet we cannot help thinking how he criminales, and sometimes violently criminales, his Maker! There is that in his deportment which seems

sometimes to justify what is said of him by Elihu, "What man is like Job who drinketh up scorning like water?"

Then again, too, there are truths uttered by the other speakers, divine truths, truths of inspiration we may regard them, which we may take, and which the higher Author of the book meant we should take, as maxims just and holy, though wrong, it might be, in their particular application, or as grounded, by the speakers, on the erroneous thought that their abstract verity would be denied by Job. The whole of it, thus viewed, becomes that sublime exhibition of the divine in the human, of God's thoughts uttered through human thoughts and human conceptions, which makes the entire book one grand lesson to us in the chapter of the supernatural in our world. We can separate, if we choose to do so, the merely human,—the impatience, the blindness, the wrong application of undoubted heavenly truth. These are the earthly media through which the great revelation is accomplished,—God's thoughts coming to us through our thoughts, and his high ways through our finite mundane conceptions. The caviller may not make this discrimination, but the pious soul does it without effort, taking the holy precept yet seeing the error of the special use, admiring these grand specimens of the olden time, loving their truthful piety, their patriarchal simplicity, their primitive elevation of thought, their pure Arabian theism, and yet seeing their human imperfections as through them shines with an enhanced glory the manifestation of the divine greatness.

Thus viewed, the book becomes valuable to us not only as a whole, but in its special precepts. Every part is "profitable for doctrine, for instruction in righteousness." We need not fear the condemnation of any divine verdict, in gathering what is precious from all the speakers, as well as from the supposed approved words of Job. We may even give the former our special admiration. What more pure than Eliphaz' conception of the divine holiness? What more grand than Zophar's thought of God's immensity? What more lofty than Bildad's idea of His high imperial

rule? "Shall mortal man be more just than God? Shall a man be more pure than his Maker? He seeth darkness in his angels;" Lo the transparent heavens are not clean in his sight:—To the utmost bound of thought is He separate from all that is finite or imperfect in the universe. "Canst thou by searching find out God? It is high as Heaven, what canst thou do, deeper than Hades, what canst thou know?"—The mystery of His being, the vastness of his energising, they transcend all conceptual power. "Dominion and fear are His; He maketh peace in His high places:"—He is the source of all authority on earth, of all law in nature, of all harmony in the heavenly worlds. But better than all, more precious in the divine sight than all, is Job's confession, his hearty self-rejection, his lowly penitence in dust and ashes. "I know that Thou canst do all things." It is with him no longer a speculation; he feels the great truth. It is the true idea of the Infinite, no longer a proud abstraction, but a subduing light, a living thought penetrating the deepest chamber of the soul. "I know that Thou canst do all things; Wherefore I reject myself, and repent in dust and ashes."

The victory is won. Satan is defeated. The Goel, the Kinsman, the Friend, the Witness on High, to whom, in certain passages, Job so pathetically appeals, is triumphant. But the triumph consists not in clearing up the questions so long and with so much mutual bewilderment contested,—not in revealing to Job his future destiny, or any thing about the future destiny of man, (more than the few faint notions then already entertained by the ancient mind,) but in bringing the self-righteous reasoner to the full, unconditional, unquestioning recognition of that first greatest truth for man to acknowledge, the absolute and omnipotent sovereignty of Him who is at the same time infinitely wise and infinitely good. In opposition to a false philosophy and a false humility which are getting too much currency in the religious world, we maintain that one great end here is to bring man to that spiritual cognition for which this philosophy denies him any mental faculty, that spiritu-

al state which it ignores for the human as well as for the animal psychology—in other words, that recognition of the *divine infinities*, without which, whether for the philosophical or the common mind, there can be no true faith, no true religion.

"*I know that thou canst do all things.*" In this idea, this soul-vision of the absolute and the eternal, he feels his own nothingness, he flees from himself, he falls upon his face, he repents in dust and ashes. Not so his companions; and, therefore, he was commended and they were condemned.

The reader will see that we have made a slight change in the rendering of the passage. We have rendered the preposition 'בְּ' as it is every where else translated, "unto" instead of "for." On this very change, however, is grounded the strongest philological argument for the interpretation we have given. To bring out the rendering of our common English Version there had to be a departure here from the almost invariable sense of this particle in the hundreds of cases in which it occurs, and this variation came from the general pre-judgement of the spirit and design of the book. It had been assumed that the divine decision must have reference directly to the previous interlocutions, and therefore this turn, although a very unusual one, had to be given to the preposition to make it consistent with it. Noldius in his Concordance of the Hebrew particles gives but two or three places where it even seems to have that sense of *for* or *concerning*, and even these can be explained on the common usage. Throughout the Bible it has the direct relation and especially after verbs of speech. It is the language of address. The Vulgate has *ceram me*, the Greek *ἐνώπιον*, *before me, in my presence*, which, although it may indirectly refer to the previous reasonings, can have its fullest and most impressive meaning only by being confined to the actual *παρουσία, presence*, or closing theophany. It is conclusive, entire, without any generalising or apparent summing up of arguments. It would seem to denote not a balance of right, as though Job had said more

right things concerning God than the others, but a whole and complete speaking on the one side, and an utter silence on the other: "Ye have not spoken *unto* me the thing that is right." In accordance with our view is that of Aben Ezra one of the most satisfactory of Jewish commentators. We need only remark that aside from the moral grandeur, nothing would be more impressive rhetorically than such a close. The sublime decision refers to a single act, and is expressed in the briefest, the simplest, and, therefore, the sublimest language.

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which is not to be denied, and to which all subject matter, whether physical or moral, justly appertains. The present work, however, is not intended to be a history of the development of dogmatical thought, but to give a brief account of the principal systems of dogmatical thought, and to show how they have been modified by the progress of knowledge.

#### ART. IV.—DOGMATIC THEOLOGY—ITS CONCEPTION, SOURCES, AND METHOD.

Dogmatic Theology is the queen of the sciences. Born into the Christian world, not of blood nor of the will of the flesh nor of the will of man, but of God : her realm is that of grace and truth. All the other sciences, the natural, the mental, and the moral, as well as the religious, such as Hermeneutics, Exegesis, Polemics, Practical Theology, and Church History, are tributary to *this queen*—not arbitrarily so, but by divine appointment. By this it is not meant that they are not all of royal birth : they all derive their principles, not from the subjective understanding, not even from subjective faith, but from the objective, the eternal, the absolute Truth. This is one and undivided. In their ultimate ground therefore all sciences are one. The fact that we have a two-fold revelation of truth, the one natural and the other supernatural, by no means alters the case. Neither does the fact that we have many sciences militate against this view, just as little as the *many* human individualities destroy the idea of *one* humanity. Here as elsewhere the individual holds in the general, and the general grounds itself in the Divine.

The relation of the other theological sciences to Dogmatics is like the relation of the other graces of the Spirit to Christian faith. The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ is, objectively considered, one and infinite ; but when it actualizes itself in those who are made its happy subjects it becomes multiform. When, for instance, it produces that godly sorrow on account of sin which worketh reformation of life, it becomes *repentance* ; when it enables its subject to trust in the Saviour, and in Him alone, for salvation, it

takes the form of *faith*; when it leads out the soul in acts of obedience and devotion to God, it is *love*; and when it enables us to look out of the windows of the soul for the fulfilment of the divine promises, it is *hope*. These, and all the other graces of the Spirit, are essential to Christian character. They are compared by St. Paul (Eph. vi. 10-17) to the different pieces of a soldier's armour. Faith is the shield, and as such the apostles give it the preëminence above the other graces: it is among these as the sun among the planets, or as the heart in the human system. It is true, in another place the same apostle gives the precedence to love (1 Cor xiii. 13): "Now abideth faith, hope, and charity, these three; but the greatest is charity." It is evident, however, that reference is here had to the saints' blissful state in Heaven, where love remains, after faith has turned to vision and hope into fruition. But if we consider the Christian's present state, whilst militant on earth, even charity must give place to faith: this is the conquering grace: "This is the victory that overcometh the world even our faith" (1 John v. 6). Love indeed has its place in the conflict and does excellent service, but it is under faith as its leader, (Gal. v. 6): "Faith which worketh by love:" just as the general fights by his soldiers whom he leads on, so faith works by love which it excites. Faith is the principal and radical grace: when it is vigorous and strong the others are healthy and vigorous also; when this fails they too must fail. So it is precisely in the family of theological sciences. They are all of vast importance; they all do excellent service; none can be dispensed with; yet we must give the preëminence to Dogmatics. If this science fail, all the others must fail also; but if this be sound and healthy they too may flourish; its life is their life. The *idea* of this particular science is derived from that of Christian Theology in general, and this last is derived from the conception of the Christian Religion. The adjective *Christian* here used reminds us that there are other religions besides the Christian religion. Over against these Christianity asserts that it is the only true, the absolute religion; squaring fully with all the

wants of humanity, it professes to answer fully to the true idea of religion.

We must therefore unfold the general idea of religion, from the facts of consciousness; then compare with this general idea, the Christian Religion, and develop from it the conception of Christian Theology and especially that of Dogmatic Theology.

#### 1. THE CONCEPTION OF DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.

Human consciousness involves a three-fold idea, namely, self-consciousness, world-consciousness, and God-consciousness. Neither one of these is complete without the other two. It is not possible, for instance, for self-consciousness to awake within us without a consciousness of that which is not self. Man finds himself in the world as a part of a great whole: he is surrounded by numberless objects which exist independently of him, and yet he cannot escape from their presence; he apprehends them under the categories of space and time, whilst he is also apprehended by them: "he is in the world." This is a fact of which he becomes certain through sensation, perception, and apperception. But whilst he certifies himself of this fact, he experiences likewise the emptiness of the world; he takes it up in himself, in the way of reflection and thought, with all its contents, yet he finds in himself a boundless void which it cannot fill. "The world is in him;" but his personality, his self-conscious "I," is higher than the world and goes beyond it. Self-consciousness, therefore, cannot in the nature of the case, complete itself in world-consciousness, nor the reverse. The one cannot be without the other, and yet in themselves considered they cannot be the complement of one another. There is indeed, under this view, an actual conflict between them. Man, in desiring the objects of the world, often meets with denials, and when these objects yield to his wishes, they disappoint his cherished hopes and leave him without any solid comfort or enjoyment; he would sail upon the sea of pleasure, but its rolling waves scorn his bidding, and sink

his wearied spirit into deeper want and misery. Not only so : he cannot even observe all he desires ; and he must often see what he does not wish to see. In his experience and volitions he is necessitated. He has a will, but in opposition to the world's stern external necessity it is mere arbitrariness and weakness. Thus there is a constant conflict. "Man is in the world, and the world is in man :" he is conscious of the world and he is conscious of himself: that is, he is at war with himself.

How can the conflict be removed ? Not, as we have seen, by world-consciousness merging itself in self-consciousness ; but by both uniting in the deeper and holier ground of God-consciousness. Here, and here only, world-consciousness and self-consciousness find their complement, and come to a full reconciliation.

This gives us the conception of *religion*. Consciousness as such must necessarily ground itself in feeling : when developed as God-consciousness the feeling underlying it must be religious : that is, religion is a central life-principle which develops itself in the form of feeling, thought, and volition in the sphere of God-consciousness. As such it is essential to humanity. It is just this which distinguishes man from the irrational part of the creation ; he is a religious being. Conscious of his relation to the Absolute he also acknowledges the other relations which God has ordained ; for instance, that of himself to the world, and that of the creation to the Creator. Feeling his dependence upon the world, which Jehovah holds in the hollow of his hand, he with childlike confidence trusts in Him. Conscious dependence upon the world and conscious dependence upon God are now harmonious. The conflicting elements of his inner being are reduced to a peaceful calm. His knowledge of nature and that of God are in harmony. The outward form of the world is to him but the diagram of its own eternal *idea*. This is full of thought, full of wisdom and of truth : he recognizes in it the voice of God speaking to him. The laws of nature do not now appear to him as stern and blind necessity, but in

their complex union they authenticate themselves to him as the very revelation of the divine will: in willing the different objects of nature the subjective volition is in *harmony* with God's law. In effect religion is the elevation of feeling, of thought and will, yea, of the entire being of humanity, into the higher and immediate unity of the God-consciousness. As such it is more than knowledge, more than practice, and even more than feeling separately considered; it unites all these in a deeper and more mysterious ground: *it is a life, a divine life in man.*

In the ancient systems of theology religion is defined to be the mode of knowing and worshiping God: "Religio est modus Deum cognoscendi et colendi." Essentially this is correct: we have here the form and the contents. The word *worship* expresses the form, and the word God expresses the contents. But according to the view expressed above, this definition cannot be regarded as complete in its formal character; because it presents it under two aspects, that of knowledge and worship. The Ciceronian derivation of the word *religion* (from *relegere*) and even some scriptural expressions (for instance the "knowledge of Lord") seem to favor the opinion, that it consists merely in knowledge, as it must be taught and studied. But it must be obvious to every one that even the study of religion has something peculiar in it. We can say of the faithful student of philosophy, "he is a good philosopher," and of the faithful student of theology, "he is a good theologian;" but who would say of him who is devoted to the study of religion, "he is a good *religiosus*?" When religious truth is communicated, it is expected through the understanding to reach the heart, and the fruit is expected in the form of actual life. If religion consisted in mere knowledge, it could be demonstrated as all other knowledge; but this is impossible.

"The philosopher Kant," we are told, "resolved religion altogether into *practice*. In doing so he did not mean to deny the existence of God; but he maintained that the finite mind is not capable of knowing or comprehend-

ing the Infinite or Absolute. He makes the practical side of human nature take the lead. According to this view, morality is religion."

In regard to this theory it is sufficient to observe, that however close and intimate the internal connection between religion and morality, so that we cannot conceive of true religion without morality, nor of true morality without religion, yet the different stages of human development clearly show a remarkable difference; so that whilst the one momentum comes prominently to view the other remains on the back ground. There is such a thing as sincere piety, as for example in the case of David and the Patriarchs, which is not always accompanied with the purest morality. And on the contrary we have many examples of morality, in the form of self-government, chastity, honesty, &c., which are furnished by persons whose piety is too much like slumbering sparks under the ashes.

Morality is the harmony of the human will with the divine will: religion, as we have seen, is an original power, an original life in the soul. In like manner it can be shown, that those theologians who make religion consist in mere *feeling* have not fully comprehended its height and depth. *Feeling, knowledge, and morality* are the forms in which religion is developed, therefore neither one of them, separately considered, can be its full measure.

All these views are one-sided. Religion is objective as well as subjective: it completes itself in the union of both these sides. In it God himself is the object of human feeling, thought, and volition. "God is glorified in man," and man finds his highest blessedness in glorifying God. This idea of religion cannot actualize itself fully, except in the form of Christianity.

"The lowest form of religion is *Fetichism*. This confounds the absolute being with nature. The objects of nature are not worshiped as symbols merely, but as actually containing divinity, and as identified with it." This is the worship of idols among the Africans among whom *fetich* is an idol, and any object, a tree or a stone, is worshiped.

"Polytheism divides absolute being into the different objects of nature." This was the religion of the ancient Greeks and Romans ; they had many gods.

"Monotheism is the belief in the existence of one God as the absolute unity. This unity considered as abstract is deism."

"Pantheism is the opposite of Polytheism: here the absolute takes up in itself all the objects of nature, so that every thing is God ; the universe is God."

To this list might be added *Panchristism*, that peculiar form of Christian belief which so identifies the "new creation" with Christ, the incarnate Son of God, as to make it the Absolute in the same sense as *He* is the Absolute. Christ and Christianity are one. Christianity reveals itself, or Christ (which means the same thing) reveals Himself in the form of the Church. Christ is the Church, the Church is Christ : that is, the Church is God. Thus the "*panchristoi*" believe that the Church is God, and that she is to be worshipped, precisely in the same sense as the "*pantheoi*" believe the universe to be God.

Neither of these forms of religion answers fully to its true idea ; they cannot restore man to his normal relation, they cannot bring him into a real life union and communion with God. Christianity alone, the religion of the Triune God, can accomplish this high and holy end. Christ alone unites in his person the entire fullness of humanity and the fullness of the God-head. It is in Him alone that the idea of God and that of humanity are fully actualized ; and it is in Him alone that they are brought into real and harmonious union without confusion of natures. Christianity, therefore, though it cannot be said to be the Absolute himself, but rather the "new creation in Christ Jesus," is, nevertheless, the absolute religion : it gives "glory to God in the highest, and on earth peace, good will towards men." Luke 2: 14.

As such it is a *redeeming power* and a *spiritual communion*.

The religion of *redemption* proposes to restore man to the favor of God, to raise him from his depraved and fallen

state to the position which he occupied before he sinned, and from which he may be carried forward to the holy end for which he was created. If it comes short of this it cannot be complete; and if it goes beyond this, it is forced beyond its own proper conception. But the relation of man to God, before the fall, was normal; therefore if Christianity restores him to this relation it must find him in a state which is not normal. The abnormal, or sinful state of man, however, is a historical fact. That is, sin has entered into the world and unfolded itself in humanity in the way of historical process. If this be so, that is, if abnormal humanity have a history, then the redemption of man must also be a historical fact. This we find actually to be the case. Christ Jesus entered the stream of the world's history; He placed Himself under the law which we were bound to obey. He took upon Himself the burden of the world's sin and guilt (Isa. 53); atoned for the same by His sufferings and death; He arose from the grave for our justification; He ascended into heaven, and ever liveth to intercede for us. Now when it is said that Christianity, as redeeming power, is historical, we must, by no means understand this as simply referring to the history of Christ's person and work upon earth; but we must understand thereby also the ever living presence of the Saviour in the world, by the power of his God-head and Spirit to carry forward the great work of man's salvation: "He has power on earth to forgive sins." Mark 2: 10.

But Christianity is more than redeeming power: it is *salvation unto life*; it elevates humanity into its own higher sphere—not outwardly or mechanically, but in the way of an internal life process. It is organic. Though truly catholic in its spirit, accommodating itself to all the relations and circumstances of human life, it is ever true to the law of its own being. It spreads in the world, not like the rivulet that loses itself in the river, or like the river that loses itself in the ocean, but in the way of life development, like the grain of mustard seed which springs up and becomes a great tree. It is not an interest then

that pertains merely to the individual, but it is the general interest of humanity. It is the communion of saints. In this communion the single Christian lives and has his spiritual being : separated from it he has no life in him. The branches which are in communion with the vine must also be in communion with one another. This communion is in the Church, "the body of Christ, the fullness of Him that filleth all in all."

Christian Theology now is the science which has this holy Christian Religion as its contents. The word *Theology* (from *θεος* and *λόγος*) means the science of God. "It treats of the being and attributes of God, his relation to the creation, and the dispensations of his providence and grace to the human family."

When the science is qualified by the term *Christian*, it means the science of God, as He has revealed Himself in the special form of Christianity. It is the systematic development of the great facts of our holy religion. Like every other science, it is organic. The parts are held together, not mechanically; they are arranged, not according to the arbitrary notions of men ; but they are related to each other and united by a fixed and an abiding principle which unfolds itself according to the law of its own life.

Like other leading sciences, Christian Theology also divides itself into various branches, such as the following : *Hermeneutics*, which treats of the laws according to which the Holy Scriptures are to be interpreted. According to Schleiermacher this is an art. It partakes, no doubt, of the character of art, but it by no means loses its scientific character on this account. *Exegesis* reduces the laws of interpretation to practice. In its widest sense it includes both the exposition and explication of God's word. *Apologetics* unfolds the evidences of Christianity, both the external and the internal. *Polemic Theology* is set especially for the defence of Christian truth. *Dogmatic Theology* unfolds the doctrines of Christianity as they form the contents of faith. It holds a central position in the family of theological sciences, inasmuch as it takes up the results of

exegetical and historical studies, (so far as they relate to faith) in the consciousness of the present, and thus unites them as a living system, from which again may be deduced the laws of *Christian Ethics*, and *Practical Theology*.\* As such it is not a mere philosophy of religion, nor a mere history of doctrine ; but "it is the systematic development of the synthesis of the great fact of redemption and man's need of the same."

## 2. THE SOURCES.

As religion completes itself in the union of human nature with the divine, according to the true etymology of the word (*religere*), the "sources" of theology are two-fold, subjective and objective. Or to speak with more philosophical accuracy (though not according to the analogy of the books) we should use the singular number and say the "source of theology" is subjective and objective. We deem this form of expression preferable because strictly speaking there are not *many* sources of theology, but only *one* ; and this is not even manifold but only two-fold. We have the true source of this science in the form of *reason* and *revelation*. These terms are relative. Without reason there can be no revelation, and without revelation reason is a mere abstraction. In their union they are the *source* of theology. They must, therefore, have the same contents. This is the truth. The truth in the form of revelation is objective, in the form of reason it is subjective. By reason, in this connection, we understand the intellectual and moral nature of man. "Reason is nothing else than will with prevailing consciousness, and will is reason with prevailing practical tendency." As such it includes the idea of faith. It is allied to the supernatural and eternal. "It does not, like the understanding which has to do with the finite, depend upon the indications of the senses ; it has the power of going beyond the limits of time and space, and of perceiving divine things in their own

\* See Hagenbach's *Encyclopädie der Theologie*, and Dr. Ebrard's *Dogmatik*.

light." From this it follows that the idea of God is born in man; or in other words, he is *constitutionally* a moral and religious being. Those who deny that the idea of God is innate are perhaps not aware of their own inconsistency in holding the reason to be a source of theology. How can that be a fountain of life which has no life in it? And how can reason be a source of theology, when there is no theology, no idea of God in it? Without this *idea*, or the God-consciousness at least in possibility, reason has no contents, it is "without form and void." In this case the sun might shed his light, but there would be no eye to behold it; we might have a revelation of truth, but no power to apprehend it; God might speak but there would be no ear to hear.

It is just this fact that reason has the God-idea as its contents, which constitutes it the subjective source of theology. It is this that invests it with the power to investigate the evidences of Christianity, and to determine its contents according to the laws of rational thinking. The absolute reason is in God alone, and the finite can only fill its office properly as it rests consciously in the Absolute. In God's light alone it can see light.

Here it must not be forgotten that the light of God in man has become obscured in consequence of sin. "While experience teaches that the seeds of religion are sown by God in every heart, we scarcely find one man in a hundred who cherishes what he has received, and not one in whom they grow to maturity, much less bear fruit in due season." [Calvin.] "Men professing themselves to be wise have become fools." [Paul.] When the light that is in us has become darkness, how great is that darkness.

Whatever may have been the power of the human reason before the fall, we know from the history of the world since that sad event, that it has been totally unable of itself to discover the great truths of the absolute religion. This is sufficiently proven by the inability of the wisest men of the world to solve the problem of the universe. There is ground indeed for the belief that the obscure and imper-

fect notions which the heathen did entertain in regard to the Supreme Being, were the result of revelation in the form of tradition; not that revelation can by any means produce a religious nature in man; but the religious principle being innate, as we have seen, revelation is the necessary condition of its development. In the obscure light of a mere traditional revelation it was impossible for man by searching to find out God. Neither was it possible for him to discover the true relation of the Creator to the creation. Even Aristotle and Plato, the wisest philosophers of Greece, taught that matter was an emanation from the Deity. The former maintained that this emanation was *necessary*, and the latter that it was *voluntary*. Their idea was that by the creation of matter God became self-conscious or objective to himself. Failing thus to apprehend the truth concerning this fundamental relation, they could of course have no proper conception of the being and perfections of God. Hence upon the soil of classic Greece and Rome we find no systems of theology, and but imperfect systems of moral philosophy.

From all this it follows that the human reason must be brought under the illumining, the regenerating, and sanctifying power of supernatural revelation. The reason can be regarded as the subjective source of theology only in its normal union with the objective truth. The true knowledge of God, and the true knowledge of self are inseparable. Or as Calvin has beautifully expressed it: "True and substantial wisdom consists principally of two parts, the knowledge of God and the knowledge of ourselves. But while these two branches of knowledge are so intimately connected, which of them precedes and produces the other, it is not easy to discover. For no man can take a survey of himself, but he must immediately turn to the contemplation of God in whom he lives and moves. Since it is evident that our talents are not from ourselves, and that our very existence is nothing but a subsistence in God alone. These bounties distilling to us by drops from heaven, form so many streams conducting us to the fountain head."

We can only know the source of our being, and the high and holy end of our creation by the true knowledge of the Creator. We cannot come to a true knowledge of our own emptiness but by that of God's boundless fullness. We can discover our need of salvation from sin only by the knowledge of true holiness. We can realize the depths of our fall and misery only by the realization of the great fact of redemption. This fact is not revealed to us by the light of nature ; neither can it be deduced from the facts of consciousness : it can only be known from the Sacred Scriptures of the Old and New Testamentept. The Bible does not contain an abstract system of doctrines : though many portions of it are preceptive and poetical, yet as a whole it is to be regarded as a record of historical facts, all relating to the central fact of Christianity. It brings to us the glad tidings of salvation from sin and death unto holiness and life. But redemption, as we have seen, is not simply one fact among many others : it is the absolute fact of the world. As the power which brings men into life union and communion with God, it is the greatest power that has ever been revealed amongst men. Viewed as the reality which answers fully to its own idea, it is the absolute reality of the world. It is from this reality that all the other facts recorded in the Holy Scriptures derive their meaning and importance. This being admitted, we infer that God would so order the course of His Providence that the knowledge of these supernatural facts would be conveyed to the children of men in its ideal purity and holiness. It could not in the nature of the case be conveyed by men who are estranged from God. We cannot conceive, for instance, how the Bible could have been written by a man like Josephus, or any other unbelieving historian. The case demands that men, who were chosen as the authors of the Holy Scriptures, must have been brought from the sphere of nature into that of grace. But even the subjects of saving grace, the best and wisest men, are not entirely freed from sin and error in the present life. Hence we must conclude that the men who were chosen to record

the great facts of redemption were under the extraordinary influence and guidance of God's Spirit. From the fact of Christianity the inspiration of the biblical writers follows necessarily as a postulate. The most common argument, the only one indeed that can be adduced with any degree of plausibility against the inspiration of the Scriptures is, that it obliterates the individuality of the sacred writers. In other words, it is maintained that, if the Bible be the word of God, it cannot in any sense be human, and cannot consequently be a book for man.

This psychological objection rests upon a false conception of human individuality. It confounds the true idea of humanity with that of human individuality as affected by sin. It is *sin* that has marred the visage and spoiled the beauty of human nature. Humanity in its general conception is ever to be regarded as one and the same; but its unity by no means excludes the idea of diversity. This belongs to humanity as such. Individuality is the necessary form of its being. But sin is not essential to humanity; it is an "accidens;" it is the violation of the law of human life, as well as the transgression of the law of God as it has been revealed from Heaven. We admit that the individuality which has been transplanted from the sphere of sinful nature into that of grace has undergone radical changes and modifications: "Old things have passed away and all things have become new." But in which of these spheres is it the most truly human? It is just in the sphere of grace that it approximates its own idea; it is here that it awakens in its own proper likeness. Inspiration, which is only a peculiar form of gracious influence, or rather an extraordinary form of gracious guidance, therefore does no violence to human nature. On the contrary it is its brightest ornament and highest glory. Hence this objection is groundless.

The heathen idea of inspiration is that the individual consciousness is swallowed up, and loses its identity, for the time being, in the supernatural spirit. There is nothing analogous to this in the inspiration of the Bible. Here

the writers are all themselves, and we find their individual peculiarities impressed unmistakably upon their respective productions. Whilst they are kept absolutely free from error by the Spirit, in the communication of the truth of God, they write as men.

The fundamental law of inspiration we find in 2 Pet. 1: 21. "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." The instruments which were employed were "holy men :" men who were renewed after the image of God, and were consecrated to His service. The faith which they had in common with the other children of God was the subjective ground upon which the inspiration was based. We must not infer from the words ; "as they were moved," that these "holy men," were used as unconscious instruments, as for instance, a pen is used by a writer. God did not speak in and through them as through a tube: the "holy men" spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. Inspiration had become the fixed habit of their minds, the law of their religious life, and the form of their knowledge. This was the element in which they lived and moved. There is properly no room here for the question whether their words were inspired or merely their thoughts. Words and thoughts cannot be separated. Their relation is internal and necessary, not external and arbitrary. Thoughts unexpressed are silent words, as thoughts expressed are audible words. To think is to speak internally. Language cannot be inspired without the inspiration of ideas, and on the contrary there can be no inspiration of ideas without the inspiration of words. All abstract questions of this sort have a tendency to perplex and confuse the mind rather than to aid it in its efforts to comprehend this important and interesting subject.

But if it be correct to say that inspiration is a peculiar law of human life, it must like every other form of life be progressive. This we find actually to be the case. Here, as elsewhere, we have "first the blade, then the ear, and afterwards the full corn in the ear." Inspiration, like the life of the just which shineth more and more unto the per-

fect day, has also its dawn and noonday glory. This is evident from sacred history.

The lowest form of inspiration is the *dream*. Joseph, for instance, was inspired by dreams. Here the connection between the objective truth and the subjective consciousness is distant and loose. The inspiration in this form, as well as in every other, is real and plenary. The subject is fully possessed by the Spirit, and is infallibly defended against all error, and guided into all truth; but the consciousness of this fact is dark and confused; as in all dreams the mind is active here without being perfectly under the control of self-consciousness; or, as in infancy the mind is active before self-consciousness is developed.

A higher form of inspiration is *vision*. Here there is a closer and clearer connection between the objective truth and the subject to whom it is revealed. We naturally think of Jacob's vision of the ladder, the visions of Ezekiel, Daniel, &c., of the Old Testament dispensation, and those of St. Paul and St. John of the New.

A still higher form of inspiration is *prophecy*. Here the subject is conscious of his prophetic mission, and of the Spirit's presence to enable him to foretell with unerring certainty the realities of the future.

In designating these different forms, however, we must not consider them as exclusive. Dreams and visions in some instances partake largely of a prophetic character. The lower form may be regarded as the higher in possibility, and the higher is the lower developed. The process completes itself and comes to its full meaning in Christ, the incarnate Son of God. He is not only the absolute truth; but he is also the absolute revelation of the truth. In Him, as said before, dwells the fullness of the God-head bodily and also the entire fullness of normal humanity. As such he is the contents, the entire fullness of the *Inspired Word*. The Holy Scriptures are thus throughout the unadulterated word of God and the genuine word of man. They bear the impress of the incarnation: *they are the divine human word*. In the incarnation "the word was made

flesh," the eternal Son of God became the Son of man ; by inspiration the Word of God has become the Word of man. The Bible is the voice of God addressing us from the throne of His majesty—the voice of the Father saying : "This is my beloved Son, hear ye Him." All that is here written has reference to His person and kingdom : hence He Himself has said : "Search the Scriptures, for they are they which testify of Me." He is the substance, the meaning, and the entire fullness of the written word of God. The relation of the Holy Scriptures to Christ, is as close and intimate as that of form to contents. The Scriptures without Christ would be a dark cloud without water, a dense shadow without substance, an obscure word without meaning. Viewing them however as the Word of God, in the sense explained, they are a full revelation of His will in regard to our redemption and glorification through His only begotten Son. It is only in virtue of their living connection with the fact of the incarnation that they have been perpetuated in the world.

Christianity, starting as it does, in the incarnation, unfolds itself historically in the form of the Church. The Church is the fruit of the Saviour's birth, His life, His death, and His resurrection, as it is written: When thou shalt make his soul an offering for sin, he shall see his seed, he shall prolong his days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in his hands. Isa. 53 : 10. We have a striking type of this in the thirty-first chapter of Deuteronomy. We there learn that when Moses had completed the law of God, and had written it in a book, he gave it to the Levites, who bore the ark of the Lord, and commanded that it should be placed beside the ark of the covenant within the Tabernacle. A beautiful emblem this of the fact that the inspired volume, the Book of the Law and the Prophets, of the Evangelists and Apostles, is to be kept sacred in the Church, the true ark of the covenant of grace. It follows from this that as the relation between Christ and the Scriptures is internal and vital, that between the Bible and the Church must be inseparable also. The Church,

which is the body of Christ, is not only the bearer of His life, but also of His truth—not the truth simply as comprehended in her constitution and unfolded in her history: but of the truth also as it is given in the Scriptures. The Bible is the lamp which the Bride constantly holds in her hand whilst she is going out to meet the glorious Bridegroom. This is the bright medium through which God's Israel behold their pillar of cloud by day and their pillar of fire by night. The volume of inspiration is in the Church what the light of the sun is in the world of nature. Through the medium of the sun's light we behold the brilliant orb of day himself and all natural objects within the limits of our vision. So in the sphere of grace we behold, through the medium of the Scriptures, the bright and cloudless Sun of Righteousness, and the glorious realities of the "new creation." This is only possible, we add, in the sphere of grace. The truth of revelation can only be apprehended by regenerated reason, and reason can only be regenerated within the limits of the Christian Church. But regeneration by the Holy Ghost is just that which brings the finite reason into living union with the Infinite as it is in Christ. Reason as thus connected with the objective truth which forms the contents of the Inspired Scriptures, and the objective truth as revealed by the Scriptures to regenerated reason—that is, the objective and subjective in lawful union—constitute the source of Christian theology in general, and of course, in a special sense, of *Dogmatic Theology*.

This is the ultimate and normal source. The truth as it is taken up in the Church's confessions of faith, and as it is reproduced by the subjectivity of theologians, is to be regarded as a subordinate source.

It is not necessary here with the divines of the Cartesian School to speak of nature as a distinct and separate form of revelation, and consequently as a distinct source of theology. The truth revealed in nature can only be apprehended through the medium of conscious intelligence, that is through reason. But, as we have seen, reason can only

fill its office properly as it stands in the Absolute. Hence the truth of nature can only come to its full meaning in connection with supernatural revelation. In the sphere of Christianity they mingle their beams, and "both proclaim their source divine."

But before dismissing this part of the subject it is necessary to consider more particularly the relation of the truth as it is embodied in the Church's confessions to the Inspired Scriptures; then the relation of private judgment, or the productions of individual theologians, to the symbolical books.

1. According to the Roman Catholic view tradition is the product of the Holy Ghost as well as the Bible, and is clothed with the same authority. The ultra protestant, on the other hand, rejects tradition altogether; he would learn the way to Heaven through the Scriptures alone without any help whatever from the Church. The truth is to be found in the midst between these opposite extremes. "The relation of the true Bible principle to tradition is such that it places it neither parallel with the Scriptures, nor over them, but under them only, and measures its value by this standard."<sup>\*</sup>

To make tradition either co-ordinate or superior to the Scriptures is to say at once that they are not a perfect rule of faith and practice. That which is perfect cannot be improved by any additions, or alterations; and every attempt of this kind is contrary to the Bible itself. "Ye shall not add to the words that I command you" Deut. 4: 2. See also Prov. 30: 6. and Rev. 12: 18. "The law of the Lord is perfect, converting the soul; the testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple, the statutes of the Lord are right rejoicing the heart; the commandment of the Lord is pure enlightening the eyes." Psalm 14: 8. The Apostle Paul likewise asserts the perfection of the Scriptures as a rule of faith when He says: "From a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures which are able to make thee

\* Principle of Protestantism by Dr. Schaff.

wise unto salvation through faith which is in Christ Jesus." 2 Tim, 3: 15. This they could not do if they did not contain all things necessary to salvation. In the Gospel according to St. John 20: 31, 32, we are told that "many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples which are not written in this book; but these are written that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, and that believing, ye might have life through his name." If any thing necessary to salvation were not in the Scriptures, they could not answer the end for which they were designed.

Here we have a full revelation, a perfect and infallible rule, a divine standard of truth lifted up above every other. Yet this is no reason why traditional truth should be rejected. As the revelation which God has given us in the form of the inspired words does not, as we have just seen, contradict the truth revealed to us in nature, so the truth embodied in the Confessions of the Church may be more or less in harmony with this perfect standard; it may be water drawn from this fountain, gold from this mine, light from this golden lamp. The relation of Church tradition to the Bible is like that of the stream to its fountain, like that of light to its source, or like that of gold to the mine from which it was taken. But the purest stream may be corrupted, the most brilliant light may be obscured and the finest gold may be mixed with alloy. So precisely in the case before us. The inspired Scriptures are as pure as God himself is pure, they are a perfect transcript of His mind; but the truth of the Bible as taken up in the consciousness of the Church, and expressed in her confessions of faith, and in this form handed down from age to age, is pure and infallible only so far as the Church herself is holy and infallible. If the Church could not err at all we might make tradition co-ordinate with the Bible; but as infallibility belongs to Christ and His word alone, and as his Church in the world is militant; not yet perfect, but only going on to perfection; her symbolical books must needs be placed in subordination to the inspired word.

When she shall be perfected in holiness, fashioned like unto her glorious Head, without spot or wrinkle, or any such thing ; when she reaches her ideal, then her teachings will be in perfect harmony with the eternal truth.

Here, however, the question arises, inasmuch as the Church is not yet perfect, how far her traditions are binding, or in other words :

2. What is the relation of the theologian to Church authority ? If, as we have attempted to show, the Bible belongs to the Church ; if this infallible standard of truth that is lifted up by the Spirit is planted in the vineyard of the Lord as its proper ground, God must have delegated to the mystical body of Christ the authority and right to determine whether the teachings of those within its communion are in accordance with His word or not. That the Church has this authority cannot be denied. Does the idea of Church authority then exclude the right of private judgment ? Not at all ; but on the contrary the latter is dependent on the former as its necessary condition and ground. Without law there can be no freedom, and without general authority there can be no individual right. Supposing there were no general law governing society, no general authority exercised over its members, then they would be *avoper*, without law.

But we are told each individual can be a law to himself, and if he be a Bible Christian, he can be a Christian to himself. No conception can be more unphilosophical, or more contrary to the order of God than this. We know, for instance that all vegetation is the result of a general law of growth ; all animal existence depends upon a general law of animal life ; and so all individual human existence must depend upon a general law of human life going before. We know of no human beings, excepting Adam and Eve, and their posterity ; and up to the present time men have always lived in society, verifying the Scripture : "No man liveth to himself." As individual existence is the result of a general law of life, the manner of that existence must also depend upon the same law. For instance, the

reasoning, the thinking, and speech of persons living in our day, must exemplify the law of reason, thought and speech, that obtained in the time of their ancestors. So in the case before us. Individual Christian existence is an impossibility without the general law of Christian life going before. We may imagine that if God were to permit a Bible to drop from heaven into the hands of some one in the remote corners of our world, who had never before heard of Christ or the Church, he might become converted and saved by this means alone ; but the case is purely imaginary and proves nothing whatever. We know but of one Christ, one Church and one Bible ; and these are inseparable. The Bible without Christ and the Church cannot save ; it can only do so by virtue of its union with them. To illustrate : When Philip met the eunuch of the Queen of Ethiopia in the highway, he found him reading the Scriptures ; his mind was predisposed to receive the truth ; but he could not become savingly acquainted with it until Philip took the Scriptures and preached unto him Jesus : he then immediately believed and was connected with the Church by baptism. This verifies the observation that Christ is the truth of the Scriptures, as well as the life of His people. From this it is evident too that, as the general law of human life starts in Adam, so the law of individual Christian life starts in the Second Adam. "As in Adam all die even so in Christ shall all be made alive." And if we are made alive, born into Christ by the Holy Ghost, according to the law of life revealed in His person, then this law of life must be the governing principle of all our thoughts, words and actions : that is, all individual thought and judgment must be in agreement with the general law of Christian life—that law which was in force long before we were born either into the world of nature or into that of grace.

The private judgment that is in harmony with this general law of Church life is free, as it is written : " If the Son shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed." On the contrary the private judgment which opposes the general law

and authority of the Church, is not free ; it is bound by selfishness and caprice. But as it has been conceded that the Church may err, suppose she were to bind men's consciences contrary to the word of God, how then ? Would not the individual in this case have the right to resist the authority of the Church ? We can best answer this question by supposing another case which is perfectly analogous. Suppose a citizen of this country imagined that the government of the United States with its constitution had bound him to do that which is civilly and morally wrong, would he not be bound to resist ? Or may he not alter the constitution of the United States to suit his own conscience ? It is obvious that his resistance and alterations will avail but little. He is at liberty of course to persuade all the citizens of this great Commonwealth to effect the desired alteration, if he can ; and if he cannot succeed in this, he may modestly conclude after all that his private judgment is not superior to the united wisdom of our entire country, including the present and past generations. Thus the Church's creeds or symbolical books are not to be altered to suit the views of this or that theologian. In case he arrives at conclusions which contradict the authorized standards of the Church, it becomes him to study the entire history of the process through which the Church passed in settling the articles of her creed, and then in the light of the Sacred Scriptures, and in the light of dogmatic history, let him carefully re-examine the process of his own reasoning ; and if he occupy the Christian stand-point, it is quite likely that the contradiction will be removed ; if not, the burden of proof that the Church is wrong and that he is right rests with him. Let him spend his time in convincing her of her mistake ; if he succeed well, and if not, let him die in peace ; well for him if in the end he finds himself in the communion of the saints.

But the case we have supposed is hardly conceivable of the Church which holds the Bible as the only normal rule of faith. The Church that has a tradition which is not grounded in the inspired Scriptures, may bind men's con-

sciences contrary to the Word of God, but the true Church, which acknowledges no infallible standard of truth but the Bible itself, whose traditions and teachings all ground themselves in it alone, and whose confession of faith is but the form in which she has apprehended the truth as it is in Jesus, cannot bind the individual conscience to that which is wrong. There is no room here for individualism. The authority of the Church being but the authority of God revealed in the Bible, the one cannot be rejected without rejecting the other also.

From this it follows that the ultimate and subordinate sources of theology can only become available to the theologian as he stands in living connection with the Church. He that would study the laws of optics must have eyes to see; he that would enjoy the light which God has set in the new heavens must be taken up by the Holy Ghost as a part of the new creation: he that would behold "the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night" through the medium of God's Word must belong by covenant to God's spiritual Israel. The theologian who stands in the communion of the saints is to be regarded as a Teacher of God, and the results of his literary and scientific labors must be regarded as fruits of Church life—we do not say perfect fruits, or fruits fully matured; for this science, like all others, is not yet perfect, but is going on towards perfection. Yet all that the Church has given us in this form, that is, all theological literature, (especially standard works) may in turn, in the sense explained, be noted as sources of theology. The order, relative position, and authority, is the following:

1. The Inspired Scriptures, the *norma credendi*;
2. The Church's confessions, the *forma credendi*;
3. Theological works, the *fructus credendi*;

The norm, the form, and fruits of *faith*, not beliefs.

#### METHOD.

"Methodology," says Dr. Hagenbach, "is nothing more than applied Encyclopedia; because the correct in-

sight into the nature and connections of science will lead to the correct treatment of the same, and as encyclopedic knowledge is the necessary condition of a good method, so the latter is the verification of the former."

The appropriateness of this remark will appear when we remember that the relation of the theological encyclopedia to theological science in general is twofold: It is introductory; it stands at the threshold of the sacred temple of theological science and introduces the student to its inner realities. It is exhibitory; it gathers the best fruits of theological science and investigation and presents them to our view. The fulfilment of this twofold office is *method*.

Here again there are two extremes to be avoided: namely, a false empiricism and an abstract idealism. The theological empiric is one who is continually trying experiments in the religious world, just as the medical empiric does in his department, without having the necessary scientific training. He makes no account of Colleges and Seminaries of learning. For him the ancient proverb has full meaning: "Non scholae sed vitae discendum" (not the school but real life should be studied). He reminds us that the Apostles themselves were not scientifically educated; and hence he infers that the less scientific a man is, the more apostolical and evangelical. Quite an empirical conclusion. Those of the opposite class make the school every thing, while they ignore the order of God in real life. They delight in fine theories, in abstract speculations, and in scientific dreams.

Bacon very appropriately compares the rude empiric to the ant: the piles of sand heaped up by this insect cannot well have less inward connection than the confused productions which they are here used to represent. The ideal dreamer is compared to the spider; and it must be owned that between the fine spun theories of the one and the webs of the other there is a striking resemblance. Men of true science are like the bee: they gather their material from the various departments of real life, and their products are sweeter than honey dropping from the honey-comb.

In determining the true method of the science under consideration it is of the utmost importance to avoid both the extremes here mentioned. The school and real life, should not be regarded as opposite interests. Real life itself is educational, and Institutions of learning are designed to educate for real life. They sustain a reciprocal relation, the one to the other; so they should always exert a reciprocal influence. It cannot be expected, of course, that all men should become scientifically educated, yet the sciences are intended for humanity in its totality, and not merely for the few: they are realities. The science of Dogmatic Theology especially, being the most real, as we have seen, because it has the greatest of all realities, namely, the Christian Religion as its contents, reaches to the very centre of human life and to all the stages of its development.

The most natural method to be pursued in the development of its principle, might, at first view, seem to be that of the Cartesian divines, which grounds itself upon the distinction of *natural* theology and *revealed* theology. According to this are considered in the first general part, "The nature of man," "The God-consciousness," "The immanent law of religious conduct," "The fall of man and his need of redemption;" and in the second general part are treated "The Trinity," "Incarnation," "The person and work of Christ, &c.

To this method some of the best modern theologians have objected on the ground that it is not practical and not strictly scientific. That which God has joined together is here disunited. For instance the doctrine concerning God is treated partly at the beginning of the first general part, and partly at the beginning of the second. Doctrines are treated as entirely separated from each other, whilst at every point they should be carefully compared, and their union preserved inviolate.

The distinction between natural revelation and supernatural, upon which this method is based, may have its place in Dogmatics; but it cannot be the true basis of division; for, as we have already observed, they are but two

forms of one revelation, whereas the true division must ground itself upon the internal distinction in the Absolute One, the *θεός*, Himself.

For the reasons here given it is obvious too that the method of the Federalists does not reach far enough either. The division into the natural covenant, and the three economies of the covenant of grace, answers very well as an outline of the history of redemption; but this belongs properly to the department of Biblical History.

Recently we have been introduced to some theological systems based upon the familiar distinction of the objective and subjective: "*The knowledge of God objectively considered,*" "*The knowledge of God subjectively considered.*" To say nothing of the contradiction in the terms here used, the superstructure reared upon this foundation can never surpass in glory the temples of either the Cartesian or Federalistic schools, notwithstanding the defects already named. The distinction, of objective and subjective being, is of vast importance in every department of science; but it cannot be the true basis of a good "body of divinity," for the obvious reason that it is itself grounded in the temporal and the finite. It is true, God being a personal Being, we may view Him as standing on the side of subjectivity, and as He reveals Himself to our faith we may regard Him as on the side of objectivity; but strictly speaking, He is neither object nor subject: *He is the Absolute.* "Systematic theology," says Dr. Ebrard, "ascends upwards to the eternal purpose of God to glorify Himself, from which the acts of revelation have proceeded: it should not merely ask, what has God done? but why must He, according to His eternal nature, do this?" It investigates the realities of the creation (of both objective and subjective being), and particularly of human salvation, in their ultimate ground and deepest necessity.

In doing so all that is true in the systems above named can be retained, whilst every law of scientific investigation may be satisfied. Accordingly the division of dogmatical material must ground itself in God, in His eternal and es-

sential purpose to glorify Himself, as Father, Son, and Holy Ghost, in the creation of the worlds, the redemption of man, and the consummation of all things.

This may be denominated the *Trinitarian Method*. It is by no means of modern invention : it has its full justification in history. We find it underlying both the natural and supernatural revelation of God. It is the ground upon which are gathered up the articles of our undoubted Christian faith in the form of the Apostles' Creed : and it forms the basis of all the best theological works of both ancient and modern times.

Tiffin, O.

M. K.

## ART. V.—SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY IN 1860.\*

“Many shall run to and fro, and *knowledge* shall be increased;” this passage is a most truthful description of the present condition of our race. Science has furnished contrivances that have enabled us to overcome the inconveniences arising from distance, and, not content with satisfying old wants, seems to create new ones for the mere pleasure of satisfying them also. Action is impressed on civilized man wherever we find him. He is restless, fretful under restraint, impatient under reproof, and eager for every novelty that may gratify ambition or add to the wealth which his daily labors is collecting about him. The readings of science in the book of Nature have been so many and attractive, that her followers have almost forgotten the Book of Revelation and the truths contained therein. This is not however a necessary consequence. We can understand how one could wander

“ Into regions yet untrod,  
And read what is still unread  
In the manuscripts of God,”

and yet approach with holy awe, and the deepest faith, the perusal of the Sacred writings, which inspiration has given for man’s comfort as well as his instruction. In the unrest of the present age, probably more than at any other period of the Christian era,—when the ocean has become but the highway for intercourse of great commercial nations,—when the barriers of exclusivism, which had shut

\* *L’Année Scientifique et Industrielle, ou Exposé annuel des travaux scientifiques, des inventions et des principales applications de la science à l’industrie et aux arts, qui ont attiré l’attention publique en France et à l’étranger, par Louis Figuer, Quatrième Année.* Paris. 1860.

*Annual of Scientific Discovery: or Year-Book of facts in Science and Art for 1860.* Edited by David A. Wells, A. M. Boston. 1860.

out great countries from intercourse with the world for centuries, have been torn down,—when many run to and fro and knowledge is being increased,—amid all this toiling and moiling, this rapid reaping and gathering in of rich crops, there is much need that man shall cultivate a spirit of faith in the great Creator, a humble recognition of His power, so that he may be ready at all times to join in the apocalyptic shout which the Revelator heard “as it were the voice of a great multitude, and as the voice of many waters, and as the voice of mighty thunders, saying, Allelulia : for the Lord God omnipotent reigneth.”

But while the student of science must not forget his duty towards the Power which produces the phenomena that give him constant delight, and enables him to contrive machinery to aid his fellow man in performing his daily tasks,—there is a duty also incumbent on those, whose studies lead them more peculiarly to the investigation of the Book of Revelation, to make themselves acquainted with the contributions which God is pleased to make mankind, through the medium of science. We may err by overlooking the claims of religion,—we may err by overlooking the wonders of science. Our task here on earth is to glorify God by every means within our reach. It is our bounden duty to use *all* the sources of knowledge within our grasp,—to rejoice in the wonderful works of our Father’s hands, as so many manifestations of His Providence, “whereby, as it were, by His hand, He upholds and governs heaven, earth, and all creatures : *ut quae terra nascuntur, pluvia item et siccitas, fertilitas et sterilitas, cibus et potus, bona et adversa valetudo, divitiae et paupertas, omnia denique, non temere aut fortuito, sed paterno ejus consilio et voluntate contingant.*” From this point of view every collection of the contributions made by science to human knowledge, may be considered as eminently worthy of the study of the Christian philosopher. Such study should not lead him away from the Creator, dazzled simply by the wonders of Creation, but should make him feel like the psalmist who was constrained, when he saw all

things as it were put *under* man's foot, to cry out "O Lord, our Lord, how excellent is Thy name in all the earth." Each Year-Book of facts in Science and Art becomes a cause of wonder as well as thankfulness. We have glanced over the two which France and the United States have published, with so much interest, that we have thought it would be not out of place to present to our readers some of the facts contained in their pages. Both are prepared with great care, but commend us to Dr. Figuier, as the most interesting writer in the whole domain of science. Every thing he touches becomes brilliant with the light his sparkling intellect casts upon it. *L'année Scientifique* is one of the most readable books from the French press, and a translation of the volumes as they appear, with each recurring year, would place in the hands of English readers a most charming resumé of the doings of science.

We shall not attempt anything like a systematic examination of the range of Scientific Discovery in 1859, but select such subjects as may appear to be of special importance, reserving to ourselves the privilege of foregoing system in what claims to be but a friendly gossip with our readers. If we can only induce them to study the wonders of creative and inventive power, which the records of science afford, they will find proof of a God in Science as well as in History.

The progress of discovery is sometimes very singular. Those who have delved for years being denied the treasure, while the laborer of an hour may find it quickly at his hand. Discoveries are, to a certain extent, revelations. This is very well shown in the discovery of the new planet. Le Verrier, finding that the planet Mercury was undergoing some perturbations, which were inexplicable on the supposition that no planet exists between its orbit and the sun, accordingly concluded that there must be a planet moving in this place. He indicated a method by which its existence could be proved,—since "if the orbits of such a planet be slightly inclined on that of Mercury, one could seize the moment of its passage over the disk of the sun," and thus obtain

data which would lead to proof of its existence. All this suggested the necessity of accurate examination of the spots which are noticed on the sun's disk; but while astronomers, in their observatories, armed with the best instruments failed to detect signs of the new planet, a hard-working physician of the little village of Orgères, France, with an instrument, mounted by himself, discovers *Vulcan*, and Dr. Lescarbault is announced now as the discoverer, whose modesty makes him decline all testimonials, in the way of public banquets and presents, with which his professional brethren have been desirous of presenting him.

But while the heavens are revealing from time to time, orbs which have heretofore been concealed from man, the composition of the earth on which he lives is becoming more and more known. Aristotle's dictum that all matter was composed of four elements—earth, air, fire and water, could not be tolerated even by the alchemists, who advanced the idea that the three primal constituents were salt, sulphur and mercury. Modern discovery has furnished sixty three substances, called elementary because they resist decomposition into simpler substances, which are said to form, by their combinations, all substances found in nature. Dumas, the French chemist, asserts that it is impossible to prove that the bodies reputed simple are undecomposable. There is moreover such striking family resemblances between some chemical bodies, as Chlorine, Iodine and Bromine, that would lead us to the belief they are different forms of one and the same substance. Without having proof as yet of the idea that many of the elements are compound substances, we think that a light is about breaking on Chemical science which will reveal a nearer relation between its elementary bodies than is admitted at present,—and which will make much simple and intelligible that is now obscure. That this is no vague dream the late researches of Schönbein will clearly show. Surely every school boy fully understood the properties of Oxygen gas, and yet we find there is reason to believe that it is a compound body, consisting of substances known as ozone and

antozone, and these, combining with others, are capable of forming those substances which have heretofore been considered elements. But, we must pass on to subjects, elucidated by science, of more general interest.

Science is not only changing the nature of warfare by her improvements in weapons of offense, but also in supplying the adjuvants required for the proper conduct of a battle. "At the battle of Solferino, a high degree of precision in evolution was attained by the French army, by means of the telegraph. From each corps, once in position, a horseman rode off to the next division, unrolling on his rapid course a light wire, which no time was lost in adapting to a field apparatus; and the process was repeated all along the French line of twelve miles. Hence the movement of the whole army was known and regulated like clock-work, on that decisive day. This arrangement had been planned in Paris, and a supply of gutta-percha covered metal thread forwarded with secrecy and dispatch."\* Not satisfied with this novelty, the sagacious French Emperor employs M. Godard, the aeronaut, to make observations of the enemy, and obtain accurate information of the disposition of the latter. The balloon puts at the command of the commanding officer "a tower of great altitude, whence to contemplate all the surrounding country." It is only necessary to ascend to the height of several hundred metres and it may be held down by cords whilst an officer makes his observations." The Piedmontese government have gone even still further: M. Porro "has invented an apparatus by means of which it is possible to take a panorama rigorously exact of the whole horizon, in three proofs, by an operation that can be accomplished in a few minutes." Here then are three scientific discoveries brought to the aid of war, and made to do effective service in time of battle.

But this very subject of light-painting or Heliography as the men of science call it,—what wonders has it not already

\* Annual, 140.

displayed? what wonders has it not yet in store for mankind? Every one knew from experience that in the moral world association would always leave a mark more or less inefaceable, and evil communications are known to corrupt good manners; but it was a discovery of the nineteenth century that, in the material world, proximity as well as contact would also leave a mark more or less indellible. Acting on this principle,—striving to make permanent the image which the rays of light, reflected from an object, have the power of making, Daguerre, and others laboring in the same department of science, succeeded in the wonderful discovery of the art of sun-printing or Heliography. Improvement upon improvement in this art has demanded attention, during the last twenty years, so that we have lost the capacity even of wondering at its advances, since they have become every day occurrences. With these improvements, operators have learned to shorten the time required for catching the image of the object and fastening it as it were on the sensitive material. Formerly minutes were required to produce any permanent impression; now, with the skillful operator a second is a very long period. The experiments of Mr. Waterhouse show that an image could be produced in the 1-9000th of a second, and "that when wet collodion was employed, one third of this time only was requisite, or 1-27000th of a second. This duration, however, inconceivably short as it appears, will seem to be a tolerable length of time, where we try to bring the mind to appreciate the rapidity with which Mr. Talbot performed his crucial experiment at the Royal Institution, when he photographed a rapidly revolving wheel, illumined with a single discharge of an electric battery. To a casual observer, or reader of this experiment, the wonderful part appears to be, that the wheel appeared perfectly well defined and stationary in the photograph, although in reality it was being rotated with as great a velocity as multiplying wheels could communicate to it. A little further consideration will, however, show that the time occupied in the revolution of the wheel was a planetary cycle compared

with the duration of the illuminating spark, which according to the most beautiful and trustworthy experiments of Wheatstone, only occupies the *millionth* part of a second." And as a companion to this experiment let us refer our readers to that of Mr. Skaife at Woolwich, consisting in the taking of a stereoscopic photograph of a bursting shell. This was taken just as the shell emerged from the smoke, and exhibited "three-eighths of an inch of the projectile's track, commencing at a distance of eighteen times the shell's diameter (18 in.) above the mortar, and 1½ inch visual distance above the head of the superintending officer in front. \*\* Particular attention is however called to a likeness of the human head, which so distinctly dominates in the smoke. The phantom does not appear to be the result of chance, for, on repeating this experiment, it is invariably reproduced at a certain phase of the smoke's expansion. Further, the apparition is not, nor can it, I believe, be seen by the human eye, excepting through the medium of photography, which, in its highest instantaneity, appears to eternize time, by giving, at the photographer's will, a series of pictures of things, which have their birth, marked phases of existence, and extinction, in a moment (from the 20th to the 20.000th part of a second), much too fleeting to be noted by the naked eye."

If material agents enable man to discern objects that are otherwise not recognizable by his senses,—if the telescope reveals to him the worlds which people the immensity of space and the microscope the inhabitants of the tiniest particle of matter,—if photography fixes the record of actions almost as quick as thought;—if such wonders are being revealed to us through the refinements of science, are we not prepared to believe in greater wonders when the scales shall be freed from our eyes,—when the senses shall be freed from the imperfections, through which they now act, and shall be the inmates of a spiritual body. Every day shows the student of nature the truth involved in the great dramatist's words:

There are more things in heaven and earth,  
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.

While accuracy in experimentation and profound study have revealed us the phenomena of light, sound has not been neglected. The *Phonautograph* has been invented, and sound is made to register its vibrations, so that a faithful reproduction may be secured of all its curves. The aged *Abbe Moigno* exhibited to the British Association, the results of this invention in a collection of sheets of paper, "on which were self-registered the sounds of the human voice, organ pipes, &c., to the amount of five hundred or a thousand vibrations." Is it a wild dream that "the phonautograph will eventually be made capable of superseding every species of stenography, and not only the words, but the very tones of our talented speakers and actors will, by its aid, be registered for future generations." Madame Daguerre thought her husband mad when he endeavored to render the images in the camera permanent. Let us profit by her example and not reject the embryo of a discovery, which may be also developed to like gigantic proportions.

Some attention has been paid during the last year to the gradual elevation of the concert pitch of our musical instruments. The pitch is based upon very strict and accurate mathematical calculations. The increased elevation of pitch, which has gradually crept into favor all over the world, was first occasioned, it is believed, by the makers of wind instruments,—as by its elevation, greater sonorousness and brilliancy are obtained for such instruments. The 4 of the scale is now a whole tone higher than it was a century ago, as is shown by a comparison of wind instruments and church bells, made then, with those at present manufactured. The attention of distinguished singers has been directed to this evil. Difficulty has been found in executing vocally certain pieces of music unless they were transposed in a lower key. Some, trying to adhere to the composer's key, have converted what should be dulcet sounds into ear piercing shrieks. Jenny Lind stated that "there was a considerable amount of music that she could not think of singing at the present pitch; and music which she sang

with the greatest ease about twelve years ago, when the pitch was lower, she could not now attempt."

In view of "the increasing elevation of the diapason presenting inconveniences to music, composers, musicians and instrument makers," the French Emperor appointed a Commission to investigate the subject and to report upon the same. The Commission consisted of fourteen members, comprising eminent musicians, composers and professors of physica. A report has been made by this Commission, recommending that a standard diapason be adopted, and that all the musical establishments, under government control, be obliged to adopt the same. For those of our readers who may wonder how a standard could be prepared, we may mention that a certain number of vibrations will always form one definite sound. All that was necessary in determining the new standard, was to declare how many vibrations shall represent a certain note. In the time of Louis XIV. A consisted of 810 simple vibrations, while, in modern times at the Grand Opera in Paris it had risen to 898. The French Commission have reduced it to 870 vibrations. This will in the course of time reach other countries, and the reduction of the diapason will be welcomed by vocalists with much delight.

*Weights and measures* continue to attract the attention of the powerful nations of the globe. So much is dependent on the accuracy of these for the existence of harmonious relations among mankind, that we can readily understand the injunction of Moses—to have a perfect and just weight, a perfect and just measure—and the declaration that those who have divers weights and divers measures "are an abomination unto the Lord." Each government reserves to itself the right of fixing the standards of *its* weights and measures. This has given us different standards, producing confusion and trouble in commercial intercourse between nations. Commissioners have been appointed by the principal nations to discuss this subject, and if possible to present some plan or system which could be adopted by all, thus establishing uniformity of weights and mea-

sures wherever civilization extends its influences. Nothing as yet has been done that bids us hope any speedy relief from our difficulties. Each nation seems so wedded to its own system, that it will be difficult for all to throw away old prejudices, and unite upon a compromise plan. Our own decimal coinage, and its convenience, suggests naturally the idea that *decimal* weights and measures would be the best. A late writer on the subject objects to this on the ground that a decimal system is really inconvenient because of the difficulty in making up fractional portions, and suggests that an octonary system be adopted, all weights, measures, &c., being regulated by series of eights. It is true this would require us to give up our entire system of notation, but the author thinks that would be of little account, and presents a system which is certainly curious, as it contains substitutes for all the old names used in computation at present;

Un.	Du.	The.	Fo.	Pa.	Se.	Ki.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
Unty.	Duty.	Thety.	Foty.	Paty.	Sety.	Kity.
8	16	24	32	40	48	56
Under.	Duder.	Theder.	Foder.	Pader.	Seder.	Kider.
64	128	192	256	320	384	448

We shall not transfer the author's tables of weights and measures, which are equally as singular to the eye and as harsh sounding to the ear. May the future only furnish us some clue to the labyrinthine mazes which now surround the subject!

Every new occupation necessarily places man in new relations to those causes which produce disease. The question of the effect of railroads on the mortality-bills is beginning now to be agitated with some interest among statisticians and hygienists. The data collected are hardly sufficient to justify any conclusions as yet, though it may be interesting to see how much that is of importance is contained in this apparently unattractive subject. We shall present some thoughts from Dr. Figuier's book on this subject, which struck us forcibly in our examination.

Railroads must bear some of the blame for the increase of nervous diseases. This is particularly the case where their daily aid is employed to transfer business men from rural or suburban residences to their places of business. Dr. Wirm of London says "the fear of being left behind, produces a sort of febrile excitement which acts at length injuriously on the nervous system. Failure to be in time for the train, requires one to seek the hotel for lodging and meals, occasioning worry and annoyance to the traveller and his family who are awaiting his arrival. This condition of affairs, continued for a long time, tends to the production of nervous attacks and cerebral congestion." The same effects are noticed as occurring in Paris where this continuous state of anxiety has been prolific in injury to health.

Another question, however is of interest to the casual as well as the habitual traveller, and that is the comparison of accidents on railroads, and in the old mode of conveyance by horsepower. Most persons, looking superficially at this subject, would say that the number of accidents is much greater now than years ago, and hence conclude that the per centage of accidents was also greater. Such a conclusion would, however, be very erroneous, as one will see by comparing statistics. From 1846 to 1855, there were 20 killed and 238 wounded in a total of 7,109,276 passengers in French *Diligences*, giving 1 wounded out of 29,871 travellers, and 1 killed out of 355,453. From 1835 to 1856, there were 111 killed and 402 wounded out of 224,345,769 persons traveling on French railroads, giving the proportion of 1 wounded out of 558,071, and 1 killed out of 2,021,183. Thus the danger of being wounded was eighteen times greater, and of being killed five times, by the diligence mode of conveyance than by the railroad. The ratio does not differ very much from that furnished by the statistics of other roads, and we are right in claiming, for this mode of travel, safety as well as convenience, comfort and speed, which are admitted by every one.

Steam has been brought into use in our cities as the motor for fire-engines, which have heretofore only been

worked at the expense of human muscle. We are indebted to the United States for this application of steam, and water is made to combat fire, being urged on to the conflict by the same agent. The existence of fire companies employing hand-engines has been a fruitful source of the destruction of young men in our cities. The engine houses were centres of attraction for the idle and unemployed, who soon became experts in all the acquirements of the worthless. The spirit of rivalry between the companies engendered quarrels and bloody encounters, and seemed to be entirely beyond the control of ordinary legislation. The steam fire-engines, requiring but few men, have necessarily destroyed the old companies and paved the way for the formation of paid fire-departments in our cities, thus removing the evils which the old system had produced. We consider the steam fire-engine as a most excellent contribution towards public morals, and never see one, in its quiet contest with the destructive element, without a feeling of thankfulness to that Providence which has enabled the human brain to use steam for so many of the wants and necessities of the race.

But steam is not hereafter to confine its usefulness to manufactures, to means of conveyance or even to the working of fire-engines. The farmer is demanding that it should work for him. For years he has contented himself with plough-tillage of his land, not on account of any special advantage it possesses over spade-husbandry, but because human labor had become too valuable to employ it in such operations as lightening soil for agricultural purposes.—In fact “the plough now in use is merely a barbarous implement, planned in rude days, for enabling horses to do man's work. The spade lifts up the soil in mass, turns it over, and leaves it evenly spread as a loosened, porous bed; but the plough-share, on the other hand, squeezes down and condenses one part, while it loosens and turns up another.” The problem for solution is, how can the farmer obtain the advantages of spade-husbandry without the necessity of employing manual labor. Already attempts have

been made at the solution, with more or less success. Steam—the slave of man—has been harnessed to the plough and we may discern the beginning of an era in husbandry when the steam-engine shall be one of the regular pieces of machinery found on every farm. A native of Lancaster Co., Pa., has contrived a steam plough, which demonstrates “the practicability of employing steam for ploughing, and other farm purposes.” This, we trust, is but the beginning of a series of useful inventions, having as their end, the adaptation of steam to arts which have heretofore been carried on only by manual labor. One may conceive the gratification that all this would give the heart of Roger Bacon, could he but see how real and true have become many of the dreams that floated through his mind centuries ago.

The mechanic arts, under the influence of scientific discovery, have not been at rest during the past year. Great bridges have been completed, wondrous ships constructed, and other indications that the restless spirit of man has been active. The Victoria bridge, over the St. Lawrence at Montreal, is the proudest monument of engineering skill that has ever been thrown across a river. This bridge is nearly two miles in length. The difficulties to be overcome in its structure arise not only from the width of the river, its depth and rapid current. “There was another obstacle—far more formidable than all. In the winter season, the St. Lawrence presents a field of ice from three to five feet thick. Whilst it is thus frozen, the river rises sometimes as much as twenty feet above its summer level.” When the ice breaks up, in the spring, “a field of ice, probably nine miles long and from four to five feet thick, threatens destruction by its weight to any structure that may be in its way.” These difficulties have been overcome;—an iron bridge has been constructed, with a weight of 100,000 tons, which is strong enough to meet the requirements of the case, and the arrival of the heir apparent to the British crown is awaited for the insertion of the cap-stone which shall complete the whole. But Canada is bound to the United States at Niagara by a bridge, which would

have been considered still more wonderful, some years since. The Victoria bridge is supported on massive piers, which have been built in the river,—the Niagara suspension bridge floats, as it were, in mid air, 250 feet above the level of the river, supported by suspension cables made of steel wire, and deviating but ten inches when loaded with a train of cars weighing 326 tons. This wonderful bridge is situated a short distance below the falls, that have commanded the silent awe of man for centuries, so that nature and art here combine to manifest the power of Him, who made the one and put it in the mind of man to contrive the other with its admixture of strength and beauty. The roar of the mighty waters no more certainly hymns forth the praise of its great Creator, than the beauty of the triumph of art attests how great was the gift to man of the mind that could conceive, and the hands that could execute it.

“Earth, with her thousand voices, praises God,”

and man, with the cunning skill which his Maker has given him, joins in the chorus, whether his praise come from a willing or an unwilling heart.

The construction of the Leviathan of naval art—the Great Eastern—deserves also a passing notice, before we leave this portion of our subject. We are aware that circumstances have prevented the trial of this monster at any distance from shore, and it may be that no direct practical benefit will result to her owners from her construction, yet we dare not say that the time and money, expended on this vessel, have been thrown away, when we look upon it as embodying the vast conceptions that the progress of civilization has enabled man to form of the *future* wants of his race. The Great Eastern has been constructed before the needs of commerce demanded such a vessel, yet how wonderfully does it exhibit the fact that man’s ingenuity will be equal to any demands that may be made upon it, or rather that he shall be endowed with the faculty of constructing whatever the wants of his race shall require, whenever these wants shall obtain an articulate utterance. Who can doubt in the capacity of Noah’s ark, when he learns

that the Great Eastern is capable of carrying with comfort four thousand souls on board; and that "her whole weight when voyaging, with every contemplated article on board, is estimated at not less than twenty-five thousand tons!"

A peculiarity of modern Chemistry is its ability to imitate certain organic compounds, through the mutual reactions of others possessed of very dissimilar properties. Public attention was attracted to this, more especially at the time of the great London Exhibition, through the report of one of the Juries. Certain artificial fruit essences were exhibited, so perfectly imitating the natural fruits, that detection was difficult, if not impossible. These substances are employed in confectionery to flavor preparations of sugar known as fruit drops, lozenges, &c.,—and in the perfumer's art to give scent to soaps, or in the liquor-dealer's laboratory to convert ordinary whiskies and brandies into close imitations of those that have been improved by the mellowing effects of age. The sources of these fruit essences are indeed very singular, and show what a transmuting power chemistry has on all forms of matter. It cannot endow a particle of inorganic matter with the attributes of that which is organic, but give it organic matter and it will produce changes well calculated to challenge our wonder.

One of the most interesting of these essences is that imitating the oil of bitter almonds, which has been known for many years, but only applied to practical use about the time of the great exhibition. Every one knows the peculiar taste of the bitter almond and the peach leaf,—and has probably enjoyed it in some of the desserts which the cook has prepared for his table. The imitation article is nitro-benzole, and may be formed in several ways, depending upon the action that nitric acid has upon the substance benzole, which is one of the liquid products obtained in the distillation of coal gas. It may also be obtained from hippuric acid, "which is extracted from the drainage of our stables." From such sources, by no means savory or attractive, this artificial oil of bitter almonds is obtained,

which afterwards constitutes an attractive characteristic of toilet soaps, or of custards and puddings. Pear oil, used to flavor lozenges, has an equally unattractive origin. Associated with the whisky obtained from potatoes and corn is a peculiar fiery product, known as *fusel oil*. It is this which gives the pernicious quality to the commoner varieties of whisky, speedily closing up the careers of those who use them habitually, and whose effects have been attributed, by the ignorant, to the presence of strychnia. Its odor is that which pours forth, with other vile fumes, itself more potent than the rest, from the low groggeries that infest our cities; but when distilled along with acetic acid, the result is the chemical compound—the acetate of oxide of amyl or *pear oil*. If the same fusel oil be distilled along with bichromate of potash and sulphuric acid, we have, as the result artificial, apple oil. The pine apple oil has an origin still more repulsive. This is a butyrate of oxide of ethyl, and is obtained from butyric acid and ethyl. Butyric acid gives the peculiar penetrating odor which we find in sauerkraut and rancid butter, but when combined with the ethyl the result is the delicate odor of the pine apple, to be employed in flavoring rum or the lozenges, made of sugar and starch or plaster of paris, which are sold at such attractively cheap rates on our rail road cars. But of the transmutation of matter much has been said since the philosophic reflections of Hamlet; Dr. Playfair, presents thus some striking results: "The horse shoe nails, dropped in the streets during the daily traffic, are carefully collected, and reappear in the form of swords and guns. The clippings of the traveling tinker are mixed with the parings of horses' hoofs from the smithy, or with cast-off woolen garments, and soon afterwards, in the form of dyes of brightest blue, grace the dresses of courtly dames. The main ingredient of the ink, with which we write, was possibly once part of the broken hoop of an old beer-barrel. The bones of dead animals yield the chief constituent of Lucifer matches. The dregs of port wine, carefully rejected by the port wine drinker in decanting his favorite

beverage, are taken by him in the morning, in the form of seidlitz powders, to remove the effects of his debauch. The offal of the streets and the washings of coal gas reappear carefully preserved in the lady's smelling bottle, or are used by her to flavor blanc-manges for her friends."

Among the suggestions of new articles of food may be mentioned that of blood. A German, by the name of Steinroth, proposes that beeves shall be fed with the view of using their blood, obtained by venesection at stated periods. This proposition, worthy of an Abyssinian, on account of its cruelty, has been favorably received by some students of political economy, among whom we are surprised to find Dr. Figuier. The use of blood in food is not peculiar to any country. Germans and Swedes, with many of our country of German descent, employ it in the form of pudding, &c. This is not the point of objection. It is the cruelty of abstracting, from an animal in health, that liquid which is essential to health. The removal of milk is a different thing, as milk is a secretion which must be removed from the animal system. We have too much confidence in the humanity of even scientific experimenters to believe that any supporters will be found among them for Steinroth's suggestion. We are willing that it should only be said of the Adjebas, of the valley of Sobat, "that they raise large herds solely for the purpose of subjecting them to stated bleedings, with the view of employing the blood as food."

While speaking of food, the singular researches of Pouchet, on the substances which are always a component portion of the air, deserve notice. It seems that the air always contains greater or less quantities of minute particles of organic or inorganic matter. This atmospheric detritus constitutes what is known as dust, and its composition is very curious, containing portions of all kinds of matter on which *tempus edax rerum* has laid its destructive hand. Pouchet examined microscopically dust from the cornices of houses, garrets, churches, &c. It consists of mineral and organic substances—the first are furnished by the detritus of the

minerals peculiar to the country. The second come from the animal as well as the vegetable kingdom. The animal kingdom furnishes silicious skeletons of infusoria, fragments of insects, the tissues of which our clothing is made, and a thousand other curious relics of life and activity, now borne about by the passing wind, so that the atmosphere has become, as it were, a Golgotha of the remote past. The particles from the vegetable kingdom are as follows: "Fragments of tissues of different plants, ligneous fibres, fragments of cellules and vessels, down from the nettle and kindred plants, portions of the egrets of compound flowers, many cotton filaments, ordinarily white, but sometimes of other colors, pollengrains, &c., &c." The substance, however, which is present in greatest abundance, is fecula, or starch. It seems to bid defiance to changes, in its atmospherical home, more successfully than any of its companions. Grains of starch, found in the dust collected in the tombs of Upper Egypt, responded to the proper tests just as the starch obtained from the vegetable of yesterday. Starch grains from the time of Sesostris and the Pharaohs were found identical with that of the present time.

M. Pouchet, with the view of testing the general distribution of these starch granules, extended his investigations over a wide space. He examined dust from various localities, the monuments of cities as well as those in deserts, inland and seashore localities, and the starch was always found as if gifted with the property of indefinite preservation. Its antiquity is very striking; he found it in the most inaccessible retreats of old gothic churches mixed with the blackened dust of six or eight centuries, in the palaces and hypogea of Thebes, in the hidden windings of Gothic monuments which had not been entered within the memory of man; and in the interior of the tympanum of a mummied dog taken from a subterranean temple in Upper Egypt.

Whence all the starch? M. Pouchet thinks that its source is the wheat or corn used for food. Its presence is

in proportion to the density of the population in the regions where it is found, and it diminishes as we explore monuments more remote from the habitations of men. Thus no starch granules were found in the temple of Jupiter Serapis on the banks of the Gulf of Baiae, nor in that of Venus Athor on the confines of Nubia.

These discoveries of Pouchet, while their practical importance may not be very clearly defined to the mere utilitarian, still suggest to the philosopher material for thought. Man, with all his wonderful reasoning faculties, has but an ephemeral existence as compared with that of the particles of food, which thus pass through ages, until finally the microscope of the naturalist recognizes them, as possessed of all their original chemical and physical properties. A grain of starch from Egypt, from the time of the Pharaohs,—who knows that it may not have been a portion of that very corn which Joseph had gathered “as the sand of the sea?” But we dare not trust the imagination with the idea, lest our article grow beyond its intended limits,—we leave it with the reader as a subject for meditation.

Along with scientific discovery, there has been death among men of science during the past year. Brunel, Henfrey, Lardner, Lassaigne, Mather, Nichol, Nuttall, Olmstead, Carl Ritter, Soubeiran, Wilson, and, *primus inter pares*, Baron Alexander von Humboldt, have been called to render up an account of their labors,—to show whether, amid their career of scientific discovery, they have found that all things were made by One, in whom we live, and move, and have our being. To Him let us leave the decision of the question, whether they have been faithful to their trusts, while we avail ourselves of the discoveries they have announced.

Baltimore, Md.

L. H. S.

## ART. VI.—RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

**HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH TO THE REFORMATION.**  
From the German of Professor KURTZ; with emendations and additions by the Rev. Alfred Edersheim, Ph. D., Author of "History of the Jewish Nation." Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 38, George Street. 1860.

The preface of the translator gives us no information concerning the different works of Dr. Kurtz, on the same subject. We will supply this defect. Dr. Johann Heinrich Kurtz, a pupil of Tholuck and Neander, formerly professor in the Gymnasium of Mitau, now professor at the German Russian University of Dorpat, has written no less than six historical works, three on Sacred or Biblical History, and three on Church History, of three different sizes, small, middle and large, the first for College-students, the second for Seminary—or theological students, and the third for scholars. Of his three Biblical Histories two are now translated, the one of middle size in one volume by Prof. Dr. Schäffer of Gettysburg, and the largest one in three volumes by Rev. Alfred Edersheim of Aberdeen in Scotland. Of his Church Histories the smallest one is a mere compend for beginners and hardly worth translating, unless Church History should be introduced as a regular study into the junior or senior classes of our Colleges, as is the case in German Gymnasia. The largest one, which he calls *Handbuch der allgemeinen Kirchengeschichte* and which is to embrace at least three volumes in several parts, is not yet finished, having been commenced only in 1853. The one of middle size, called *Lehrbuch der Kirchengeschichte*, or as it is familiarly called in Germany Kurtz's *Studentenbuch*, is now brought before the Anglo-American public by the same Scotch translator in the elegant and solid dress of the publications of my friend, Mr. Clark of Edinburg, and can be had at the rooms of Messrs. Smith & English, in Sixth street above Chestnut, Philadelphia, one of the very best and cheapest book stores in America.

The original of this middle sized Church history contains but one volume which through the various editions following each other in rapid succession (the first was published in 1849, the fourth and last in 1860) has swollen up to over seven hundred closely printed pages. The translator divides it into two volumes. The first goes to the Reformation, the second, which is promised in the preface, will bring the history down to the present day. In the latter, the author contemplates a number of changes with a view to adapt the book more fully to the Calvinistic churches of the British race. In the first volume, too, he has introduced several chapters of his own on Wycliffe and the Lollards, Hus and the Bohemian brethren, Humanism in England and Scotland. As to the propriety of such changes there will, of course, be a difference of opinion, many preferring an author just as he is, even with his defects. In the end, it is doubtful whether any German work can fully satisfy the wants of the English and American reader. We must and will have in due time a Church history of native growth, reviewing the whole history of Christ's kingdom on earth down to its latest phase and prospects in the new world, and doing full justice to America as well as Europe. But in order to rouse our historical energies we must have this foreign stimulus furnished by the almost inexhaustible stores of modern German research:

As to the merits of Kurtz's *Lehrbuch* and its prospects to a favorable reception of its translation, there can be little difference of opinion. A man who writes so many works on the same subject can, indeed, hardly be an independent master, striking out new avenues of thought and investigation and furnishing a classical work of lasting authority and value. Gibbon, Neander and Gieseler, devoted the energies of their life to one grand work which has outlived them and will be consulted for many generations to come.

But in addition to such large and permanent works for the careful study of the advanced scholar we need compendious and popular reproductions for more general use and circulation, and the more they are based upon original research, the better.

Among these compendious Church histories for the use of Seminaries we give Knitz decidedly the preference. Kurtz is orthodox and evangelical in sentiment, just and liberal in judgment, clear and fluent in style. He has a keen eye for the salient points in history and a power of condensation almost equal to

that of Hase. We have now translations of the compendious Church histories of Hase, Guericke and Kurtz, besides the large works of Neander and Gieseler. Hase's manual is unique in its kind and will always retain its value as a real master piece of the rare art of historical miniature painting, but it is altogether unsuited as a text book in America, owing to its want of evangelical spirit and its enigmatic brevity and pregnancy. Of Guericke's work we have a translation in part by Prof. Schedd of Andover, covering the first six centuries, but we doubt whether he will continue it. If so, he would be obliged to make radical changes to adapt it to English and American taste and use. For Guericke, while he is slavishly dependent on Neander in the history preceding the Reformation, has written the history of the Reformation and the subsequent periods in the spirit and interest of an intolerant and exclusive Lutheranism and in ignorance of, and injustice to, the Reformed and Calvinistic type of Christianity. Besides, his method is intolerably heavy and confused, and his style proverbially complicated and uncouth. Whatever is good in Guericke and gave it its temporary value and popularity, namely, its decided positive Christian and churchly tone, is found in Kurtz, without the defects. Kurtz's Manual is equally positive, and far more liberal, comprehensive, clear, and polished. We have no doubt that it will soon supersede Guericke's work altogether even in Germany. For England and this country it is infinitely better adapted, and we predict for it a large sale and popularity similar to the excellent translation of his "Sacred History" by Prof. Schäffer.

English and American theology is fast getting Germanized by the rapid succession of translations. The prejudices against these foreign importations are fast passing away, and no minister can lay claim now to a thorough education, nor keep progress with the age without some knowledge of German or Anglo-German literature. Perhaps in the course of time American theology, as it will grow out of this connection of two national modes of thought, may repay its debt by Americanizing the European theology. A reacting influence has already commenced, and American literature is beginning to attract the attention even of German divines who used to be far better at home in the remotest corners of antiquarian research than in the living development of American Christianity. Kurtz man-

ifests in the latter part of his Church history a much better knowledge and juster appreciation of the German Churches of this country, derived from recent works of an Anglo-American divine, than either Gieseler, or Guericke or Hase, although even he is far from doing full justice to this interesting branch of modern Church history.

P. S.

SERMONS BY JOSEPH ADDISON ALEXANDER, D. D. 2 vols. New York: Charles Scribner, No. 124, Grand Street. 1860.

Here we have two volumes of sermons from the manuscripts of the lamented Dr. J. Addison Alexander of Princeton, most elegantly printed and furnished with a striking likeness of the author. Dr. J. Addison Alexander, besides being regarded as the most learned divine of the American Presbyterian Church, enjoyed a high reputation as a preacher. The sermons here given to the public were all actually delivered in Princeton, New York, Philadelphia and other places. One of them we heard ourselves in New York, and can testify to their impressiveness. They are impregnated with Gospel truths and written in a style as happy, pure and smooth as the productions of the celebrated English essayist whose name he bore. We could wish for a greater variety and an alternation of light and shade, of sunshine and thunder, of breeze and torrent. The highest order of style, it seems to us, varies with the subject and clothes every idea with such language as is best adapted to express it. So nature's beauty is not uniform, but changes with every season and every clime. The sermons of Dr. Alexander will, of course, be widely circulated, especially in the Old School Presbyterian Church and among his numerous admiring pupils and hearers. We regret the absence of a fixed order and method in the arrangement of the Sermons, and of a Memoir by the unknown editor (probably a brother of the author) which would have added to the value of the publication. For ourselves we greatly prefer hearing a sermon, and very seldom read one. But we have at least cursorily looked over these two volumes with a melancholy pleasure and respect for the memory of one of the most gifted American divines who was taken from us at the very height of his power and usefulness. But though dead he yet speaketh.

P. S.

A CRITICAL DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LITERATURE, and British and American Authors, living and deceased, from the earliest accounts to the middle of the nineteenth century. Containing thirty thousand biographies and literary notices, with forty indexes of subjects. By S. AUSTIN ALLIBONE. Vol. I. Philadelphia: Childs & Peterson, 602 Arch street. 1859. (The first edition was published in 1854.)

A truly national work, which should adorn the library of every gentleman of education and taste. It will be found an invaluable book of reference on almost any name and topic relating to British and American authorship and literature. The reader may be sure to find here, with rare exceptions, just the kind of instruction which he seeks, and the oftener he uses it, the more will he prize it and admire the zeal, industry and skill of the author. It gains upon acquaintance in proportion to the knowledge of the immense field which it covers. It throws its predecessors far into the shade both as to fulness and accuracy of information. It is an imperishable monument to the worthy author with whom it is a labor of love and the work of his life, to the publishers, who have ventured on so heavy an outlay with no hope of immediate returns, although with a certain prospect of ultimate success, and an honor to America whose chief glory, like that of every other people, as Dr. Johnson justly remarks, must arise from its authors. This is high praise, indeed, but not higher than has been bestowed upon the work by many of the most distinguished literary men of the age, who are far more able to judge of its merits than we, such as Macaulay, Tennyson, Cardinal Wiseman, of England, Washington Irving, Prescott, Everett, Bancroft, Ticknor, Bryant, Woolsey, Felton, Ch. Hodge, G. S. Hillard, Francis Lieber and many others of America, whose recommendations are prefixed to the first volume.

We do not mean, of course, that the book is perfect, which can be said of no human work. We could wish many articles to be more positive and characteristic. The article on *Hore*, for instance, neglects to mention his famous library which is said to have been the most extensive and judiciously selected of all the private libraries of England, his work on *Luther* which is the best critical vindication of the German reformer in the English language, his peculiar, though by no means

commendable method of composition which throws the principal matter into the notes (as in the "Mission of the Comforter"), his interesting relations to Bunsen, Arnold, Coleridge, and especially to the so called Broad Church school of Anglican Theology, of which he, in connection with Coleridge and Arnold, may be said to be the chief founder. The article on Dr. Berg makes no mention of his prominent antagonism to "Merricksburg Theology," which constitutes the most eventful chapter in his literary history. The article on Brownson gives no clear idea either of the philosophy or theology of this principal periodical champion of Romanism in the United States. Under Gladstone his best literary production, the work on Homer is omitted. Of *Samuel Taylor Coleridge's* philosophy and theology we get no clear idea, and his relation to the system of Schelling is not even alluded to. But while we might point out many similar defects, we must admire the general accuracy of a work of such proportions and such a variety of information.

It gives us also special pleasure to add another praise to the recommendations of the eminent scholars prefixed to the volume. *It is the healthy moral and even religious tone which pervades the whole.* This is certainly one of the highest excellencies of a work of this kind, which will be consulted, and frequently consulted by scholars of every profession, clerical, legal, medical and philosophical, as well as by non-professional men of literary culture. We quote as a specimen, Mr. Allibone's remarks on the scepticism of Gibbon, of whose immortal historical work he speaks in language of well merited praise.

"We confess," says Mr. Allibone, p. 663, "to so ardent an admiration of this truly great author, that it is with pain we are obliged to advert to his grave errors, for which genius, however exalted, learning however profound, and diction, however splendid, can make no adequate atonement. Not for the genius of Homer, the wealth of the Indies, nor 'all the learning of the Egyptians,' would we be willing to write one line calculated to disturb the faith of the humblest Christian in that inspired Word which hath God for its Author, Truth for its substance, and Salvation for its end.' In a world of trial, sorrow, and temptation, 'let no impious hand presume to assail that Ark of Refuge and Consolation which Divine mercy has provided for the guilt and misery of humanity.'

The first volume of Allibone's Dictionary was stereotyped and first published in 1854, but in the present edition the author at a large expense (of over one thousand dollars, I believe) has made such corrections and additions in the plates as to

bring it down to 1859. It covers over 1000 large and closely printed pages.

We shall gladly and more fully return to this standard work when we shall see the second and last volume, for the early completion of which we wish the esteemed author an abundance of health, leisure, patience and peace of mind, and above all the blessing of Him, the promotion of whose glory should be our highest aim in literature and art, as well as in theology and religion.

P. S.

BISHOP BUTLER'S ANALOGY OF RELIGION, NATURAL AND REVEALED, TO THE CONSTITUTION AND COURSE OF NATURE. Edited, with an analysis, by J. T. Champlin, D. D., President of Waterville College. Boston: John P. Jewett & Co. 1860.

Butler's Analogy calls for no commendation nor extended notice. This compact argument has stood the test for more than a century; and to the present day has not been superseded by any work in the English language.

Dr. Champlin has edited a beautiful Edition, well adapted, as to type and general style, to the purposes of a text-book. Its chief peculiarity, which is of great advantage to the student, is an analysis of the argument incorporated with the text; the longer paragraphs being divided, and each having a statement of the subject or point discussed, prefixed to it.

E. V. G.

BOMBERGER'S HERZOG'S ENCYCLOPEDIA:—Part XI. of Dr. Bomberger's Translation of Herzog's Ecclesiastical and Theological Encyclopedia has been placed on our table. It runs from article *Heliogabalus* to article *Inspiration*. The further this work advances the more we are constrained to marvel at the immense resources of German learning and prompted to thank Dr. Bomberger for undertaking the Herculean task of transferring these treasures into the English tongue. As far as we have examined, there is a marked improvement in the quality of the translations. No minister or student, who desires to keep pace with the march of theological science and Church history, should fail to procure this work and place it on his book-shelves for constant reference. It gathers together and brings within his reach vast stores of useful knowledge, which have long been lying buried in the dusty recesses of the libraries of the Old World.